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1.	 Research Summary 
The environment and energy have been fundamental to the growth of the economy. 
This looks like a straightforward claim. But it is not. In order to understand how these 
are related, how growth came to be associated with the economy, and how this 
growth came to be seen as the unshakeable fundament of any environmental politics, 
this thesis focuses on a brief period of largely postwar history, and almost exclusively 
on a single country - America. At this time, and in this place, the technical removal of 
material constraints, the provision of energy, the construction of environmental limits 
and then their dismantling, forms the complex history of the growth of the environment 
and the environment of growth. This history created both the possibility of the 
contemporary political economy of the environment as well as its limits. This thesis 
traces the way that the economy, energy and the environment were co-constructed, 
transformed and interwoven in the US from the postwar years through to the mid 
1970s, through the assembling, application and reassembling of the economic 
techniques and technologies that defined growth, scarcity and efficiency. To this end, it 
orients itself around the impacts of the 1952 President’s Materials Policy Commission - 
known as the Paley Commission, and the think tank that was set up in its wake: 
Resources For the Future (RFF). The Paley Commission report and the RFF would, 
through their technical innovations play a key role in the construction of the economy 
as a separate, measurable and observable sphere of monetary flows, driven by an 
associated logic of exponential growth; energy as an interchangeable system of 
sources powering this economy; and the environment, initially as encompassing the 
economy and defined by finite limits, then reconstructed as external to the economy 
and where pollution is considered as an example of market failure to be rectified by the 
internalisation of externalities. 
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2.	 Introduction 
The environment and energy have been fundamental to the growth of the economy. 
This looks like a straightforward claim. But it is not. In order to understand how these 
are related, how growth came to be associated with the economy, how energy was 
understood as powering growth, and how this growth came to be seen as the 
unshakeable fundament of any environmental politics, this thesis focuses on a brief, 
quarter century period - from around 1950 to 1975 - of almost exclusively US history. 
At this time, and in this place, the ‘great acceleration’, the sudden postwar speeding 
up of economic growth, oil consumption and environmental despoliation (Steffen, 
Crutzen & McNeill 2007) began.  
This thesis tells the story of the complex, promiscuous nature of postwar growth, and 
how the great acceleration was initiated through the technical removal of material 
constraints on the economy beginning in the 1950s, the provision of a system of 
energy, the subsequent construction of environmental limits and then their dismantling 
during the 1970s. This process created both the possibility of the contemporary 
political economy of the environment as well as its limits, and in order to understand 
this brief period of history, I will begin with a letter. 
W. Stuart Symington had only been Chairman of the US National Security Resources 
Board (NSRB) for nine months when, in December 1950, he wrote to President 
Truman to formally propose a Presidential Commission on the state of the nation’s 
material resources. Symington, echoing the prevalent fears at the time, stated:  
[t]here is nothing more important to the future security of the United States than 
obtaining, now and in the future, an adequate supply of those raw materials 
necessary to build up our defences and maintain our economy. Already in many 
cases shortages of such materials are serious, and in some cases critical (cited 
in Goodwin 1981a:52-53) 
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These fears may have been prevalent in 1950, but they weren’t universally shared. For 
William S. Paley, the Columbia Broadcasting Service (CBS) Chairman, or ‘absentee 
landlord’ as he was known, given his tendency towards long and increasingly frequent 
vacations, boredom was a more pressing concern. Paley had been having trouble 
reengaging with the day-to-day running of his broadcasting company since his return 
from the second world war; and by 1950, Paley’s restlessness and ennui had been 
noticed by Frank Stanton, the CBS President. Stanton found Paley’s predicament 
perplexing, and was even more surprised when Paley’s wife, Babe, one day arrived at 
his office and declared immediately “We’ve got to do something about finding 
something interesting for Bill to do. He’s Bored” (cited in Smith 1990:311). Some time 
after Babe’s visit, Stanton was contacted by his old friend, Harry Truman. President 
Truman was looking for someone to head the commission proposed by Symington to 
analyse the nation’s natural resources, and Stanton, with Babe’s concern in mind, 
suggested Paley. And even more curiously than the palindromic quality of Babe’s 
phrasing, the something that Stanton found for Paley to do - Chair what would 
become the President’s Materials Policy Commission (PMPC), commonly referred to 
as the Paley Commission - turned out to be a rather interesting something indeed.  
The Paley Commissioners were tasked with evaluating America’s natural resource 
position and undertaking 25 year growth projections of the 'basic economic 
characteristics of our society' (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:3); and they began the first volume 
of their subsequent five volume report by stating that:  
…we share the belief of the American people in the principle of growth. Granting 
that we cannot find any absolute reason for this belief we admit that to our 
Western minds it seems preferable to any opposite, which to us implies 
stagnation and decay. (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:3) 
The Paley Commissioners would in fact begin the process of transforming the 
measurement of resource scarcity and actually securing the ‘absolute reason’ that 
escaped them at the time they wrote their report. The debate initiated by the Paley 
Commission ‘owed much to the contributions of the economists of the day who, in the 
process of diagnosing the linkages between economic growth and nature’s 
“niggardliness,” put in place the conceptual apparatus of a new political economy 
‘(Barber 1981a:206).  
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Coinciding with the timescale of the Paley Commission report’s quarter century 
projections, this thesis traces the postwar development of the the new conceptual 
apparatus of the economy, energy and the environment as they were constituted (and 
reconstituted) as abstract natural categories, oriented around the conventional wisdom 
of the ‘growth paradigm’ (Dale 2011; Purdey 2010): that continuous, limitless 
economic growth is both possible and absolutely necessary. These apparently cold, 
dumb objects of politics - the natural ‘laws of the social world’, are nothing of the sort, 
and: 
…they occupy a very different position from what the tradition had first 
thought. They are not behind the scene, above our heads and before the 
action, but after the action, below the participants and smack in the 
foreground. They don’t cover, nor encompass, nor gather, nor explain; they 
circulate, they format, they standardize, they coordinate, they have to be 
explained. (Latour 2005:246; emphasis in original) 
When the incoming Eisenhower administration declined to assume responsibility for 
ongoing assessment and analysis of material resources, William Paley helped found a 
Washington based think tank entitled Resources For the Future (RFF). RFF should be 
thought of as a kind of RAND Corporation for the economy, energy and environment. 
RAND was intimately involved in the development of a raft of economic technologies, 
from operations research, systems theory, game theory, and what the economic 
historian Philip Mirowski refers to as the reconstruction of the market as a cybernetic 
concept - the ultimate decision maker (Mirowski 2002). Similarly, RFF - following in the 
footsteps of the Paley Commission - developed or popularised a series of economic 
techniques and technologies: combining price scarcity with resource measurement in 
the form of working inventories, benefit-cost analysis (BCA), the Materials Balance 
approach to the environment, and ultimately emissions trading as the primary means 
of addressing environmental pollution resulting from the growth of the economy.  
In fact, linkages between RAND and RFF extend beyond this brute parallel. RFF was 
founded in 1952 and funded largely by the Ford Foundation, which had then recently 
been reorganised by H. Rowan Gaither Jr. who was head of the board of RAND and 
would become President of the board at the Ford Foundation in February 1953 
(Amadae 2003:34-39). Gaither’s reorganisation was undertaken explicitly to fund 
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research organisations in the RAND mould, and the USD 150,000 initial grant to RFF 
bore his imprimatur in spirit, if not his explicit stamp. There is also considerable overlap 
between the staff economists at RAND and RFF. Indeed, RFFs president through the 
late 1970s was Charles J. Hitch, who was the author of the ‘Bible of the pentagon’ in 
1960 with Roland McKean, and was the head of the RAND economic division from its 
1948 founding until he became the assistant secretary of defence under Robert 
Macnamara in 1961 - taking with him RAND’s game theoretic modelling and instituting 
the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the Department of 
Defence.  
The founding of RFF represents, as acclaimed British environmental economist David 
Pearce maintained, the beginnings of the discipline of environmental economics 
(2002:57). The organisation was also central to the founding of resource and industrial 
economics, and particularly if you look through the bibliography of any paper or book 
on emissions or carbon trading, or indeed environmental governance in general, you 
will find work generated by RFF scholars there. However, the organisation itself has 
garnered little academic or popular attention - unlike RAND. As such, in 2002, RFF 
was described in a piece in the magazine The National Journal as ‘the most important 
think tank you’ve never heard of’ (Rauch 2002). Although RFF was jointly awarded the 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 20th anniversary prize in June 2010 , the work 1
and impact of the organisation is rarely explicitly acknowledged. 
In this thesis I bring this work, and its impact, to the fore. The technical, economic 
innovations and popularisations developed by the Paley Commission and RFF 
economists would lie at the heart of the contemporary, postwar construction of the 
economy, energy and the environment. From the early postwar years the research, 
publications and workshops pioneered under the ‘Paley approach’ (Maass 1953) 
would play a key role in the postwar constitution of the ‘laws of the social 
world’ (Latour 2005:246): The economy as a separate, measurable and observable 
sphere of monetary flows, driven by an associated logic of exponential growth; energy 
as an interchangeable system of sources powering this economy; and the 
environment, initially as encompassing the economy and defined by finite ecospheric 
 The prize was awarded to a researcher or research group who had significantly contributed to 1
the development of the field of environmental and resource economics over the last 20 years, 
and was jointly shared with Harvard economist Martin L. Weitzman.
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limits, then reconstituted as external to the economy and where pollution is considered 
as an example of market failure to be rectified by the internalisation of externalities. By 
the middle of the 1970s, these developments would provide the fertile ground from 
which the current world spanning forms of environmental governance would blossom. 
The next chapter briefly summarises the conceptual coordinates of this study. 
Understanding the contemporary prioritisation of growth and the postwar composition 
of the economy, the system of energy and the environment, requires what I term a 
promiscuous historical perspective in opposition to the ‘natural histories’ explicitly or 
implicitly undertaken from anthropocene, ecomarxist and ‘climate capitalism’ 
perspectives. I argue each of these approaches presents naturalised accounts of the 
causes and drivers of economic growth, fossil fuel use and environmental despoliation 
and in response I outline the relational and performative basis of promiscuous history - 
derived from the tenets of actor network theory as a means to capture the historical 
specificity of the postwar great acceleration (Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill 2007). 
In chapter 4 I turn to the economy. Freshly minted at the end of the second world war, 
this chapter shows how the development of this new, central object of political 
concern was not immediately removed from its earthy constraints. The end of the war 
brought with it a resurgent fear of depression, stoked in the US by the economics 
profession under the influence of Alvin Hansen - the ‘American Keynes’. Depression 
and then national security fears at the beginning of the cold war resulted in the 
question of growth becoming prevalent. Could the US economy grow? Will the US 
economy grow? And in short order this led to the question: Do we have the material 
resources to grow? Fuelled by reports and popular texts at the end of the 1940s that 
reasserted Malthusian fears about the availability of metals, minerals and other 
materials President Truman authorised a comprehensive report under the leadership of 
William Paley. This report undertook a novel approach to the issue of material scarcity, 
and along with the organisation that would be instituted by Paley in its wake - 
Resources For the Future - would help secure the economy over the following 
decades as a discrete ontological object, capable of, and indeed defined by the 
capacity for infinite growth. 
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The ability, and indeed the need for growth during the cold war went hand in hand with 
the development of the system of energy to power this growth, and in chapter 5 I look 
at how the development of energy as an interrelated system has an altogether less 
straightforward relationship to its singularly most important component - oil. By the 
end of the war, oil was the world’s most important traded commodity and its flows, 
predominantly from the Middle East, would come to fuel parallel flows of money within 
the financial architecture that would be developed at Bretton Woods. However, the 
development of energy alongside the economy would rapidly come to threaten oil 
industry profits as the potential peak in domestic oil production, combined with the 
search for the lowest cost means to power the economy, meant that the historic 
government price and production supports could be withdrawn.  
This threat was overcome by the further application of the ‘Paley approach’ to oil 
reserves calculations. The application of economic accounts of scarcity enabled 
previously unimagined amounts of oil to be discovered, hidden not in the porous rocks 
of the earth, but in the apparently faulty calculations of oil geologists. The application 
of economic scarcity enabled new mandatory US government quotas that supported 
oil prices worldwide and resulted in the vast expansion of oil production through the 
1950s and 1960s and the final settling of the energy system, conceptually and 
practically around the template laid by the oil industry.  
While chapters 4 and 5 show how the economy was first stabilised as an object 
capable of infinite growth, with this growth seemingly assured through the parallel 
construction of a system of energy, in chapter 6, I trace how their construction led to 
the development of the environment through the postwar decades in explicit 
opposition to the economy. Commonly, the focus here is on the development of the 
new political movement of environmentalism around issues of pollution, or the 
ascendance of the new discipline of ecology and ecological thinking. Instead I focus 
on the less told work and impact of bureaucratic and academic economists in 
provoking the environment as matter of concern - defined by its closure and limits.  
The chapter begins by considering the transformation and translation of benefit-cost 
analysis. Originally a technique developed by the Army Corps of Engineers to evaluate 
waterway construction projects, with the arrival of the economy as a core political 
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concern, this was transformed into an economic technology enabling projects to be 
evaluated with respect to their impact on national growth. Further translated into 
postwar welfare economics theory, benefit-cost analysis was made into both a 
portable technology and at the same time became a target for a conservationist 
backlash against large scale water development projects in the 1950s. Alongside the 
development of the economy and the system of energy, pollution became a pervasive 
issue during the 1960s, and RFF fora during the period provided the arena within 
which economist Kenneth Boulding would launch his influential concept of the 
Spaceship Earth. The response to these developments from the late 1960s involved 
both the growth of limits - in the form of new federal environmental regulations at the 
beginning of the 1970s, but also the famed Limits to Growth (1972) report and the 
development of a popular antigrowth sensibility.  
In chapter 7 I show how the economy, energy and the environment, whose 
development I detailed in the previous three chapters, were brought together by the 
mid 1970s. I show how the growth of the economy was once again secured and 
installed not just as the primary concern of politics in general, but could also come to 
claim the central role it currently occupies within the politics of the environment. During 
the late 1960s the previously secure system of energy was made to look increasingly 
fragile and crisis ridden. This reconstruction was undertaken by the oil industry in order 
to raise energy prices and involved the rehabilitation of Hubbert’s peak oil notion and 
the lowering of fuel reserve estimates in general.  
Alongside this, economists - particularly those associated with RFF - helped remake 
the environment in the image of economic theory. The spread of benefit-cost 
technology through the federal government, the expansion of economic valuation and 
the rehabilitation of the concept of externalities through the development of the 
Materials Balance approach enabled the economics discipline to reassert itself with 
respect to environmental concerns. Under this approach the environment was 
reconstructed as no longer at odds with the economy. These developments would 
enable the construction of new limits to growth in the form of federally mandated 
environmental regulation, and the infinite growth of the economy was constituted as no 
longer a threat to a finite global ecology, but became instead the surest means to 
safeguarding it. 
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In the brief concluding chapter I bring together the argumentative strands running 
through this thesis. I highlight here how the economy, energy and the environment 
were constituted, translated and retranslated over a quarter century period from the 
early 1950s, in order to enable growth to occupy the place of prime political concern 
that it does today. The historical analysis undertaken here reveals how the apparent 
laws defining the economy, energy and the environment were brought to the objects 
they appear to simply define, through what technical and material means and with 
what outcomes - in terms of political contestation, reconceptualisation and the 
development of new powers and agencies. 
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3. The promiscuous h istory of 
economy, energy and environment 
The dawning of the 1950s in the US marked the beginning of the ‘[t]riumph of the 
growth paradigm’ (Dale 2011; see also Purdey 2010; Arndt 1978). Here, growth - 
broadly understood as increasing Gross National Product (GNP) , or more exactly ‘an 2
increase of the transactions made on markets (goods, labour and capital markets), 
measured in monetary terms’ (de Bruyn 2000, cited in Purdey 2010:7) would come 
into a ‘golden age’ (Dale 2011) lasting until 1973. In the US, and then throughout 
Western Europe, increasing productivity gains and the massive expansion in consumer 
goods would be seen as raising the standard of life for all people. As the fear of 
depression receded and the fear of the Soviet Union advanced, the belief in progress 
was resurrected and cast primarily as the growth of the economy necessary to out 
compete the red menace. This was accompanied by the rapid development of the 
advertising industry and its capacity to help manufacture new wants, new desires and 
new dreams alongside the corporate techno-optimism that made these dreams come 
true. As Gareth Dale put it: 
Worldwide, growth came to be seen as a proxy for the profitability of national 
economies and as a magic wand to achieve all sorts of goals: to abolish the 
danger of returning to depression, to soothe class tensions, to reduce the gap 
between “developed” and “developing” countries, to carve a path to international 
recognition, to contain the USSR, to accelerate “the transition to socialism”, and 
so on. (Dale 2011) 
Between 1950 and 1973 the average growth in world per capita GDP was 2.91 
percent and ‘[a]t no time in human history have so many people become affluent 
within one single generation’ (Pfister 2010:96). Beginning in the 1960s, a backlash 
against economic growth developed as its environmental impacts were made 
manifest. Popularised by the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report in 1972, these 
concerns would coincide with a global economic downturn and feed into the sense of 
crisis throughout the decade. This did not impinge on growth as an overriding priority 
for long however, and by 1975 the opposition of the environment and the economy 
had been undone and economic growth reinstalled as the unchallenged, paradigmatic 
concern of the nation. 
 and later Gross Domestic Product (GDP)2
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At the same time as the growth paradigm was taking off in the 1950s, the great 
acceleration (Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill 2007), or what Christian Pfister has called ‘The 
1950s syndrome’ (Pfister 2010) was also beginning to manifest itself. The postwar 
years would witness a sudden shift in the relationship between humanity and the 
global environment: 
The human enterprise suddenly accelerated after the end of the Second World 
War. Population doubled in just 50 years, to over 6 billion by the end of the 20th 
century, but the global economy increased by more than 15-fold. Petroleum 
consumption has grown by a factor of 3.5 since 1960, and the number of motor 
vehicles increased dramatically from about 40 million at the end of the War to 
nearly 700 million by 1996. From 1950 to 2000 the percentage of the world’s 
population living in urban areas grew from 30 to 50% and continues to grow 
strongly…(Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill 2007:617) 
Similarly, Pfister maintains that the explosion in global energy use - predominantly oil, 
from the 1950s, was sparked by the declining price of fossil fuels and that ‘seen in 
relation to the price of labour and capital, [this] was the most significant cause of the 
wasteful consumption of raw materials and energy, and the resulting excessive 
environmental stress’ (Pfister 2010:92). The environmental impact of the great 
acceleration was clearly documented with the rise of global atmospheric carbon 
dioxide levels, and the concomitant rise of climate change as the environmental crisis 
celebre, the emblematic problem of global environmental politics (Hajer, 1996). In 
1956, the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii first began to continuously monitor 
atmospheric changes. Shortly afterwards, during the international geophysical year of 
1957-1958, geophysicist Hans Suess and oceanographer Roger Revelle discovered 
that the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere had risen since its first 
measurement by Svante Arrhenius in the 1890s. As they put it:  
Thus, human beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical experiment 
of a kind that could not have happened in the past, nor could it be reproduced in 
the future. Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere and 
oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in sedimentary rocks over 
hundreds of millions of years. This experiment, if adequately documented, may 
yield a far-reaching insight into the processes determining weather and climate. 
(Revelle & Suess 1957, quoted in Pfister 2010:90) 
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Revelle and Suess observed a change of only 297 parts per million (ppm) from 1900 to 
about 316 ppm in 1957, and at the time maintained that any risk from climate change 
would only be felt in the far distant future due to the slow rate of increase. When they 
talked about the far future, they probably didn’t have just over fifty years in mind.  
Atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, as measured at the Mauna Loa observatory, 
reached a symbolic new high of 400 ppm on May 10th 2013 - a level not seen on earth 
for the last 3 million years (Gillis 2013). These levels were accompanied by not just a 
rising concern, but also increasing certitude that the effects of climate change are 
already being felt, or as US Secretary of State John Kerry described it during a speech 
in Jakarta, Indonesia on the 16th of February 2014, climate change is ‘perhaps the 
world’s most fearsome weapon of mass destruction’ (Gordon & Davenport 2014). On 
the very same day as the groundbreaking atmospheric carbon dioxide figures were 
released, the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index in London also closed 
on a symbolic high, in this case, the figure of 6,625. This number breached the 
psychologically important 6,600 level not seen since the pre-financial crisis days of 
October 2007, and appeared to herald, at least in the UK, what economic 
commentators and politicians fondly call ‘the green shoots of economic recovery’, that 
is - the return to growth. This specific conjunction of record-breaking emissions and 
financial market figures is coincidental, but the relationships between the objects they 
represent — the environment, energy and the economy — are anything but: 
For the 2.7 billion people now living on less than $2 a day, economic growth is 
essential to satisfying the most basic requirements of human dignity. And in 
wealthier societies, people need growth to pay off their debts. To sustain this 
growth they must expend vast amounts of energy. Yet our best energy source— 
fossil fuel—is the main thing contributing to climate change, and climate change, 
if unchecked, will halt growth. We can’t live with growth, and we can’t live 
without it. This contradiction is humankind’s biggest challenge, but as long as 
conventional wisdom holds that growth can continue forever, it’s a challenge we 
can’t possibly address. (Homer-Dixon cited in Dale 2011) 
How exactly should the relationship between the ‘conventional wisdom’ of growth and 
the great acceleration be approached however? How is this historical confluence of 
the economy, energy and the environment alongside the development of the growth 
paradigm best understood?  
The natural history of the great acceleration 
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For Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill, the great acceleration should be seen as a second 
stage of a new geological epoch: The Anthropocene (2007). This was first suggested 
by the Nobel-winning chemist Paul Crutzen alongside the marine scientist Eugene F. 
Stoermer. In a short statement in 2000 they argued that humanity should now be seen 
as possessing the extravagant and indeed excessive ability to act as a geological 
force, through the condensation of what was previously the action of millennia on the 
global atmosphere to around a mere two hundred and fifty years. They dated these 
years from the beginning of the industrial revolution, with its widespread use of fossil 
fuels in the form of coal and the related development of steam power (Crutzen & 
Stoermer 2000; Moore 2014a:2). Crutzen further elaborated on this proposal in a 
piece to Nature in 2002 (Crutzen 2002), and in 2008, the Stratigraphy Commission of 
the Geological Society of London announced its acceptance of Crutzen’s proposal of 
the end of one geological epoch, and the beginning of another: 
The Holocene epoch—the interglacial span of unusually stable climate that has 
allowed the rapid evolution of agriculture and urban civilization—has ended 
and... the Earth has entered “a stratigraphic interval without close parallel in the 
last several million years.” In addition to the buildup of greenhouse gases, the 
stratigraphers cite human landscape transformation which “now exceeds 
[annual] natural sediment production by an order of magnitude,” the ominous 
acidification of the oceans, and the relentless destruction of biota. (Davis 2008; 
cited in Gibson-Graham & Roelvink 2010:320-321) 
The notion of the Anthropocene, while capturing something of the changed relation 
between humanity and the global environment due to fossil fuel use and technological 
change, actually ‘creates more fog than light’ (Moore 2014a:2). By attributing epochal 
change to the Anthropos - humanity in general, it becomes impossible to determine 
the motive force driving the shift to coal and steam and then later to oil and internal 
combustion during the great acceleration (Malm & Hornborg 2014; Moore 2014a, 
1014b). As Malm and Hornborg put it: ‘transhistorical - particularly species wide - 
drivers cannot be invoked to explain a qualitatively novel order in history’ and that the 
notion of the Anthropocene misses, at least with respect to the coal-fired industrial 
revolution is that ‘a clique of white British men literally pointed steam-power as a 
weapon - on sea and land, boats and rails - against the best part of humankind, from 
the Niger delta to the Yangtzi delta, the Levant to Latin America (Malm & Hornborg 
2014:64). Here then, the environmental change — particularly climate change — 
wrought by the great acceleration and the triumph of growth, is denaturalised in a first 
step through its relocation from natural causes to human activities, but then 
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immediately renaturalised in a second step: ‘when derived from an innate human trait, 
such as the ability to control fire. Not nature, but human nature - this is the 
Anthropocene displacement’ (Malm & Hornborg 2014:65).  
Against this natural history, an ecomarxist tradition has sought to make clear that the 
environmental impacts of the Anthropocene, particularly climate change, should not be 
seen as anthropogenic, but as sociogenic (Malm & Hornborg 2014:66). The new 
geological epoch is not the Anthropocene, but rather the Capitalocene (Moore 2014a, 
2014b) or even the Ecocene (Nooorgaard 2013) with respect specifically to the mid 
20th century great acceleration. Following criticism from environmentalists that a 
Marxian analysis was of necessity anti-ecological (e.g. Rudy 2005:115), an ecomarxist 
tradition initiated in the 1970s through the work of thinkers such as Barry Commoner 
(1971) was further developed from the beginning of the 1990s onwards (see e.g. 
Benton 1989, 1994; Burkett 1999, 2009; Foster 1999; Kovel 2007; O’Connor 1993; 
O’Connor 1994, 1998; Redclift & Benton 1994). Here, issues of environmental 
degradation are broadly viewed as following Marx’s logic of the ‘metabolic rift’ between 
town and country. Ecomarxism explicitly rejects the possibility of a global capitalist 
modernity (as the town) being reconcilable with environmental protection or 
sustainability (country), at least as long as capitalist social relations are underwritten by 
a reliance on a fossil fuel-based energy systems (Saurin 1994, 2001).  
The environment, energy and the economy are viewed here as separable spheres, the 
former two as natural and the latter as social. The metabolism of the environment and 
energy by the economy or capital - particularly in its neoliberal guise, is prone to run up 
against the hard limits of the natural ecology (Commoner 1971). Climate change is 
understood here as the result of a 'specific pattern of economic growth' (Williams, 
1996: 51), or as Redclift has put it; '[t]he concentration on “Growth” has served to 
obscure the fact that resource depletion and unsustainable development are a direct 
consequence of growth itself' (Redclift 1987:56) - a growth that is the imperative of 
fossil capitalism (Altvater 2006; Huber 2009; Malm 2013; Parr 2013; Wrigley 2010).  
Altvater, for example, maintains that capitalism and fossil fuels (particularly oil) are 
fundamentally congruent: ‘In comparison with other energy sources fossil energy fulfils 
almost perfectly the requirements of the capitalist process of accumulation. It fits into 
capitalism’s societal relation to nature’ (2006:41). First, Fossil energy enables the 
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transformation of pre-capitalist space and place into capitalist ones. The local 
availability of energy is no longer the overriding reason for the location of industry, 
which has enabled the development of globe spanning logistical chains. Second, fossil 
energy enables the reconstruction of time: Diurnal and seasonal rhythms no longer 
constrain production processes when energy is available on a constant basis. Fossil 
energy also enables the acceleration of these processes and the compression of time 
and space. Third, the flexibility in production, consumption and transportation provided 
by fossil energy enabled the ‘…mobilisation and acceleration of economic processes 
and … a degree of individualisation of social life never before experienced in human 
history’ (Altvater 2006:41). Overall: 
No managerial decisions could follow the logic of profitability without needing to 
take energy restrictions or spatial and temporal constraints into account. 
Accumulation and economic growth, i.e. the “wealth of nations”, became 
increasingly independent of natural conditions and their limitations. (Altvater 
2006:41-42) 
The problem with ecomarxist analyses such as Altvater’s (see also Huber 2009; Malm 
2013; Malm & Hornborg 2014; Wrigley 2010) is that in challenging the naturalised 
historical accounts of the Anthropocene thinkers, in overturning a too easy, too shallow 
reliance upon ‘human nature’ as a baggy explanation for the new geological epoch, 
there is a reliance upon a form of ‘fossil fuel-fetishism’ (Moore 2014a, 2014b; Newell & 
Paterson 2011).  
Newell and Paterson maintain in a theoretically oriented addendum (2011) to their 
Climate Capitalism (2010) that fossil fuel-based capitalism, however entrenched and 
enduring, is merely one variant of capitalist social relations (2011:25), and a similar 
point is also made by Koch (2012). Drawing from Buck (2006), Newell and Paterson 
argue that approaches which focus on fossil fuel use ‘confuse particular 
manifestations of capitalism - that is, particular historical social formations - with 
capitalism itself, thus under-estimating the flexibility of the beast’ (Buck 2006:60). Here, 
‘[t]echnological dynamism is at the heart of capitalism, and as a consequence, its 
technological trajectories are not necessarily set in stone.’ (Newell & Paterson 
2011:25) Or oil as the case may be. Newell and Paterson (2011) rightly characterise 
these forms of analysis as ‘depressing’ with respect to future possibilities for the 
decarbonisation of a global capitalism that ‘[w]hether we like it or not’ will form the 
context of responses to climate change’ (Newell & Paterson 2011:23; see also Lane & 
Stephan 2014) - a decarbonisation that Altvater dismissed as a ‘myth’, or 
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‘bullshit’ (Altvater 2006:37). This doesn’t overcome the problem of the fetishistic 
naturalisation of the environment and energy however. Instead, the ‘ahistorical and 
apolitical bottom line’ (Moore 2014a:16) of a nature external to capital is joined by an 
ahistorical and apolitical capitalism in itself divorced from its specific historical 
instantiations. Both the ecomarxist and climate capitalism accounts then represent a 
problematic basis from which to undertake a historical accounting of the specific 
conjunction of the economy, energy and the environment and the rise of economic 
growth to its paradigmatic status after the second world war.  
The ‘human nature’ of the anthropocene thinkers, the fossil fetishism of ecomarxist 
approaches and the naturalised, ahistorical ‘climate capitalism’ each undertake 
variants of a ‘natural history’ of growth. This effects a specific methodology which 
tends towards a strong distinction between historical accounting and causative 
analysis, where the former is rendered as mere description and the latter as abstract 
yet non-historical explanation (Knafo, 2010: 495-496). As Bruno Latour argued in his 
Politics of Nature, under these type of accounts: 
Even if, through work, knowledge, and ecological transformations, human history 
can modify nature in a lasting way, can disturb, transform, and perform it, the 
fact remains that there are two histories, or rather there is one history full of 
sound and fury that unfolds within a framework that itself has no history, or 
creates no history.’(Latour, 2004: 33-34) 
Once this divorce of history from both explanation and issues of power has taken 
place, it becomes very difficult to account for both the historical and material specificity 
of the postwar great acceleration. This has the unfortunate consequence of following 
Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ argument - only shifting it back to either a pre-
human history when our hominid ancestors learned to control fire (Malm & Hornborg 
2014), to the development of capitalism during the ‘long sixteenth’ century, or to the 
beginning of industrial capitalism in the ‘long 19th century’ (Moore 2014a:5). Again, this 
divorce of history from cause flattens multiform, contested historical agencies and 
powers into the mere dumb action of ‘linear’ (MacKenzie 2009) or ‘diffusion’ (Latour 
1999b) accounts: 
But what should appear extraordinarily bizarre is, on the contrary, the invention of 
inanimate entities which would do nothing more than carry one step further the 
cause that makes them act to generate the n+1 consequence which in turn are 
nothing but the causes of the n+2 consequences. This conceit has the strange 
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result of composing the world with long concatenations of causes and effects 
where (this is what is so odd) nothing is supposed to happen, except, probably 
at the beginning. (Latour, 2010: 10) 
What is required here is a much more relational (Moore 2014a; 2014b), and much 
more promiscuous (Lane 2012, 2014) historical analysis. 
Promiscuous history: relationality, performativity, translation 
The conceptual perspective afforded by a promiscuous historical account derives from 
the actor network theory first developed as a tool for social science research in the 
1980s in and through the ‘Science and Technology Studies’ of Bruno Latour, Michel 
Callon and John Law (e.g. Callon 1986; Callon & Latour 1981; Latour 1987, 1993a, 
1993b, 1999a, 1999b, 2004; Law 1986, 1992). Actor network theory can be thought 
of as comprising the two intertwined ‘stories’ (Law 1999:3) of relationality and 
performativity as a double helix of metaphysical commitments. In the first instance, 
actor network theory ‘… takes the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, 
the notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this ruthlessly to all materials 
- and not simply those that are linguistic.’ Law 1999:4). Entities and objects are hereby 
understood as deriving their form and attributes as a result of their relations with other 
objects and entities. Much as John Donne noted with men, for actor network theory, 
no thing is an island; and objects have no primary qualities, naturalised substance or 
objective laws withdrawn from, or independent of, their specific relations.  
Here the intrinsic nature of humans, fossil fuels or capitalism cannot be taken as 
separate and separable causal explanations, but must be considered in relation to 
each other in any historical accounting of the postwar great acceleration. An important 
point to reiterate here though is that in doing away with essentialist, naturalised 
qualities and categorical, dualistic distinctions, these are not merely replaced by a 
formless, homogenous flux of powerless, structureless socio-matter. Power, structural 
imperatives and what appear as the apparently settled objects of politics exist, but 
they exist as effects, as outcomes. As I indicated in the introduction, the laws of the 
social world are not granted existence ex nihilo, nor do they wield a brute causal 
efficacy. Instead, they are to be explained and cannot unproblematically be 
incorporated within accounts and analyses as the silent arbiters of truth (Harman 
2009; Latour 2005, 2010). 
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The second metaphysical commitment, performativity, derives from the first: ‘…the 
semiotic approach tells us that entities achieve their form as a consequence of the 
relations in which they are located. But this means that it also tells us that they are 
performed in, by, and through those relations (Law 1999:4). The notion of 
performativity has been developed extensively with a specific focus on economics 
within the sub-discipline of the Social Studies of Finance (e.g. Callon 1998; MacKenzie 
2006; MacKenzie et al 2007). Economics as a discipline is understood as not merely 
descriptive or analytical. Instead, economists perform the increasingly certain reality of 
their own propositions, inscribing them into existence through the provision of new 
analytical techniques, mathematical theora, practical accounting, economic decision 
technologies, and market tools etc. The economy is not to be seen then as embedded 
in society, but in economics, and where ‘[e]conomics does not describe an existing 
external “economy” but brings that economy into being: economics performs the 
economy, creating the phenomena it describes’(MacKenzie & Millo, 2003:108).  
Following Barry (2002, 2013), the constitution of the economy in the mid 20th century 
as a stable object of politics didn’t simply foreclose political contestation around this 
object, but its very fabrication opened up new forms of politics, around new objects - 
namely energy and the environment - and resulted in the development of new 
economic technologies and techniques in order to manage this politics. But it must 
also be seen as fracturing the prior direct relation between economy and growth. The 
economy, understood as an object defined by an essential law of growth has a very 
particular and peculiar quarter-century history from the end of the second world war - 
one which requires a promiscuous perspective in order to capture the way the 
economy and its essential law of growth were brought together. 
Overall, the term ‘promiscuous history’ I derive in part from Philosopher Levi Bryant 
(2010). For Bryant, the ‘promiscuous ontology’ undertaken by the relational and 
performative commitments of actor network theorists involves a kind of indiscriminate 
realism, a sensitivity to the materially heterogenous composition of social actors and 
structures: 
Within a promiscuous ontology, fictions, signs, corporations, signifiers, etc., are 
no less real than quarks and cane toads. Consequently, if we are to understand 
the world around us we can’t privilege one of these types of entities as 
overdetermining all the others, but must instead think them as a heterogeneous 
composition posing a problem of engineering (without an engineer or author). 
(Bryant 2010; emphasis in original) 
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This sensitivity to non-human agency - the role played by the material, technical and 
discursive aspects of the world captures part, but not all of what promiscuous history 
refers to here. It is not simply the case that we can go back through the postwar 
development of the economy, energy and the environment and reinstall a cacophony 
of human and non-human actors through an all-encompassing historical descriptivism. 
This would run the danger of sliding back into a fossil fuel fetishism, and as Jason 
Moore argues with respect to coal at the dawning of the age of industrial capitalism: 
Geohistorically speaking, whomever says capital implicates coal in the era of 
large-scale industry: those who say fossil fuels make industrial capitalism are not 
wrong so much as errant in the insertion of a non-relational object (coal) in the 
relational process of capital accumulation … By itself, coal is only a potential 
actant … To paraphrase Marx, coal is coal. Only under specific conditions does it 
become fossil fuel, and come to shape entire historical epochs’ (Moore 2014b:
14) 
The promiscuous history that I undertake here is, in part, at odds with Moore’s claim, 
and from this perspectives there are no strictly non-relational objects: coal is coal is the 
material, technical, social, cultural and discursive relations within which it is embedded 
at different historical junctures. However, Moore’s warning against fossil fuel 
fetishisation is well taken, and the same point needs to be made for oil during the 
postwar triumph of growth. Only under specific conditions does oil become energy, 
and come to fuel the great acceleration. A promiscuous historical account needs then 
to be sensitive to the processes that render the complex socionatural world down into 
apparently silent, stable, factual objects. This is not a case of just opening up the 
‘black boxes’ that comprise the economy, energy and the environment, but of both 
following the researchers, economists, engineers and political entrepreneurs who 
conceived and produced these objects, but who became largely invisible once the 
object was finished (Latour 2004:22-23), and then tracing the technically, materially 
and socially specific relations between these ‘black boxes’ and the things they 
seemingly black box.  
This approach demurs then on the possibility of tracking the movement through time 
of already existing objects (Harman 2009:80), instead a promiscuous history is one 
that traces the series of translations (Barry 2013; Harman 2009; Latour 1993a, 1999b, 
2005) required to construct and reconstruct the economy, energy and the 
environment. The concept of translation was originally defined by Latour as one of his 
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four principles of ‘irreduction’ (Latour 1993a; Harman 2009:14-16). Understood here 
as the means of linking one thing to another, it aims at capturing the process of 
constant mediation required to construct the ‘laws of the social world’ (Latour 
2005:246). Translations link the things of the world - but never in a straightforward 
way. As Graham Harman has put it ‘[n]othing is pure calculation, nothing follows 
directly from anything else, nothing is a transparent intermediary. Everything is a 
mediator, demanding its share of reality as we pass through it towards our goal. Every 
medium must be negotiated’ (2009:18).  
Andrew Barry makes this same point slightly differently: ‘Translation is a process of 
replication or imitation and differentiation at the same time’ (2013:415; emphasis in 
original). It is never smooth. A Promiscuous historical account draws upon this notion 
to bring to light the unintended translational consequences that bring forward new 
relationships, powers and forms of contestation. The triumph of growth as (at least to 
contemporary mainstream political and economic thought) untranscendable and law-
like, was developed through a series of performative translations that were central to 
the construction and reconstruction of the economy, energy and the environment and 
would format and standardise the relationship between these objects of politics within 
an economic narrative. This work was undertaken through the application of new 
economic tools and technologies developed and deployed by new economic sub-
disciplines - first resource economics, then later environmental economics - and 
largely through the work of economists associated with Resources For the Future. 
What do I mean more concretely by an object of politics? In the case of the economy, 
the approach undertaken here is much informed throughout the thesis by the political 
theorist Timothy Mitchell. Mitchell has analysed the economy, albeit with a variety of 
particular emphases, in a series of articles and chapters spanning a near-15 year 
period (e.g. Mitchell 1998, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). Drawing 
from the material semiotics approach espoused by the actor-network thinkers, he 
argues that, ‘[t]he economy came into being between the 1930s and 1950s as the 
field of operation for new powers of planning, regulation, statistical enumeration and 
representation.’ (Mitchell 1998:91).  
The economy does not refer simply to a new means to represent pre-existing 
economic functions however, although it is this in part. Nor does it refer only to the 
development of new economic processes, or regulations e.g. currency reform, 
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monetary circulation, exchange rate controls etc., although it bears in part on this too. 
Instead, the economy should be seen as a technical assemblage or machine 
composed of figures, tables, monetary flows, economists and their theorems. The 
economy understood in this way bears a rather more complicated, strange, and often 
unforeseen relationship to the system of energy and the environment as similarly 
fabricated objects of politics. As Mitchell argues (2008), shifting the development of the 
economy chronologically forward to the 1930s does not licence a simple recalibration 
of e.g. a Polanyian account, merely shifting this forward by a century. Mitchell 
maintains that Granovetter’s (1985) repopularisation of a Polanyian account of 
embeddedness is limited here as: 
…it always invokes some essential form of the economic. The economic refers 
either to rational action, which in different social and cultural “contexts” is more 
or less restricted by cultural or social ties, or to materiality, which in different 
“contexts” is differently stabilized or imagined (Mitchell 2008:1117)  
Instead, and to quote Mitchell at length: 
Rather than assuming there was always an economy, then, we need to explore 
the rival metrological projects that brought the economy into being 
Understanding the making of the economy as overlapping and sometimes rival 
metrological projects, we can think about the relationship of economics to the 
economy in a different way. The two are not separate things. The projects that 
form the economy involve economics; economics is not outside, representing 
the economy from some other place. It is caught up in these projects. The 
success of economics, like all science, is measured in the extent to which it 
helps make of the wider world places where its facts can survive. (Mitchell 
2008:1119)  
In his 2011 book Carbon Democracy, Mitchell argues that energy and the environment 
are made into objects of politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s to rival the economy 
as part of, and as a means to, construct the crisis of the 1973-1974 oil price shocks, 
and thereby help install the market as a fundamental organising principle of 
democracy. Here I take the components identified in Mitchell’s narrative, reposition 
them historically, and reassemble the total narrative for different ends, in order to 
adequately grasp the postwar historical development of the great acceleration. In order 
to begin this process, it is first necessary to outline how Mitchell approaches the 
historical development of the economy. 
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The national economy 
Mitchell argues that for Adam Smith and the political economists of the 18th century, 
the notion of the economy was not related to the structure of production or the 
exchange of goods within an economy (Mitchell 2005a:128). Rather, the notion of 
economy referred only to the frugal and prudent husbanding of resources, the 
undertaking of which was naturally related to notions of progress and growth. Drawing 
from Tribe (1978) and Poovey (1998), Mitchell (e.g. 1998, 2005, 2011) argues that an 
earlier tradition of writing on the management of the household or estate was applied 
by the early political economists to discussions of the state, thereby imagining this as 
the household of the sovereign. The political economists took as their object of study: 
the proper husbanding and circulation of goods and the proper role of the 
sovereign in managing this circulation…Political economy referred to the 
economy, or government of the polity, not to the politics of an economy.’(Mitchell 
2005a:128) 
The second generation of political economists writing at the end of the 18th and start 
of the 19th centuries moved away from the tradition, initiated by Smith, of the imaginary 
of the household. What replaced this focus was not the economy as it is currently 
used, but rather their object of analysis was the world of ‘human settlement, 
agriculture, and the movements of populations, goods and wealth.’ (Mitchell 2005a:
128) 
From the late 19th century onwards, the classical focus on the frugal and prudent use 
of resources was displaced by the marginal revolution in the economics discipline. 
Here, neoclassical economists proscribed the sphere of economic behaviour to the 
abstract notion of ‘the market’. The new science of physics had just displaced the 
diverse and particular forms of matter and force associated with mechanical forces, 
heat and light, with the universal concept of energy. Economic theorists such as 
Jevons, Walras and Menger, enamoured of this theoretical approach sought to 
translate the singular force of energy into the economic milieu (Mirowski 1989, 2002; 
Mitchell 1998:85-86). Marginal utility theory was developed to describe economic 
phenomena solely with recourse to the interactions of buyers and sellers, each seeking 
to maximise their individual utility values in an abstract market.  
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It was not only the concept of energy that was translated from one discipline to the 
other, as economists made use of the language and imagery of physics. Equilibrium 
and stability, while having had a longer history of usage in classical economics, moved 
from being theological or biological concepts and mechanistic descriptions of actual 
markets, production and trades to the natural states of a highly abstract market; and 
terms such as inflation, contraction, inertia, friction and efficiency were taken to 
describe market pressures. Finally, economics borrowed from the pre-second law of 
thermodynamics programme of ‘energetics’ in physics its methods and models of 
explanation (Mirowski 2002:7). Mathematics increasingly became the language of 
economics, and formal proofs and quantitative measurement displaced both the 
analysis of the nature of the economic phenomena being described as well as the use 
of natural and mechanistic concepts to describe these economic phenomena 
(Mirowski 1989, 2002).  
However, the need to incorporate processes beyond changing utilities in theories of 
economic functioning was becoming readily apparent by the depression era of the 
1920s and 1930s. Erratic fluctuations in market prices necessitated that these 
processes, viewed as external to the market, be reincorporated into the discipline’s 
conceptual structures. This would result however, not in a return to the political 
economy of Smith, or Ricardo or Marx, but in the development of the new concept of 
‘the economy’. Economy would no longer simply be the means through which 
progress and growth was achieved; instead it was invested with an ontological vitality, 
and through the development of a series of measurement processes into an entire 
metrological system. A system that was carefully tended by a new class of adepts - 
macro economists - and would come to play a vital role in the economics discipline as 
economists would claim their central place in the world in the middle of the 20th 
century.  
In order to trace the development of the economy as a distinct object of both 
knowledge and politics - something that inheres not in ‘the government of the 
polity’ (Mitchell 2005a:128) but as a ‘…general structure of economic 
relations’ (Mitchell 1998:85), Mitchell begins, as he notes, in the most obvious place: 
The publication of John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
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and Money (1936). Although Keynes himself referred to the ‘economic society’ or ‘the 
economic system as a whole’ in this text, it is clear that the coherent structure 
identified by Keynes is what would shortly thereafter come to be known as the 
economy. Keynes’ approach, and the theory that he developed, arose in response to 
the immiseration and mass unemployment of the depression years, as well as to the 
economic programmes deployed by governments to address the depression, and the 
initiation of welfare and development programmes in the European colonies in 
response to threats to colonial rule after the first world war. In responding to these 
programmes, this new approach was concerned not just with the behaviour of the 
individual human, but by making use of aggregate measures of employment, 
investment and money supply, the construction of the idea of the economy can be 
seen as responding to ‘…the attempt to include in the picture of the economic 
process other forces besides the “energy” of individual utility (Mitchell 2005a:131)  
Following the publication of his A Treatise on Money in 1930, Keynes was to break 
with his Cambridge predecessors, Alfred Marshall, and Arthur Cecil Pigou, and would 
argue that monetary flows should be conceived as a system in their own right, rather 
than as simply another market. Keynes argued that earlier theorists treated money as a 
neutral signifier of value, and for them therefore there was no essential difference 
between a system of exchange using money and a barter system. In contrast, in the 
earliest surviving drafts of The General Theory, from 1932 to 1933, as well as 
fragmentary lecture notes from the same period, Keynes discusses the difference 
between the ‘real exchange economy’ or ‘neutral economy’ of classical theory and the 
‘money economy’ of the contemporary world (Mitchell 2005a:135).  
This represents his first use of the economy in the sense taken for granted today, ‘…
not as an aggregation of markets in different commodities, but as the circulation of 
money. The economy was the sum of all the moments at which money changed 
hands.’ (Mitchell 2005a:135). However, as Mitchell notes, the importance of Keynes is 
easy to exaggerate, and this new perspective on what the object of economics was - 
the economy as the totality of monetary movements - coincided with the crucial 
development of the econometric tools and technologies required to accurately 
measure, determine and subsequently represent this new object. 
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The first econometric model claiming to represent an entire economy was published in 
1937 by Jan Tinbergen , the year after Keynes published his General Theory. 3
Concerns about the depression drove Tinbergen’s early work, similarly to Keynes, and 
he developed his first model in response to a Dutch government request for anti-
depression policies. Three years later, in 1940, Tinbergen, then working for the League 
of Nations, developed the first large-scale model of the U.S. economy. This birth of 
econometrics in the late 1930s as an ‘…attempt to create a mathematical 
representation of the entire economic process as a self-contained and dynamic 
mechanism’ (Mitchell 1998:85), should not be seen as resulting from some immaculate 
statistical conception however, but rather in relation to the earlier mechanical models 
of markets.  
While the marginal revolution’s adoption of the forces and explanatory models of 
physics was sweeping through the economics discipline in the late 19th century, there 
was a continuation of mechanical analogies for the functioning of economic processes 
in the work of American economist Irving Fisher. Fisher’s 1892 doctoral dissertation, 
which would later be referred to by Paul Samuelson as ‘the best of all doctoral 
dissertations in economics’ (Samuelson, 1950:254; cited in Mirowski 1989:31) laid the 
intellectual groundwork for his mechanical model of a market, built the same year, that 
was comprised of a system pipes, levers, stoppers and cisterns through which water, 
representing utility, could flow. Fisher used this contraption in his classes at Yale until it 
was finally replaced by an improved model in 1925, and he maintained that this 
represented not just an overall picture of the market, but an investigative instrument, 
allowing variations in the economy to be studied by altering the position of the 
stoppers and levers that represented market variables (Fisher 1925: iii, 44; cited in 
Mitchell 1998:86).  
Although attempts at calculating national wealth had been undertaken since 1665 and 
William Petty’s estimates of income, expenditure, population, land and other assets of 
England, Wales and Ireland (Coyle 2014:8), approaches to calculating national wealth 
had been repeatedly scuppered by a series of vexed problems, such as how to avoid 
the double counting of goods and money. Even after the first world war, The Dawes 
 Who would later share the first Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 3
Alfred Nobel for this work.
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Committee, set up to estimate Germany’s ability to pay war reparations, would founder 
not just due to a lack of reliable data on national income, but to a failure to develop a 
useable conception of what it was supposed to count (Mitchell 2005b). While the 
following 20 years saw numerous attempts in Germany and the United States to 
remedy this situation, it was not until the innovations of Keynes and the 
econometricians that this problem became tractable, by reconceptualising the object 
to be counted.  
Like Fisher, the new econometrics scholars, such as Tinbergen and the Norwegian 
Ragnar Frisch, would approach economic processes through mechanical analogies 
and models. At the time, this innovation was understood as a shift from a static 
conception to a dynamic one, where external forces were viewed as displacing and 
producing dynamic, internal impulses affecting the entire economic machinery. This 
approach required two conceptual shifts. First, a clear distinction had to be defined 
and maintained between what Frisch (1933) would call the ‘intrinsic structure’ of a 
mechanism and its exterior. Second, this intrinsic structure cannot be thought of any 
longer as a single market - it must be thought of as ‘the whole economic system taken 
in its entirety’ (Mitchell 1998:87).  
This whole economic system would be rendered most clearly in the US, when Simon 
Kuznets of the National Bureau of Economic Research, developing the earlier work of 
British economist Colin Clark, systematised a method for estimating national income in 
1934 (Coyle 2014:12). In 1942 the US Department of Commerce would begin 
publishing national economic data, and in his 1944 budget speech, President 
Roosevelt would officially introduce what would become the embodiment of the new 
idea of the economy; and what Alan Greenspan would refer to in 1999 as ‘one of the 
great inventions of the 20th century’ (Walker 2007:177) - Gross National Product 
(GNP). The enumeration of the GNP of an economy made it possible to represent the 
size, structure (and crucially) the growth of this new totality (Coyle 2014; Fioramonti 
2014).  
Alongside this, the metrological tools capable of accounting for all the instances of 
spending and receiving money within a specified geographical space - the national 
income accounts - would help make this object coextensive with national boundaries; 
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and in this way, the burgeoning reality of the new notion of the economy rapidly led to 
a re-imagination of the nation-state (Mitchell 1998:89) as the bearer of this precious 
burden. This re-imagination was not itself explicitly theorised and was instead 
introduced as a ‘commonsense construct’ (Radice 1984:122, cited in Mitchell 1998: 
89) which provided the boundaries within which the new aggregate accounts of 
production, employment, investment, as well as synthetic averages such as interest 
rates, price levels and real wages could be measured. The subsequent division of 
economics into micro- and macro-economics would score this ‘commonsense’ 
construction of the national economy deep into the bones of the discipline. These 
conceptual innovations, alongside Keynes’ reconsideration of monetary circulation, do 
not, however, simply denote the development of new forms of economic thought in 
the form of dynamic models and macroeconomics. Instead, they should be seen as 
marking the construction of a newly imagined object - the economy. 
Economy and growth 
It was not until the turn of the 18th century that the idea of progress became 
commonly understood as involving a specifically material aspect, and the notion of 
progress began to be applied to standards of living, or national wealth (Purdey 
2010:68). In 1776, Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations that ‘[t]he progressive 
state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state to all the different orders of society. 
The stationary state is dull; the declining melancholy’ (quoted in Arndt 1978:7), and by 
the middle of the 18th century - in Britain at least - the conviction that material progress 
was both possible and desirable was largely settled to the satisfaction of the discipline 
of classical economics. 
Prior to this point, none of the many accomplishments achieved in engineering, 
architecture, technology, navigation and in numerous other areas and disciplines ‘…
was thought of as “progress” - simply as ingenious contrivances of persons, mostly 
anonymous, to meet immediate needs’ (Tuveson quoted in Purdey 2010:65). Purdey 
argues that there is no singular casual driver underlying the development of material 
progress in public thinking (2010:66), and that this should be seen as broadly driven 
by a series of social, material and intellectual innovations over the preceding three 
hundred years. The development of capitalism and protestantism spurred innovations 
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in capital formation and accumulation, while new wealth poured into the European 
empires through colonial expansion. Alongside this, the Italian renaissance, and later 
European and specifically French enlightenment thinkers - such as the Abbe de Saint-
Pierre - proselytised for the possibility of new material comforts and riches. Later, the 
industrial revolution in Britain boosted material productivity driven by coal as a new and 
vastly superior source of energy in comparison to wood and man- or horsepower, and 
meanwhile, classical political economists followed Adam Smith’s lead and promoted 
material growth, progress and economy in the use of resources.  
For the classical economists, the actual desirability of material progress was rarely 
explicitly discussed or challenged (Arndt 1978:7). Here, their beliefs were in tune with 
the French encyclopeadists and English Utilitarians in viewing the object of 
government as being the overall happiness of the people - and it was simply taken for 
granted that material progress was key to avoiding the declining melancholy of the 
stationary state as described by Smith. Notions of economy and notions of growth 
were closely intertwined here, and prudence in the husbanding of resources was 
directly related to the unabated assumption of progress and growth ‘the progress of 
England towards opulence and improvement [would be] universal, continual, and 
uninterrupted.’ (Smith 1776 quoted in Purdey 2010:68). To the extent that growth had 
limits, these were understood by Smith as inhering in laws, institutions, the size of 
markets and their impact on the division of labour, and with respect to the example of 
China given in the Wealth of Nations as inhering in the long run in the nature of China’s 
soil and climate. Growth was ultimately conditioned by the state of the land - the 
‘passive’ element of classical growth theory - for Smith (Smith & Skinner 1986), but 
this was essentially unproblematic given the distant limits of the fertility of the earth; 
and for the British Empire at least, its continual territorial absorption, population 
expansion and concomitant stimulation of demand and production (Arndt 1978; 
Purdey 2010). The second generation of classical economists would, however, view 
economic growth with a more baleful eye. 
The first of this new generation of political economists, the Reverend Thomas Malthus, 
would take the cycle of populating and cultivating new territories as his central 
concern. Malthus was writing at the end of the 18th century and the start of the 19th - 
at a time when Britain was at war with revolutionary and imperial France, and then 
!29
experiencing deteriorating social conditions in industrial cities, mass unemployment 
and post-war depression. This influenced Malthus’ much less optimistic outlook with 
respect to growth. Malthus, like Smith, believed in the desirability of rising material 
prosperity and living standards, however, he was far more pessimistic than Smith on 
the likely possibility of material progress in the future.  
For Malthus, the threat of an increasing population, which unless it was checked by 
moral restraint - a prime concern in the writings of the good Reverend, and a facility he 
found sadly lacking in the ravening crowds of the poor and indigent - would surely 
outrun supply, primarily that of food. Not only this, but the potential for excessive 
saving, and a consequent glut resulting from this, could, from the other side of the 
classical equation, destroy demand and ‘leave no motive to a further increase in 
production’ (Malthus, cited in Arndt 1978:9). Importantly though, this concern of 
Malthus’ was not with a diffuse, amorphous or ever-present notion of scarcity in 
general. Instead, as Lyla Mehta argues, paraphrasing Xenos (1989): ‘Until the late 19th 
century, scarcity connoted a temporally bounded period of scarcity or dearth. Scarcity 
was experienced cyclically, dependent usually on poor yields’ (Mehta 2010:14). 
Specific scarcities were Malthus’ focus, not scarcity in general. 
David Ricardo retained a Malthusian focus on land settlement in his narrative on corn 
production, as well as an expectation of the end of growth as the rate of profit declined 
- given the transfer of an increasing proportion of income to landlords as rent due to 
the pressure of an increasing population on limited land. Ricardo was no dire pessimist 
however: 
The question is not whether the Creator did not consult our real happiness by 
limiting the productive powers of the land, but whether the fact be not, that he 
has so limited it,—while He has given us an unbounded supply of water, of air, 
and has set no limits to the use we may make of the pressure of the 
atmosphere, the elasticity of steam and many other services rendered to us by 
nature. (Ricardo et al.2004:210) 
Unlike Paul Samuelson’s later characterisation of him as representing a ‘retreat to a 
gloomy concentration upon the law of diminishing returns’ (Samuelson, collected 
papers; cited in Arndt 1978:9), Arndt indicates that the end of growth and the 
stationary state can be put off for Ricardo, effectively into the indefinite future, through 
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the development of foreign trade, exploitation of the almost limitless resources of the 
non-European world, and through technical progress (Arndt 1978:9-10).  
Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill would similarly make use of these organic and cyclical 
imaginaries. In the case of the former, Marx critiqued the lack of distributive justice 
under capitalism, but not the concept of material progress per se. The latter, Mill, was 
the last major classical economist to focus on economic growth in line with the 
thought of Adam Smith. Mill bore much more lightly a concern with the end of growth 
in the stationary state that laid heavy on the brows of the other great classical 
economic thinkers, but on the likelihood of future growth he had little new to say (Arndt 
1978:11). He straightforwardly accepted Ricardo’s argument on the fall of the rate of 
profit in the face of population increases without an expansion of productive land.  
For the classical political economists then, growth and progress were considered in 
the brute material terms of the expansion of populations and agriculture, towns, trade 
and manufactures; and this growth was intrinsically and therefore atomically fused to 
economy as the ultimate aim in the husbanding of resources, whether these be of the 
household of the sovereign, of the settlement in its territory, of the city, or even the 
factory. Outside of the sphere of academic political economy, geopolitical concerns 
were increasingly intertwined with a rush towards growth at the time, but these were 
similarly thought of in the very concrete terms of the expansion of colonial holdings 
and the spread of empire, as Friedrich List would make clear in his admiring 
assessment of Britain in 1885, a country which: 
owes her immense colonial possessions to her surpassing manufacturing power. 
If other European nations wish to partake of the profitable business of cultivating 
waste territories and civilising barbarous nations…they must commence with the 
development of their own internal manufacturing powers, their mercantile marine, 
and their naval power. (List 1885:270; quoted in Dale 2011) 
With the coming of the marginal revolution in the mid-to-late 19th century in the work of 
Jevons, Walras and Menger, the interest in, and concern with growth would largely 
disappear - replaced by a focus on marginal utility theory in the developing 
neoclassical tradition. At this point, professional and academic economists broke with 
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the earlier political economy tradition of Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Marx and Mill. These 
changes enabled the reconstruction of the market in specifically mathematical and 
graphical terms. No longer referring to the social marketplace conceived in relation to 
agriculture or the factory that Ricardo and Marx had in mind, but ‘to a utopic space, 
formulated geometrically, by the axes of a chart, as the two-dimensional plane on 
which numerical utilities could meet and balance one another’ (Walras 1874[1952]; 
cited in Mitchell 2005a:129).  
After the 1870s the explicit concern with growth in the economics discipline largely 
disappeared along with the classical notions of social marketplaces and the meaning 
of economy. Instead, the preoccupation with the market as intersecting utility functions 
would subsume a concern with growth under the notions of efficiency and Pareto 
optimality, and as Arndt has noted ‘hardly a line is to be found in the writings of any 
professional economists between 1870 and 1940 in support of economic growth as a 
policy objective’ (Arndt 1978:13). Along with the disappearance of growth, would 
come the arrival of generalised scarcity. The particular and cyclical scarcities of 
Malthus - grounded as they were in the failures of a limited natural environment, to 
provide for the unlimited desires of human nature - were reconceived under the 
marginal revolution as a general scarcity derived not from an external nature, but from 
human nature and the inherent tendency that the neoclassical economists divined for 
human wants to perpetually outrun the means to satisfy these. 
Overall, growth was largely coeval with the notion of economy as this was understood 
prior to the middle of the 20th century, and had two notable characteristics within the 
discipline of economics. First, it was rarely an explicit concern. To the extent that 
growth was overtly considered by the classical political economists, it was understood 
simply in terms of material expansion: the appropriation and population of more lands, 
their cultivation, and expansion of trade. Growth was ultimately dependent upon the 
expansion and cultivation of the fertile soil, and it would either follow directly from the 
practice of economy and would develop towards what Smith envisioned as the  future 
of England, namely opulence and improvement; or the possibility of its exhaustion 
would follow directly from the depletion or otherwise of the resources of nature. 
Second, for the later marginal theorists, growth would disappear altogether from 
scholarly analysis as the focus of the discipline shifted from specific marketplaces to 
an abstract notion of market efficiency. However, the development of the new concept 
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of the economy as a discrete object brought with it the possibility of new powers, new 
agencies, new politics, and new policies (e.g. Mitchell 1998, 2008). As I uncover in this 
thesis, the mid 20th century composition of the economy revitalised concerns with 
resource depletion. This brought about the necessity for the application of the 
generalised, economic scarcity of the neoclassical economists, and a new conception 
of growth. This was subsequently stabilised over a quarter century period beginning 
around 1950, through the innovation of new economic techniques and technologies 
and the subsequent construction and reconstruction of energy and the environment. 
The promiscuous history of growth 
If we want to understand the development of the great acceleration, it is necessary to 
undertake something other than a natural history of the economy, energy and 
environment. I maintain that a promiscuous approach - sensitive to the ways that 
these are composed as objects of politics - is required to appreciate how, through 
what means, and with what effect the growth of the economy would come to be seen 
as central to the nation state.  
Anthropocene, ecomarxist and ‘climate capitalism’ perspectives, in their attempt to 
de-naturalise their objects of enquiry, simultaneously naturalise the causal drivers and 
contexts they use to explain the development of these objects. These explanans are 
then rendered as often silent, ahistorical, and divorced from the materially and 
technologically composed, contested and recomposed objects themselves. Grasping 
and ultimately contesting the very contemporary focus on economic growth with its 
manifest environmental impacts requires that its causes not be reduced to the simply 
human, nor to a fetishised fossil fuel, nor indeed to capitalism. Instead, the relations 
between these apparent causes need to be brought within the ambit of study and their 
material instantiation traced over the quarter century period beginning in the middle of 
the 20th century.  
Before the expansion of monetary flows, Keynes’ analysis of their circulation, the 
innovations of econometrics and the development of national accounts and GNP, if 
growth was discussed at all, it was imagined, following the classical political 
economists as inhering directly in the development of new territories, cities, 
manufactures and markets, the expansion of trade and, most crucially, the population 
(Mitchell 1998: 90). The economy as an object of political and academic concern, as 
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outlined above, was tabulated into existence from the mid 1930s, through the new 
metrics of national income accounting and GNP. But these measurements were 
focused on the increased frequency with which paper money changed hands, and not 
the accumulation of wealth as had previously been counted. Following this new 
conception of the economy ‘it became both possible and necessary to imagine 
economic growth in new terms, not as material and spatial extension but as the 
internal intensification of the totality of relations defining the economy as an 
object.’ (Mitchell, 1998:90) The economy, in the process of its development, was 
therefore torn away from its direct material basis.  
The growth of the economy did not inhere in, nor was it measured by, the expansion of 
population, the conquest and settling of new land, the development of agriculture or 
the trade in new commodities. Instead, ‘[i]t could grow without any problem of physical 
or territorial limits.’ (Mitchell 2011:139) And given this lack of limits, without fear of 
ending, ultimately, in the unavoidable ‘declining melancholy’ of Adam Smith’s 
stationary state. Ironically, the development of the economy as a dematerialised object 
capable of apparently infinite growth would result in a refocusing of attention on the 
material resources of the nation. That is, while the development of the economy, as a 
separate, measurable and observable sphere of monetary flows was elevated to the 
level of both essential freedom and natural necessity, this rapidly brought about a 
concern with this essential growth. The economy was not immediately disinterred from 
its earthy, material constraints. Instead, the natural resource base of the national 
economy was itself brought crashing back into the ambit of political and economic 
consideration in several ways.  
First, through the developing cold war the possibility of the growth of the national 
economy was converted into an absolute necessity. In the postwar world of evidently 
exhausted mineral and other natural resources, the need for economic growth, 
understood as the intensification of monetary flows within spatially constrained national 
boundaries, would at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, bring the 
Reverend Malthus heaving back from the dead; and as the ghost of economics past, 
the pessimism of resource scarcity would begin rattling its filthy chains around the 
new, and essential, national economy.  
Second, from about the mid-1930s, and at the same time as the economy was being 
constructed as a discrete and ontologically secure object, the various mineral fuels and 
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other power sources that sustained the means of production and consumption in the 
US were beginning to be reconsidered not as separate sources of power, but as a 
total system of energy. This system was perceived as complexly interrelated and in 
need of overall coordination in order to enable continued growth.  
Third, during the postwar years, a concern with environmental despoliation would 
continue to grow as the settling of the economy as a central object of politics would be 
seen to result in ever broader, non-local and pervasive environmental impacts. 
Eventually, and shortly after both the growth of the economy and the energy to fuel this 
growth had been secured by a raft of new economic techniques and technologies, this 
very certainty was reconstructed as a fundamental problem, and the environment was 
brought to objective life in opposition to the economy.  
This would not last however, and fourth, from the late 1960s through to the mid 
1970s, both energy and the environment would be reconstructed in such a way as to 
undermine this opposition and reinstall the primacy of growth. It is to these changes, 
the relational, performative and therefore promiscuous history of the contemporary 
composition of the economy, energy and the environment and the eventual 
development of growth as a core ‘law of the social world’ that I now turn.  
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4. Economy 
In 1949, the US economy was born. Or, to put it a different way, in 1949, in the US, 
‘the economy’ was born. Or to put it differently again, in 1949, eight years after Simon 
Kuznets, creator of the Gross National Product (GNP), had echoed Dr Frankenstein’s 
concern at the apparent vivacity of his own creation, and warned that ‘a national total 
facilitates the ascription of independent significance to that vague entity called the 
national economy’ (Kuznets 1941; cited in Mitchell 2005a:136) the independent 
significance of this vague entity was further assured by literally writing it into history. 
But this was a strange, self-abjuring birth. In 1949, the national economy, given form 
and figure as national income, GNP and other aggregates, averages and statistics, 
would be collated, compiled and projected back through American history in a single 
volume; the Bureau of the census’ landmark study: the Historical statistics of the 
United States 1789-1945 (United States 1949). And in this way would find that it 
always and already existed.  
This volume was developed as a supplement to the annually produced Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, and was overseen by the Social Science Research 
Council Committee (SSRCC) on the Source Book of Historical Statistics. The 
Chairman of the SSRCC at the time, the economist J. Frederick Dewhurst, who was 
also the Executive Director of an organisation called the Twentieth Century Fund  was 4
instrumental to this project. In a memorandum dated April 12th 1945, Dewhurst wrote 
of the need for ‘a volume which would bring together within a single cover the most 
important of the comprehensive statistical series measuring the economic 
development of the United States over the past century or more.’ (United States 
1949:vi). Comprised of over 3000 time series, within fourteen formal categories  over 5
363 pages, the Historical statistics of the United States 1789-1945 would represent 
for the first time, in one single place, the entire economic history of the US. But it did 
more than this. By retrojecting Kuznet’s GNP and other national income figures in the 
 The Fund was originally incorporated as the nonprofit ‘Co-Operative League’ in 4
Massachusetts, and would later be renamed as The Century Foundation.
 e.g. Wealth and Income; Population Characteristics and Migration; Vital Statistics, health and 5
Nutrition.
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form of a series of partial estimations  the Historical Statistics didn’t, in fact, uncover 6
the history of a heretofore existing object - the US national economy; rather, it 
tabulated and transcribed this object into historical existence. This enumeration 
constructed the specific US economy as a historical object, and at the same time 
helped reinforce the idea of the economy as transhistorical. The economy measurable 
in the form of GNP was rendered outside of the flow of history and therefore capable 
of containing, of bearing, a history of its own.  
The birth of the economy as a discrete object in the world, whose corporeal presence 
could be captured and weighed by the new aggregate statistical measures pioneered 
from the mid 1930s onwards, had been substantially completed by 1949. As with all 
new arrivals however, the occasion was also marked with a certain amount of 
Trepidation. In 1947, two years before the publication of the Historical Statistics, J. 
Frederick Dewhurst had been responsible for another study - on the natural resources 
of the US, the impact of the war on these, and how future use would affect the 
economic position of the nation. America’s Needs and Resources (Twentieth Century 
Fund 1947) sought to undertake a comprehensive audit of the material position of the 
US, and was a highly influential volume. Dewhurst’s work here would help set the tone 
for the widespread post-war concern over the apparent depletion of natural resources 
in the US and help usher in a reinvigorated postwar Malthusian pessimism.  
This chapter begins by tracing the relationship between Dewhurst’s two concerns. It 
unravels how the construction of the economy resulted in a new and overriding 
political focus on its growth in the aftermath of the second world war, and how this 
would itself result in the manifest fear of resource depletion and the devastating impact 
this would have on the economy. In response to this fear, on June 2nd 1952, The 
President’s materials Policy Commission (PMPC) published its report: Resources for 
Freedom: Foundations for Growth and Security. More commonly referred to as the 
Paley Report after its Chair, the Columbia Broadcasting Service (CBS) Chairman, 
William S. Paley. Alongside a comprehensive assessment of both historical and 
contemporary mineral, energy and agricultural resource use over its five volumes, the 
report projected the basic economic characteristics of American society over a twenty 
 e.g. time series A 154-164 which represented National Income from 1799-1938 as estimates 6
of realised private product income.
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five year span and included the prospect and potential extent of any materials 
shortages over this period.  
The Paley Commission would begin the process of securing the economy as an 
apparently tangible object in the world bounded spatially and temporally to the nation 
state, and defined first and foremost by a naturalised law of limitless growth 
irrespective of any material constraints. For Mitchell (2011:177, footnote 10), the issue 
of the scarcity of oil and other fuels - considered under the rubric of natural resources - 
is laid to rest by the Paley commission report. This is not quite the case however. While 
the conceptual and methodological innovations of the Paley commission helped to 
further secure the notion of the economy, concerns continued throughout the 1950s 
regarding the ongoing use of increasingly limited resources and the resurgent 
necessity for conservation measures. At the same time, the necessity of the growth of 
the economy was increasingly bearing down on the American political consciousness, 
given the ever increasing weight of comparison between the new national account 
statistics (Arndt 1978: 50-51).  
Ultimately, these post war concerns were finally exorcised by work undertaken at the 
end of the 1950s and early 1960s by Resources For the Future (RFF), the think 
established in 1952 by William Paley in the wake of his commission report. Studies 
that were published in 1962 and 1963 by RFF were widely read and would kill off the 
lingering fears of resource scarcity, formalising growth as the fundamental logic of the 
economy. By 1964 the growth of the economy had come to occupy ’an exalted 
position in the hierarchy of goals of government policy, both in the United States and 
abroad, both in advanced and in less developed countries, both in centrally controlled 
and decentralized economies.’ (Tobin 1964:1). This chapter tells this story - of how, in 
postwar America, the economy got its growth. 
The necessity of growth 
In 1940, President Roosevelt had proclaimed ‘freedom from want’ as one of the basic 
‘four freedoms’. Similarly, ‘economic advancement for all’ was one of the peace aims 
of the Anglo-American alliance as laid out in 1941’s Atlantic Charter. While these 
espoused aims sought economic advancement as the means to the material 
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betterment of humanity after the war, the settling, during the 1940s, of ‘the economy’ 
as a spatially bounded entity coterminous not only with national borders, but with the 
foundation of the nation itself, would result in both the development of a new politics of 
growth, and driven by this, new attempts within the economics discipline to theorise 
the growth of the economy (Arndt 1978:33). In the US, the legacy of the great 
Depression and New Deal resulted in a continuation of Keynesian macroeconomics 
oriented around a doctrinal concern with secular stagnation. This approach was 
particularly associated with Alvin Hansen, the Harvard Professor of Economics who 
was known as the ‘American Keynes’.  
Within this rarefied air of US Keynesianism, the construction of ‘the economy’ as an 
observable totality provided - with the development of GNP and other macro-
economic statistics - a ready marker of potential catastrophe; and indeed, every dip in 
economic activity and employment in the late 1940s was suspected of heralding the 
long-feared return to depression. Hansen himself believed that the war was merely a 
delay to an ultimate reckoning, and along with the majority of the American economics 
establishment, believed that a return to peace would result in deficit aggregate 
demand and mass unemployment (Arndt 1978:28). 
The economy and the fear of postwar depression 
Paul Samuelson, one of Alvin Hansen’s students at Harvard, was influential in 
propagating this concern with secular decline. In 1943, he wrote in the volume 
Postwar economic problems that ‘the most important of [the post-war economic] 
problems is that of providing for continuing full employment’ (cited in Arndt 1978:27). 
Later, in The New Republic magazine in September 1944, Samuelson warned again 
that victory in Europe would result in an increase in unemployment or 
underemployment of around five million (Samuelson 1944; cited in Lekachman 
1966:147). This view was corroborated by a series of econometric projections based 
on pre-war consumption estimates , that predicted the number of unemployed by the 7
first spring after the cessation of hostilities to be anywhere between 5 and 11 million. 
(Lekachman 1966:138)  
 Notably, these estimates neglected to include war time personal savings and estimations of 7
deferred demand.
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Unemployment was not merely an obscure academic concern either. On December 1st 
1943, the Pabst Brewing company of Milwaukee announced an essay competition on 
the theme of US post-war employment and future economic growth. They received 
over 35,000 entries. It was in this atmosphere of manifest concerns over 
unemployment and the return to depression, that Congress passed the Employment 
Act of 1946. This imposed on the Federal Government the requirement to maintain at 
least ‘high levels of employment’ (Arndt 1978:28), and in order to help implement the 
act, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) was set up to advise the President on 
national economic policies. Indeed, one early member of the Council, and its second 
Chairman (from 1949-1953), Leon Keyserling, had, with all the dull prognostication of a 
fairground fortune teller, already pre-empted the CEA three years earlier by advocating 
for a council of economic experts in his submission to the Pabst competition. His 
essay was placed second (Pickens 2009:122)  8
The development of the CEA effectively institutionalised the discipline of economics 
within the White House, placing this at the centre of political discourse, and indeed in 
‘a position that enabled economics to situate itself in the postwar period as the true 
political science’ (Mitchell 1998:88-89). This ‘true political science’, as [agricultural 
economist] Edwin Nourse, the first President of the CEA would later claim, was 
focused clearly on the newly defined object of the economy: 
Passage of the Employment Act not only constituted a formal recognition of the 
integral character of the economics of the economy, but also set up a specific 
machinery for dealing with this problem in the spirit of science, with the best 
tools that economic science can provide, and with trained scientific personnel. 
(Nourse, 1953:15-16; cited in Mitchell 1998:89) 
These personnel, bearing the tools of economics and built into a government 
machinery increasingly focused on the economy and its problems, could situate 
themselves as presidential viziers , capable of translating GNP and other statistical 9
measures into meaningful and programmatic macro-economic policy prescriptions 
aimed at addressing the much feared economic decline. The concern with post-war 
depression that resulted in the development of the CEA was not unique to the US 
 Keyserling was at that point a consultant economist to the Senate. The first place Pabst 8
essay winner was Henry Stein who would later act as CEA Chairman from 1972-1974.
 similarly to the process under RAND with respect to the air force.9
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either, and one of the last reports published by the League of Nations in 1945 was 
focused on employment and stability measures for the post-war world (Arndt 
1978:28). However, the fear of mass unemployment accompanying the depression 
heralded by Hansen and his peers would not for long survive the end of the war. 
Although initially resistant in the face of high employment and booming demand in the 
mid-to-late 1940s, this would eventually give way to concerns over precisely this 
demand and the potential inflationary pressures that it presaged. This change was 
adroitly captured by the preface of a book on US income stabilisation begun in 1946 
but not finished until 1953: 
This book…was conceived in 1946 at a a time when it appeared that all the 
instruments of policy might have to be mobilized to meet the problem of a major 
postwar depression. Later, when first drafts of some of the chapters became 
available, it seemed inconceivable that there could be a threat to stability from 
any cause but inflation. (Millikan 1953:v; cited in Arndt 1978:29) 
Conjured out of the corpus of statistics that settled the weight of the newly 
constructed national economy, the fear of depression and decline that spread from the 
American Keynesians to the public at large would rapidly subside in the US. However, 
the federal government’s response to this fear - in the form of the 1946 employment 
act and the President’s Council of Economic Advisors - would prove to have a broader 
and more tenacious impact. The solution proposed to the problems of the economy - 
initially depression, then a fear of inflation - by these economic experts was quite 
straightforward: The economy must grow. In October 1949 Leon Keyserling, in the first 
week of his appointment as acting Chairman of the CEA, would expound on his core 
idea of ‘expansion economics’ in the first of his Monthly reports to President Truman. 
Likely the earliest substantive, official pronouncement in favour of the growth of the 
economy as a policy objective (Arndt 1978:35), Keyserling would claim: 
We need more than a slight upward trend of business and employment… 
Economic stability requires economic growth, and the maximum employment 
and production objectives of the Employment Act require an expanding economy 
from year to year… We believe that your announced goal of a 300 billion 
economy is not just a slogan; it is the central solution to the core problems of our 
economy. (cited in Arndt 1978:35) 
The call for growth explicit in the ‘expansion economics’ ushered in by Keyserling 
echoed for the next three years as the ‘theme song of the Council of Economic 
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Advisors’ (Smithies 1951; cited in Arndt 1978:35); and from 1949 this song would be 
played to a more explosive beat.  
Expansion economics and security 
The detonation of the first Soviet atom bomb in August 1949, two months prior to 
Keyserling’s first monthly report, would help ignite a new anxiety in the US, and the 
concern with security would be further inflamed in the minds of policymakers by both 
the release on April 14th 1950, of the National Security Council’s NSC-68 report - with 
its depiction of an uncontrollable and monstrous Soviet threat; and the entrance, one 
month later, of the US into war on the Korean Peninsula. These new security threats 
immediately reinforced the necessity of economic growth, and an expanding economy 
rapidly came to be seen as the basis of a response to these threats to the nation. In 
the three years between 1949 and 1952, growth became a nascent political concern 
not simply as a means for the achievement of human material betterment, but 
because the economy as an object could grow, and above all - with the creeping fear 
of what Walter Lippmann initially named (borrowing from George Orwell) the ‘cold war’ 
- must grow. 
By 1950 the call for economic growth had been heard not just in the US, but around 
the globe. In May of that year, the UN Economic Commission for Europe published the 
third volume in its Economic Survey of Europe series. Produced under the auspices of 
the UN’s first Executive secretary, Gunnar Myrdal, and its first Director of research, 
Nicholas Kaldor, the survey marked a distinct shift of emphasis from growth as a 
means to full employment and the avoidance of a post-war depression, to full 
employment as a means to economic growth as a central concern. While Myrdal wrote 
in the preface of this report on the importance of an expanding economy and the 
expansion of production in order to raise living standards, the shift from growth as 
means to growth as goal should be located with respect not just to the development 
of an expansion economics programme, but with the recent construction of the 
economy as an object defined primarily by its growth.  
The survey took a dim view of what it characterised as a tendency within Western 
Europe to regard the current economic programmes as part of some short-term and 
exceptional measures, rather than as the initial phase of a long term drive for 
economic growth (Arndt 1978:37), growth that the survey authors took as 
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unproblematic and assured: ‘A basic assumption underlying the perspective of a more 
rapid growth in the future is that it will be a steady and cumulative 
development’ (quoted in Arndt 1978:37). This evidently deplorable lack of concern in 
Western Europe with secular growth was contrasted in the report with the focus on 
growth in both the Soviet Union, with its aim to treble industrial output within about 
twenty years, and the US, with its expectation of matching Truman and Keyserling’s 
desire, and increasing national income by a quarter, to 300 billion USD in just five years 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1950:98). 
Stephen Purdey has argued that in keeping with the doctrine of neoclassical 
economics, the post war renaissance in explaining and enhancing processes of 
growth required a numerical indicator as a means to measure forward motion (Purdey 
2010:79), and that GNP served as that newly developed indicator. Contrary to the 
causal direction of this claim however, it is rather that the development of the 
economy, enumerated into discrete existence in large part through the development of 
GNP, that resulted in this new and urgent policy concern with growth; and through the 
very possibility of comparison shaped the nascent cold war into what economist 
Richard Norgaard referred to as the ‘great GNP race’ of the US and USSR (Norgaard 
2001; cited in Purdey 2010:79). Not only did the new aggregate statistics enable the 
national economy to be measured into ever sharper existence then, but GNP and the 
very possibility of comparison that it allowed created new and further pressures for the 
cold war.  
In 1952, Simon Kuznets noted that the development of academic economists’ 
‘interest in problems of economic growth [was] largely an aftermath of current 
events’ (quoted in Arndt 1978:35), and the rapid segue from depression fears to 
security concerns can be seen as marking the development of the contemporary 
interest in the growth of the economy by both policy-makers and the economics 
profession at large (Purdey 2010:78). However, in the case of the economics 
discipline, this should not be considered as simply a return to a classical economic 
concern with growth after the interregnum of the neoclassicals and their focus on 
market efficiency. Instead, the economy, as a newly imagined, tabulated and 
historically reconstructed object brings with it both the possibility and the necessity of 
imagining growth in new ways (Mitchell 1998:90). This new understanding of growth is 
driven by the newly developed machinery of the economy: increasing monetary flows 
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within and between nationally bounded territories, new economic techniques and 
technologies of measurement, developed by the ‘true political science’ of economics, 
operated by the personnel of this discipline, and pushed into pre-eminence by the 
developing architecture of the cold war.  
In the same way that the modern conception of ‘the economy’ differs from classical 
economic notions of economy as a process, the modern understanding of growth - 
specifically the growth of ‘the economy’, is not equivalent to its classical forebear. The 
politics of this new growth would derive, in the first instance, from the continuation of 
an American Keynesian programme that was overwhelmingly concerned with a post-
war return to depression, and when this depression failed to arrive the concern with 
national security would take over as the driver of a concern with growth. Indeed, the 
developing cold war converted the possibility of the growth of the national economy 
into an absolute necessity. In the post-war world of apparently exhausted natural 
resources, the need for economic growth, understood as the intensification of 
monetary flows within spatially constrained national boundaries, would at the end of 
the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, bring the Reverend Malthus heaving back from 
the dead; and as the ghost of economics past, the pessimism of resource scarcity 
would begin rattling its filthy chains around the new, and essential, national economy. 
The scarcity of natural resources 
On May 31st 1945, Harold Ickes, who was then Secretary of the Interior, wrote to 
President Truman proposing: ‘a world conservation conference following the end of the 
war’. Ickes explained that ‘the war has taken a heavy toll of the forests, the oil, the 
coal, and the iron and other metals’ (cited in Goodwin 1981a:10), and he maintained 
that the demands for these materials could hardly be expected to diminish in 
peacetime. For Ickes, a world conference would enable an inventory of natural 
resources to be developed on a global scale, and allow the extent of natural resource 
depletion to be properly evaluated. Following this, techniques for conservation could 
be established, including the development of synthetic fuel sources and the prevention 
of the private monopolisation of natural resources. This initial attempt by Ickes to 
establish the Interior Department’s responsibility for both international and domestic 
natural resource issues was promptly cut short when the proposed conference was 
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delayed for four years. This postponement would not deter Ickes and his staff for long 
however, and in November 1945, he held a five day ‘Post-war resources Institute’ in 
the Department.  
The urgency of Ickes’ vision and his desire to convert the Department of the Interior 
into what would in effect be a Department of Energy, Resources, and the Environment 
was underlined by the institute’s emphasis on the status of post-war scarcity in the 
US, and its growing dependence on foreign natural resources of all kinds. Alongside 
this, in the immediate post-war years, the umbral fear of growing resource shortages 
would begin to stain the bright minds of American economists and policy makers. The 
potential shortfall in the availability of uranium, the observation of hugely disruptive 
British coal shortages, and shift from the US as net exporter of oil to net importer all 
heightened concerns about the continued availability of mineral fuel sources. In 1950 
W.E. Warne would state at the fourth World Power Conference that “… the rate of 
extraction of coal and oil gives rise to anxiety as to the future sources of energy for 
power production” (Warne 1950; cited in Putnam 1953:117).  
Dewhurst, neo-Malthusianism, and the postwar resource scarcity 
In the face of presidential reticence over the expansion of the Interior Department and 
changing national goals, Ickes’ vision for a single department in charge of national 
energy policy never came to pass (Goodwin 1981a:14). For the Truman administration, 
the push for an expanded remit smacked of a New Deal Planning philosophy - with 
which Truman himself was never comfortable, and with the newly developing fear of 
communist expansionism, the nation’s natural resources and energy were considered 
too important to be entrusted to a single department (Goodwin 1981a:14-16). While 
the development of the Interior Department as an institutional locus for energy and 
resource issues stalled in 1945, the importance of these concerns would be further 
reinforced for the Truman administration and the general public at large by intermittent 
shortages in all of the major fuel sources - particularly in the winter months - following 
the war.  
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These shortages were temporary, and more often than not related to bottlenecks in 
refinery capacity, steel shortfalls or transportation issues rather than the outright 
scarcity of resources. However, the fact that these were accompanied by significant 
price rises and ongoing public uncertainty as to whether they were merely short run 
issues or long term problems raised the spectre of neo-Malthusian pessimism 
regarding the status of material resources (Goodwin 1981a:32). The moans of this 
shambling revenant would only get louder to the public ear with President Truman’s 
decision to involve the US in the economic recovery of Europe through what would 
become known as the Marshall Plan. Arising almost immediately from this decision 
were the questions of what this would mean for the US, and how this would stress an 
already depleted resource base (Goodwin 1981a:32). In the middle of this developing 
concern, J. Frederick Dewhurst, the principal force behind the Statistical History of the 
United States, would undertake, at least with respect to the US, the kind of inventory 
of natural resources and assessment of resource depletion that Harold Ickes had 
proposed in 1945, but failed to bring to fruition. Dewhurst’s project added the weight 
of numbers to the burgeoning fear of resource depletion and further discoloured the 
mouldering American imagination. 
Dewhurst was, during the war years a staff economist with the Twentieth Century 
Fund. In this capacity he was tasked with producing both a wide-ranging audit of the 
material and economic position of the US, as well as the vastly more difficult task of 
projecting forward the trends revealed by this research. In May 1947, this project 
would reach fruition with the publication of America’s Needs and Resources. Here, 
Dewhurst, alongside the many federal and state employees who were involved in 
developing the analysis, actually helped undermine depression fears through 
estimations of deferred consumption and capital goods demand - which were argued 
to be as high as 60 billion USD (Twentieth Century Fund 1947:653). Alongside this 
however, the report was clear to state that ‘The Development of the American 
economy has been determined in large measure by the natural resources at our 
disposal and by our ability to obtain from them the raw materials that supply the 
foundation of our economic activity’ (1947:573). What was of real concern here then, 
was the impact of the war on the US’ natural resource base. The war brought home to 
the American people, Dewhurst argued, the fact that while the US was ‘blessed with a 
wider abundance of natural resources than any other industrial nation (with the 
possible exception of the Soviet Union)’ (1947:675), they were not self-sufficient in a 
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wide array of essential raw minerals. Moreover, Dewhurst and his co-authors would 
reinforce the view that the preceding global conflagration had burned too bright, for 
too long, and in the process: 
It “chewed up” enormous quantities of iron, copper, lead, zinc and aluminium, 
much of which will never be recovered for further use. The war also resulted in a 
vast consumption of petroleum, and to a less extent of other exhaustible mineral 
fuels. On the whole, the war left the United States with a depleted supply of most 
natural resources, and a critical situation so far as some of the most essential 
minerals are concerned. Petroleum, copper, lead and zinc “present” the most 
important scarcity problems for the future.” (Twentieth Century Fund, 1947:675) 
America’s Needs and Resources was covered in Fortune, Life, Business Weekly, 
Forbes and the New Yorker magazines as well as numerous other periodicals, and this 
dense, 800 page tome proved so popular as to exhaust its initial print run in just three 
weeks, was reprinted in the fourth week, and again in September 1947. That same 
month, the American Broadcasting Company aired a special radio documentary based 
on the report (Twentieth Century Fund 1947). In 1949 - the same year as the Statistical 
History - It was reprinted for the fifth time alongside a simplified graphical 
representation of the report’s findings in a volume entitled: U.S.A., Measure of a 
Nation, and a series of three essays based on this new volume were printed in 40 of 
the nation’s leading newspapers (Twentieth Century Fund 1950). The popular 
dissemination and discussion of Dewhurst’s work here would help set the tone for the 
widespread post-war concern over the apparent depletion of natural resources in the 
US and help usher in a postwar neo-Malthusian pessimism. 
While the report echoed the absolute resource scarcity concerns of Malthus, Dewhurst 
himself was in fact somewhat sanguine about the ability of future needs of the 
economy to be met by this depleted supply of natural resources - which he maintained 
could be provided through the expansion of overseas trade. However, the concern 
that the nation’s material bounty had been exhausted was spread like a pox through 
the broader American public by a glut of popular books that followed the Dewhurst 
report. In 1948 Fairfield Osborn published his best-selling book Our Plundered Planet 
(1948), and this was shortly followed, also in 1948, by the even more popular Road to 
Survival (1948) by William Vogt. These books reinvigorated fears of a neo-Malthusian 
apocalypse driven by resource scarcity and rapidly increasing population (Desrochers 
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& Hoffbauer 2009; Foster 1998; Hays 1959:41-42). As a contemporary reviewer noted 
at the time: 
As a means of attracting the public’s attention to an over-all problem, “Road to 
Survival” and its prototype, “Our Plundered Planet”, certainly have great value. 
Both books are filled with a wide variety of valuable information. But they make 
one shudder, and create fear, with a minimum of suggestions as to how we are 
to extricate ourselves from the dilemma they so ably portray. (Cooke 1949:210) 
These books not only grabbed the American public’s attention, but their reach 
extended both beyond popular purview and America’s borders. Julian Huxley, the first 
director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cutural Organization 
(UNESCO), argued that Osborne’s book ‘draws attention, in a forceful and compelling 
way, to one of the most urgent problems of our times…A new ethical attitude is 
required, in which the proper conservation of the natural and human resources of 
every country is regarded as a moral duty.’ (quoted in Barnett & Morse 1963:28) In 
1948, under Huxley’s auspices, UNESCO would inaugurate the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), an organisation dedicated to 
the preservation and conservation of the natural world, and later, in 1961, Huxley 
would go on to co-found the conservationist organisation the World Wildlife Fund.  
Coinciding with both the publication of U.S.A., Measure of a Nation, and the Historical 
statistics of the United States 1789-1945, in 1949 the Hoover commission reported to 
President Truman and the Congress would reflect both of Dewhurst’s concerns when it 
stated, with respect to natural resource policy that: ‘…Federal activities in this field 
must therefore be studied in the full light of the part which these resources play in our 
whole manner of life…our country has reached a point in its development that calls for 
a new concept of the relation of natural resources to its economy.’ (quoted in Barnett 
& Morse 1963:21).  
Economy and scarcity: the postwar fears over growth 
The economic technologies and metrics that helped bring about the existence of the 
economy as a de-materialised sphere of monetary flows capable of ever increasing 
intensification and therefore growth, did not result in this growth being perceived as 
unproblematic. How and through what means could the economy - as measured by 
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Gross National Product (GNP) - grow? As I argued in the last chapter, prior to the 
1940s, growth, in the form of the material expansion of territory, population and trade 
was largely taken for granted as both a good, and natural outcome of economy. 
Growth was a natural outcome of material expansion. The acquisition of more land 
and territories, the founding of new cities, developing new markets and trades and 
growing populations were both the means to and measure of growth. For the classical 
political economists, growth at some point must end in stagnation as the limits of the 
land are reached, but with the exception of Malthus, this end was usually conceived of 
as in the far distant future.  
The development of the economy as an object in itself however, required that growth 
be considered both in new terms and as a new priority. Initially a resurgent fear of 
post-war depression in the US, enabled and abetted by the development of the new 
raft of aggregate statistical tools measuring the new economy, would result in the 
explicit and institutional prioritisation of economic growth via the development of the 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). From 1949 onwards, the tenor of this call would 
rapidly change, under the influence of the burgeoning cold war, into a concern not with 
economic growth to meet other policy ends, but with a concern with the growth of the 
economy as the primary object of US politics. In this sense, the growth of the 
economy, similarly to Mitchell’s arguments regarding the economy itself, should not be 
considered as some long-standing, objective order of the world, brought down on 
stone tablets from Scotland by Adam Smith himself. Instead, the growth of the 
economy as a preeminent policy objective is a much younger, and indeed 
predominantly post-war concern.  
This new concern almost immediately reinvigorated concerns regarding the newly 
quantified scarcity of natural resources. The resulting fear of mass resource depletion 
during the war reasserted and fed into questions of the longer term security of the US, 
a country with an administration increasingly frightened of the now atomic glow of the 
Soviet bogeyman. In July 1953, the English Economist P.D. Wiles wrote an article in 
the American quarterly Foreign Affairs (Wiles 1953) that would meet with a responsive 
audience in the US. Wiles echoed both George Kennan’s famous 1946 Long Telegram 
from Moscow with its emphasis on the ‘irrational rapacity’ of the Soviet union, as well 
as the UN Economic commission for Europe’s concern with the growth of communist 
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economies. He argued that ‘For the aims of Communism are boundless: a new man 
or a new earth - the whole earth’, and: 
…that by whatever other criteria economies may be judged, Communism is at 
any rate beating ‘capitalism’, whether in the form of laissez-faire or of the welfare 
state, in its rate of growth. And in a long cold war the rate of growth is the most 
important thing, for in the end the country that grows most becomes biggest, 
and every economic advantage belongs to it, be it military power, dominance in 
world markets or even a high standard of living. (Wiles 1953) 
Although Wiles lamented the ‘mendacity’ of Soviet statistics (Wiles 1953), he made 
use of what he argued were the most reliable of these figures in comparing the growth 
of Soviet and Western economies and came to the conclusion that ‘Soviet economic 
development betters all recorded data for the West’ (Wiles 1953). Wiles’ particular 
figures were not unchallenged (Arndt 1978:48), but what is important here is that the 
very availability of aggregate measures of the economy enabled comparison between 
nations. Subsequently ‘In the 1950s momentous political importance came 
increasingly to be attached to…comparisons of growth rates’ (Norgaard 2001; cited in 
Purdey 2010:79). As the grinding mechanical howl of the second world war began to 
fade at the beginning of the 1950s, a resurrected Malthusian concern with the 
absolute scarcity of material resources - in the form of energy - began to take hold. 
With the upward ratchet of the great GNP race, and the US being thrust back onto a 
war footing with its May 1950 entrance into conflict in Korea, this fear would become 
the cold war’s keening echo: Were there enough energy resources available for the 
necessary growth of the economy? Were the lights going to go out? Was the US, and 
with it the free world, in danger of being left behind in the cold gloom of the Soviet 
shadow? 
Resources for Freedom, resources for growth 
In the same year that America’s Needs and Resources was released, the National 
Security Resources Board (NSRB) was established by the National Security Act of 
1947. The NSRB’s purpose was to maintain up-to-date information on essential 
material resources and facilities in case of the outbreak of war (Goodwin 1981a:16), 
and while it was originally an independent office, in 1949 it was transferred to the 
Executive office of the President upon the recommendation of the Hoover Commission 
and here concern only increased regarding the potential availability of resources in 
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both peacetime and wartime (Goodwin 1981a:18-19). Shortly after his arrival as 
chairman of the NSRB in 1950, W. Stuart Symington formally approached William 
Paley, after his recommendation by Frank Stanton, and appealing to his patriotic 
streak, would ask him to head up a special NSRB committee (Smith 1990:312).  
By the end of the year this NSRB committee had been converted into a Presidential 
commission, and on January 22nd, 1951, the White House announced that Paley 
would lead a five man group known as the President’s Materials Policy Commission. In 
a letter to Paley dated that same day, the President made clear the threat of ‘the 
nation’s materials problem’ and that shortages of material resources could not be 
allowed to jeopardise either national security or economic expansion. In order to 
respond to this materials problem, the Commission, funded under the National 
Defence budget, was to undertake a detailed review of the future supply of mineral, 
energy and agricultural resources in the US; including the prospect and potential 
extent of any materials shortages over a twenty-five-year period, and propose policy 
responses to deal with these.  
The PMPC was initially tasked with producing their report within six months. However, 
after four months, Paley told Truman that the job would in fact take a further year to 
complete. In spite of this, money was no object for the commission and in total the 
federal government spent around USD 900,000. The President’s support for the 
project also extended to his telling cabinet officers to make both personnel and 
information available to the commission as and when they required (Smith 1990:315). 
Alongside Paley, the PMPC was formed of five other commissioners. Eric Hodgins was 
an engineer from MIT, former managing editor of Fortune magazine, and was chosen 
for the commission precisely because of his skills as a writer (Smith 1990:313). Philip 
Coombs was the Executive Director of the Commission and was an economics 
professor at Amherst College. Coombs, had also previously been employed at the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) set up in 1948 to administer the Marshall 
Plan and was also a previous candidate for the position of Director of the Division of 
Minerals and Fuels when it was first created in the Interior Department in 1950 under 
Secretary Chapman’s order 2602 (Goodwin 1981a:45) 
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The remaining members of the commission were George Rufus Brown who was the 
head of the contracting firm Brown & Root ; the Republican fundraiser Arthur H. 10
Bunker, who had moved from investment banking at Lehman Brothers to the minerals 
extraction company Climax Molybdenum; and Edward S. Mason, an economist who 
ran Harvard’s graduate school of public administration. As Coombs later noted: 
It was no accident that the majority of commissioners were Republicans…And 
they were not just ordinary Republicans but important figures. We were likely to 
come out with controversial policy recommendations for government and 
industry. If you had a bunch of flaming liberals, you wouldn’t be taken seriously. It 
was pretty hard to make an attack on Bunker, who was a fund-raiser for 
Republicans. Some might call that calculation, I called it common sense. (Smith 
1990:314) 
On June 2nd 1952, seventeen months after the announcement of its formation, the 
Commission transmitted its five volume report: Resources for Freedom: Foundations 
for Growth and Security, to the office of the President. 
The Paley report and the concern with growth 
When it was published, the PMPC report (usually referred to as the Paley Report) 
documented clearly the concerns with resource scarcity, and indicated how, in the US 
alone, consumption of petroleum and other mineral resources since the beginning of 
WWI had been greater than the total consumption of all the previous centuries put 
together (Kula 1998:112). This expansion in consumption was accompanied by a shift 
in the US position from net materials exporter to importer. In 1900, it produced 15 per 
cent more materials than it consumed, but by 1950 it was consuming 9 per cent more 
than it produced (Andrews 1999:183). Alongside these assessments of historical 
material resource use, the economy was given a future history through the 
commission’s 25 year growth projections of the 'basic economic characteristics of our 
society' (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:3), and given the provenance of the report, growth was a 
paramount concern for the commission and a key point of difference from the 
‘constant recycling of the ideas of the early New Deal and those usually associated 
with the names of Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot, and Robert Malthus’ (Maass 
1953:206). As the commissioners’ noted at the beginning of the report: 
 Later to become Kellogg, Brown & Root and subsequently sold to Halliburton.10
!52
…we share the belief of the American people in the principle of Growth. Granting 
that we cannot find any absolute reason for this belief we admit that to our 
Western minds it seems preferable to any opposite, which to us implies 
stagnation and decay. (PMPC Vol. 1, 1952:3) 
The staggering amorphousness of the commissioners account of growth - to our 
contemporary Western minds at least - is testament to its status as a newly developed 
concern following the construction of the economy; and although this blunt statement 
of belief in spite of any ‘absolute reason’ superficially echoes Adam Smith’s concern 
with the ‘declining melancholy’ of the stationary state (Smith; cited in Arndt 1978:7), 
what is clear here is that the focus on growth had taken on a different tenor to that of 
the first generation of classical economists (Mitchell 1998, 2005a, 2005b). As I 
discussed above, prior to the middle of the 20th century, growth was generally 
understood in terms of material expansion. More trades, more factories, more 
commodities produced, larger populations living in bigger cities and ultimately more 
land and larger empires. Growth and economy were organically interlinked with the 
former following naturally from the practice of the latter in the husbanding of resources. 
For the Paley commissioners, and amongst economic thinkers, politicians and the 
public at large, growth was now being considered as a defining characteristic of a 
specific object - ‘the economy’.  
Elsewhere, and apparently not content with basing a belief in growth on the apparent 
preferences of the ‘Western mind’, the report also states that its 25 year projections 
are based on a quantified, but equally unqualified presumption that the historic 
average rate of growth of 3 per cent a year would continue over the 25 year period of 
the report’s projections (Maass 1953: 207). As I have already discussed, this historic 
average was itself constructed after the fact through the work of Kuznets in developing 
the GNP, and through organisations like the Bureau of the Census and SSRCC in 
reconstructing national accounts figures back through time to the founding of the 
nation.  
The Paley report’s growth projections were for a doubling of the size of US GNP, from 
273 billion dollars in 1950 to almost 550 billion dollars in 1975, a massive increase that 
would result in the US’ consumption of up to 20 per cent more raw materials than it 
would produce over the same period, further increasing its reliance on overseas 
imports (Andrews 1999:183) - particularly of oil (Calel 2011:7). The question of whether 
the growth of the economy could be maintained in the face of scarce resources lay at 
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the heart of Resources for Freedom. Coombs’ calculated common sense enabled the 
Commissioners to state clearly and succinctly the long term constraints on growth 
implicit in a reliance on finite natural sources; ‘It took nature over 500 million years to 
store in the ground these stockpiles of “fossil fuels” which civilisation is now 
consuming in a flash of geologic time’ (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:104). 
However, the Paley report undertook a fundamental break with the neo-Malthusian 
pessimism of previous assessments of the materials position of the US, such as 
Dewhurst’s 1947 analysis (Landsberg 1987), and it did this through a concerned focus 
on the growth of the economy. This approach was underpinned by two particular 
innovations. First, the report undertook a technical redefinition of the way that resource 
scarcity was measured: from the absolute scarcity of Dewhurst’s report to a relative 
economic scarcity. Second, and following this redefinition of natural resource scarcity, 
the report argued not for simple conservation and national self-sufficiency, but the 
expansion of overseas extractive industries under the banner of a ‘least cost principle’ 
in order to ensure future economic growth. It is to these two innovations of the Paley 
Commission that I will now turn. 
Scarcity and reserves 
In America’s Needs and Resources, Wilbert G. Fritz, a former Director of the Wartime 
Energy Resources Survey, and in 1947 a member of the War Assets Administration, 
had the responsibility of drafting the chapter on natural resources. Fritz maintained that 
several factors determined the ability of resource supplies to meet the demands of a 
growing economy: the extent and exhaustibility of existing reserves, economy in the 
use of materials, use of a wider variety of materials, and discovery of new sources. In 
calculating the first and last of these factors, Fritz collated figures from the National 
Resources Committee, the National Resources Planning Board, his own previous 
reports, Oil and Gas journal estimates and most importantly from the Bureau of Mines 
reports: the Minerals Yearbook and Mineral Resources of the United States. The 
figures from these sources were based on the measurement and estimation of 
absolute scarcity i.e. the physical stocks of reserves in ground. For example, for crude 
oil, estimations of reserves were generally made through volumetric analysis (Bowden 
1985:212), which involved four basic steps: First, the likely geographical distribution of 
oil basins was established; second, estimates of oil content per volume of sediments 
in known areas were collated; third, comparable amounts of oil per volume of 
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sediment were assumed in similar but unexplored geological areas; fourth, total 
reserves were calculated by multiplying the volume of unexplored sediments by the 
estimates of oil per unit volume in known areas.  
Volumetric analyses, alongside the other estimations of absolute scarcity that formed 
the basis of America’s Needs and Resources study of natural resources resulted in 
Fritz concluding that: ‘It is inevitable of course, as time goes on, that our supplies of 
mineral resources will come nearer to exhaustion and that our needs will be satisfied 
with less ease and at higher cost than before.’ (Twentieth Century Fund 1947:598) 
While this was no prelude to a clear cut Malthusian pessimism, ‘[g]iven a system that 
permits free access to the world’s resources, however, there can be no question of a 
raw material supply adequate to support and expanding American economy for many 
decades to come’ (Twentieth Century Fund 1947:598), with respect to oil production 
in the US, the writing was evidently on the wall: 
Although new supplies of petroleum will undoubtedly continue to be discovered 
in the future, we have probably passed the peak of discoveries. Naturally, every 
oil field found diminishes the chances of finding another one, and almost every 
new pool that is tapped produces at a steadily diminishing rate over its useful life. 
Thus, there may be diminishing production from diminishing reserves. (Twentieth 
Century Fund 1947:588) 
Fritz’ analysis of the nation’s long-term reserves of crude oil should in fact be seen as a 
continuation of pessimistic assessments of ultimate US oil reserves going back all the 
way back to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) first survey of reserves 
undertaken in 1909 by David T. Day. This initial assessment was integrated into the 
national inventory of mineral wealth and conducted under the supervision of the new 
National Conservation Commission, chaired by the head of forestry and renowned 
conservationist Gifford Pinchot (Maduriera 2012:143-144). The survey indicated that 
between 10 and 24 billion barrels of oil remained underground, and that this would last 
the country less than 25 years, if upward production and consumption trends were to 
continue (Day 1909; cited in Madureira 2012:144). Assessments of ultimately 
recoverable US oil retained this pessimistic conclusion over the next 40 years, in spite 
of constantly and indeed spectacularly increasing oil production levels, and in the next 
chapter I will indicate why this pessimism was prevalent in both governmental and 
industry oil surveys, and what role this pessimism played in the production of oil and oil 
industry profits.  
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In comparison to volumetric measures and other geological assessments of natural 
resources, the PMPC’s estimates and predictions focused instead on economic 
factors such as the costs and prices of end products derived from natural resources, 
and where ‘The growth of demand is at the core of the materials problem we 
face’ (cited in Maass 1953:206). Resource depletion was expressed through rising 
costs and was not considered as the absolute depletion of physical stocks but of the 
relative depletion of stocks with respect to each other. This crucial shift from absolute 
scarcity to (relative) price scarcity by combining the account of energy as a system of 
interchangeable fuel sources with the neoclassical notion of economic scarcity as ‘a 
kind of open-ended myth’ (Xenos 1989:35) — popularised by Lionel Robbins in his An 
Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932) — allowed the 
commissioners to abstain from the then common concern with resources running out 
(Landsberg 1987:85), and shift to a new conception of mineral reserves: 
Public judgements of the prospects for future petroleum supplies have frequently 
been distorted because of popular misconceptions concerning the nature of 
proved reserves. Time after time the fact that proved reserves were equivalent to 
only about 12 to 15 years’ production has come to the attention of publicists 
who have then sounded the alarm that the United States was about to run out of 
oil. Reserves must be considered not as a total reservoir from which all future 
production is to be drawn, but as the basis of operations, a sort of working 
inventory. Proved reserves are indeed like a reservoir, but a reservoir into which 
there is an inflow as well as an outflow. (PMPC vol. 3 1952:5; emphasis added) 
The inflow into the reservoir could be maintained simply by ensuring that the cost of 
new discoveries does not exceed the general price level of crude oil and associated 
petroleum products; therefore, as Hans Landsberg put it in his introduction to the 
reissued report in 1987 ‘It is a mistaken notion…that on a given day the world will find 
that the last ounce or foot of a given resource has been used up. At a cost there is 
always more.’ (Landsberg 1987:85; emphasis in original). This novel technical 
innovation of resources understood as working inventory - based on the combination 
of economic theory and reserves evaluation has the interesting property of effectively 
inverting the relationship of cost to material scarcity. For analyses prior to Paley such 
as Dewhurst, natural resource costs are high because they are scarce. However for 
Paley, high costs now enable the production of ever more resources, and therefore 
‘The fact that at any time reserves are only a little more than a decade’s outflow need 
not of itself be alarming if a steady inflow can be anticipated. (PMPC vol. 3 1952:5). In 
his 1953 review of the report Arthur Maas wrote that:  
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…the Paley approach can be used to introduce a degree of flexibility into 
analyses of conservation which, too often in the past, have become stuck on 
inflexible concepts of physical stocks of resources…No other approach to 
conservation and resources problems offers a framework of analysis so broad 
and yet so useful and meaningful. (Maass 1953:206) 
The PMPC arguably provided more than just a useful and meaningful framework of 
analysis however, it helped undermine the notion of absolute physical scarcity. By 
replacing this with a relative notion of economic scarcity, and applying this notion to 
material reserves calculations through the innovative reconstruction of these as 
working inventory, the Paley report reinforced an understanding of the economy as an 
object that can grow irrespective of absolute material constraints, as these material 
constraints had been abolished. Alongside, and following the reconstruction of 
reserves calculations, the Paley report pushed for the exploitation of these (no longer 
absolutely scarce) resources at least cost.  
In 1949, Harold Ickes’ long delayed world conservation conference would finally take 
place at Lake Success, New York - albeit under the responsibility of the State 
Department, and with Ickes’ successor at the Department of the Interior - Julius Krug - 
at the head of the US delegation (Goodwin 1981a:26). The United Nations Scientific 
Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, not unsurprisingly, 
would emphasise resource conservation rather than economic growth across the 
seven substantive volumes that it subsequently published. The geologists, mineral 
specialists and other natural scientists attendant at the conference would would give 
significant pessimistic voice to resource concerns (Barnett & Morse 1963:31) - a voice 
in tune with the general consensus of the day on the necessity of resource 
conservation above all.  
In contrast, the Paley report, alongside a general concern with the ongoing growth of 
the economy, was also crucially concerned with ongoing war-preparedness measures, 
and made recommendations to balance the supply and demand of materials in part by 
increasing materials production and distribution - particularly in the areas of steel, 
aluminium, oil and electricity (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:156). This increase would mean that 
the necessity for crash programmes required to scale up industrial production during 
the second world war could be avoided in future conflicts and simultaneously, 
peacetime growth and industrial employment could be maintained (Andrews 
1999:183). A focus on economic scarcity rather than absolute scarcity enabled the 
PMPC’s belief in both the importance, and the unlimited possibility, of this economic 
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growth. Following this innovation, the report moved away from advocating a New Deal 
like response focusing on resource conservation (Maass 1953:206) and instead 
recommended adherence to what it referred to as the ‘least cost principle’ as a means 
to govern material resources (Landsberg 1987:84): 
the overall objective of a national Materials Policy for the United States should be 
to ensure an adequate and dependable flow of materials at the lowest cost 
consistent with national security and with the welfare of friendly nations (PMPC 
Vol. 1 1952:3)  
This led the Commission to reject the narrow goal of self-sufficiency (Andrews 
1999:182-183; Landsberg 1987; Maass 1953) and instead it urged the expansion of 
‘unfettered private enterprise, free from government controls and regulated to the 
greatest extent by the “spur of the profit motive,” “the competitive market structure,” 
and “the price system”’ (Maass 1953:209). However, the increased foreign investment 
in the mineral and extractive industries that was proposed in the report, while 
unfettered, was not to be entirely unsupported (Maass 1953:209; Andrews 1999:183). 
For the mineral industries the report advocated the provision of free government 
services, tax relief, and in the specific case of oil and gas, continued subsidies for 
exploration costs while simultaneously maintaining production quotas to maintain the 
necessary inflows into resource inventories below the price of products derived from 
these natural resources.  
Controversially however, the report recommended the elimination of any protective 
tariffs or laws that discouraged overseas investment in mineral fuels extraction (Smith 
1990:317). Maass suggests that the strong bias in favour of unfettered, but aided 
private enterprise in mineral extraction, particularly in contrast to the treatment of 
water, agriculture and forestry in the report, is likely due to two factors. First, minerals 
had not yet been subject to a comprehensive public policy treatment, and such 
treatment was actively resisted by the leaders of the mineral industries, the US 
Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines. Second, the Paley Commission itself 
included several mineral industry executives, including the Texas oil man George R. 
Brown, and Arthur Bunker, the President of the Climax Molybdenum company (Maass 
1953:209). Therefore, an advocacy for rent as well as minerals extraction can be 
considered somewhat unsurprising. 
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The Paley approach 
The commission aimed at reaching as wide an audience as possible, in part as a 
means to influencing policy makers who would be ‘…directly impressed if they see an 
impressive display of the Report and its recommendations on our major media’ but 
also because the audience for the report was considered (somewhat tautologically) by 
Hodgins as ‘everybody who ought to be interested in it’ (Goodwin 1981a:58-59). Prior 
to the release of the report, a series of hearings were held on various aspects of it, and 
these focused especially on issues around energy resources as they were ‘a major 
limiting factor in shifting from scarce to abundant sources of production 
materials’ (Goodwin 1981a:58). Ten thousand copies of the final report were initially 
printed, at a cost of $55,000, and it initially drew high praise from the press, including 
editorials, features, front covers and interviews. Fortune magazine referred to the 
report as ‘one of the greatest, most readable government documents of the 
century’ (quoted in Smith 1990:317). Paley even followed up the publication of the 
report with a documentary, entitled Resources for Freedom, which was televised on 
CBS in 1954. Anchored by the network’s star newsman, Edward R. Murrow, the film 
featured deferential interviews with each of the commissioners and enabled Paley to 
make a final pitch for the approach and recommendations outlined in the report:  
The only cause for alarm would be if we closed our eyes to the threat of creeping 
scarcities and higher costs and pretended that somehow the materials problem 
would blow over. It won’t…The material problem is everybody’s problem. (quoted 
in Smith 1990:318)  
The report’s 25 year projections of economic growth and material resource use were 
not uncontested  and as Smith notes, the report was unfortunately timed - being 11
released in the midst of a presidential campaign, and where the ultimate winner, 
Eisenhower, was less enthusiastic than Truman had been regarding the commission’s 
work (Smith 1990:319). However, the Paley commission was considered important 
and influential for several reasons. It was separate from the two main sources of 
attention on materials and energy scarcity within government up to that point: 
congressional committees and the Interior Department, and it brought together a wide 
 see e.g. Clark (1954); also Commission staff such as Palmer Putnam and Arnold C. 11
Harberger who argued that the report’s population predictions were implausibly low (Goodwin 
1981a:54 footnote 112).
!59
range of economists and other specialist from all the relevant parts of the government 
as well as industry and universities (Goodwin 1981a:53). As such, its independence 
afforded it broad legitimacy both within federal agencies and industry. The Paley report 
was, as the Harvard water resource economist Arthur Maass noted at the time, ‘the 
most original and significant contribution to the study of resources and public policy 
since the 1933 report of the Mississippi Valley Committee and the early reports of the 
National Resources Committee’ (Maass 1953:210).  
In the report the commissioners advocated for an expansion in reserves estimations as 
these ‘proved particularly meagre and hard to come by’ (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:26). In 
order to address this knowledge deficit, the commission recommended the expansion 
of programme analysis staff at the Interior Department, particularly in the Bureau of 
Mines and the USGS in order for the department to ‘intensify its fact-gathering and 
analytical activities’ and where ‘[h]eavy emphasis should be placed upon analysis by 
professionally trained economists; and the study of geologic, technological and other 
scientific developments and prospects should be related more than it has been in the 
past to economic consequences and opportunities.’ (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:26) The 
report had an immediate impact in the US, with federal government agencies and 
extractive industries reevaluating their resource programmes and beginning to bring 
their measurement of resource scarcity in line with the ‘Paley approach’ (Maass 
1953:210).  
The crucial technical change in the measurement of scarcity, and shift to a ‘least cost 
principle’ as a new mode of governance are key here. The development of price 
scarcity involved the measurement of the scarcity of material resources by reference to 
the prices of the commodities produced with them - according to the theory of 
economic scarcity propounded by Lionel Robbins - not a geological measurement or 
estimation of absolute material reserves. This, alongside natural resource reserves 
reconceptualised as working inventory, broke the direct connection between material 
resources and economic growth. It meant that being no longer bound by physical and 
material constraints, the economy was understood as free to continue a trajectory of 
continuous growth, a trajectory that a presumption of fixed resource supply - based in 
the work of the classical political economists, especially Malthus, and brought into the 
postwar era in part through the work of Frederick Dewhurst - would have denied is 
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possible. The materials problem, although everybody’s problem, was eminently 
solvable. In this way, the Paley commission, through their 1952 report, helped to 
further develop the economy as a separate sphere, an ontologically valid object de-
linked from specific material resources and characterised by the potential for 
continuous, illimitable and self-sustaining growth through the exploitation of material 
resources at least cost.  
This did not however, put an immediate end to US fears about the impact of resource 
scarcity on national growth. The increasing spread and use of national account 
statistics as a means of national comparison only spurred the explosive focus on the 
growth of the US national economy, and enabled the tenacious, decade long concern 
over the necessity of natural resource conservation. 
Resources For the Future and scarcity

In 1954 the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) published the 
first volume of national account statistics that made use of uniform GNP and other 
macroeconomic measurements across countries. The OEECs second volume in 1957 
was joined by the first UN Economic Survey of Europe, based on OEEC figures and 
was centrally preoccupied with the growth rates of the national economies (Arndt 
1978:51). The rise of Nikita Khruschev to Chairman of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in 1953 brought about the increasing availability of economic statistics 
and macroeconomic indicators on the USSR. This information ‘thaw’ only reinforced 
the impression of rapid Soviet growth painted by P.D. Wiles in 1953. And as Stephen 
Purdey noted, competition at this time was not limited to the ‘great GNP race’ of the 
US and USSR. Within Europe, the steady eclipse of Britain by the development of 
France and Germany helped further recast international rivalry in terms of the growth of 
the economy (Purdey 2010:79). Shortly after the US Senate’s condemnation of Joseph 
McCarthy in 1954, studies commissioned by the Joint Economic Committee of 
Congress in 1955 and 1957 comparing Soviet growth with that of the Western 
powers  further proved to popular US imagination that just because you’re paranoid, 12
it doesn’t mean they’re not growing faster than you.  
 Trends in Economic growth: A Comparison of the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc 12
(1955); and Soviet Economic Growth: A Comparison with the United States. Both cited in Arndt 
1978:49.
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Growth and conservation 
The NSC-68 (United States National Security Council 1950) inflamed fear of Soviet 
expansion continued in 1959 with the public hearings of the Subcommittee on 
Economic Statistics on ‘Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies’. 
This would produce three volumes of expert testimony on the subject, indicating the 
broad awareness at the time of the apparent necessity of the growth of the economy, 
and that differences in growth rates between the US and USSR were not merely some 
statistical abstraction, but a life-or-death metric. As the Princeton economists William 
J. Baumol and Klaus E. Knorr wrote in 1959, ‘We believe that these differences [in the 
rate of economic growth] do matter and that they may threaten the ability of the United 
States to survive in a hostile world.’ (Baumol & Knorr 1959; quoted in Arndt 1978:49). 
At this time then, nations more than ever before viewed their power as resting, at base, 
on the strength of their economies. ‘To ensure their independence, they concluded 
they must grow; if ahead, stay ahead; if behind, catch up’ (Abramovitz 1989; cited in 
Purdey 2010:79). 
Beyond the Soviet challenge, six years after the publication of the PMPC report, 
growth was finally given the ‘absolute reason’ that had eluded the Paley 
Commission. In 1958, Nelson and Laurence Rockefeller tasked Henry Kissinger 
with preparing a report entitled The Key Importance of Growth to Achieve National 
Goals (Dale 2011; Purdey 2010:80), presaging Nelson’s campaign for the Republican 
party nomination in 1960. Heading a panel comprised of economists from large 
corporations and key universities, Kissinger identified the importance of economic 
growth as the solution to the pressure on national income ‘for all major ailments of 
Western economies’ (Purdey 2010:80). The report began by stating that ‘[t]he first 
basic conclusion that emerges from our analysis is the very great importance of 
maintaining a high rate of growth’ (Rockefeller Brother’s Fund 1958; cited in 
Lekachman 1966:179). Hewing closely to the inherent properties of the ‘Western 
mind’ as trumpeted by Paley, the Rockefeller’s report narrowed down the geography 
of this image to the ongoing American adventure: 
The adventure of the American economy is a continuing reality. The dynamism 
that has produced the present level of well-being holds out the promise of a still 
more challenging future. Our nation is dedicated to economic growth. It is also 
dedicated to full employment…We want to achieve rapid growth and full 
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employment in a free economy. The freedom of the economy is fundamental to 
other freedoms we cherish (Rockefeller Brother’s Fund 1958; cited in Lekachman 
1966:179) 
The approach to growth espoused by Kissinger and the Rockerfellers was reiterated in 
1960 with the Douglas Congressional committee reporting at the time that ‘[t]he critical 
need for economic growth is found in the tasks placed upon the nation, both foreign 
and domestic… [a] high rate of economic growth is essential if… public responsibilities 
are to be discharged without limiting the advance in living standards effected through 
individual efforts.’ (quoted in Arndt 1978:46) During the 1960 Presidential election 
campaign, the growth of the economy was a major campaign issue (Arndt 1978:55), 
and although Richard Nixon would dismissively refuse to join with his democratic 
opponent Kennedy ‘in playing what is rapidly becoming the most fashionable parlour 
game of our time - a game we might call “growthmanship”’(Nixon 1960, cited in Arndt 
1978:55). The game would move ahead without him. Kennedy’s campaign platform 
promised a growth rate of 5 per cent, which became a central objective once he 
became President. As Arndt put it, the 5 per cent growth rate became ‘the most 
conspicuous signpost’ of the Kenny’s promised New Frontier, and one which he asked 
his Chairman of the CEA Walter Heller, to make good on. This promise was reaffirmed 
when in December 1961, the US along with 19 other OECD countries signed an 
agreement to aim at 50% growth of collective real GNP during the decade of the 
1960s (Arndt 1978:56). 
At the same time, the lingering, and occasionally acute concern with the availability of 
material resources to fuel the economy remained throughout the 1950s and into the 
early 1960s; and as Kennedy also stated in a special message to congress on natural 
resources in the same year as signing the OECD agreement on growth: 
From the beginning of civilisation, every nation’s basic wealth and progress has 
stemmed in large measure from its natural resources. This nation has been, and 
is now, especially fortunate in the blessings we have inherited. Our entire society 
rests upon - and is dependent upon - our water, our land, our forests and our 
minerals. How we use these resources influences our health, security, economy, 
and well-being (Kennedy 1961; cited in Barnett & Morse 1963:21) 
What could be called ‘The doctrine of increasing natural resource scarcity’ (Barnett & 
Morse 1963) was articulated again in 1953, when Fairfield Osborn revisited the 
!63
explicitly Malthsusian ground he’d tilled in his 1948 Our Plundered Planet, with a new 
book entitled Limits of the Earth. Here he concluded: 
We are under the power of a timeless principle, exerting its influence relentlessly 
on a global scale. This principle … finds expression in a simple ratio wherein the 
numerator can be defined as “resources of the earth” and the denominator as 
“numbers of people.” The numerator is relatively fixed and only partly subject to 
control by man. The denominator is subject… to control by man. If we are blind 
to this law, or delude ourselves into minimizing its power, of one thing we can be 
assured - the human race will enter into days of increasing trouble, conflict, and 
darkness. (Osborn 1953:206-207; emphasis in original) 
The release, in 1955 of America’s Needs and Resources - A new survey, Frederick 
Dewhurst’s follow up to his 1947 study, provided a widely read companion piece to a 
statement that same year by the industrialist Meyer Kestnbaum: ‘Natural resources are 
the foundation of the material prosperity of the Nation - both present and future. Their 
wise use is therefore the concern not only of all the people but of all levels of 
government’ (cited in Barnett and Morse 1963:20). This statement by Kestnbaum - 
who was also chairman of a presidential advisory group - was published in the US 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations’ Study Committee Report on Natural 
Resources and Conservation, and reflected the general redevelopment of the 
conservationist ethics, concerns and indeed potential politics of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Clearly, even after the Paley commission’s rejection of an explicitly New Deal 
style conservationist response to the nation’s materials problem, the question of how 
the circle of material resource conservation and the absolute requirement for economic 
growth could be squared remained.  
Resources For the Future 
Following on from his report, William Paley had intended for the Federal government to 
assume responsibility for ongoing, continuous assessment and analysis of resource 
problems and prospects (Landsberg 1987); the incoming Eisenhower administration 
declined this proposal however. In the face of Eisenhower’s resistance, Paley 
petitioned, both figuratively and literally, for the creation of a research organisation to 
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undertake this assessment instead. This resulted in the founding of the private 
nonprofit Resources for the Future (RFF)   13
Paley and members of a committee on resource availability and economic growth 
within the newly reorganised Ford Foundation (Amadae 2003:34-39) set up the new 
organisation with an initial USD 150,000 grant. RFF’s first conference in 1953, which 
set out its research mission, was attended by 1,600 people in the Shoreham Hotel in 
Washington D.C. and indicating continuing links with the executive, President 
Eisenhower invited himself to speak before the assembled mass of researchers, 
conservationists and members of the business community (Darmstader 2003:4; 
Portney 2002). Up until 1977, RFF was funded largely by grants from the Ford 
Foundation to the tune of USD 47.5 million (Darmstader 2003:3; Magat 
1979:186-187), and during this time a substantial element of the research undertaken 
by RFF was prompted by, and should itself be considered a continuation of, the ‘Paley 
approach’ (Maass 1953:210).  
As well as the PMPC report itself, which prompted RFFs initial focus (Portney 2002), 
Frederick Dewhurst’s America’s Needs and Resources would act as a blueprint for its 
early years (Cronon 2002), and the organisation began by developing a number of 
work programmes that would last through the 1950s and into the 1960s. These 
programmes would cover such themes as resources and national growth, energy in 
the economy, the economics of multipurpose river development and RFFs ongoing 
concern with natural resource conservation and what this implies for the other themes. 
The founding of RFF represented, as David Pearce has maintained, the beginnings of 
the nascent discipline of environmental economics (2002:57). More immediately 
however, the organisation would first play a key role in the development of natural 
resource economics and through its continuing technical innovations in this area would 
play a central role in further securing the economy as a sphere whose growth was not 
directly limited by natural resource constraints but was defined instead by its potential 
for limitless growth. A growth, that as I outlined in the previous section, only became 
more urgent throughout the 1950s. 
 Fairfield Osborn, author of Plundered Planet, would be amongst the signatories of this 13
petition, and would also be a board member of the organisation from the beginning.
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One of the founder members of RFF, Joseph L. Fisher, became the organisation’s 
President in 1959 . Fisher had been a former member of the CEA, which he was 14
appointed to by the first CEA President Edwin Nourse in 1947 to help establish CEA 
expertise in the area of resource development. Regardless of Nourse’s intent in 
appointing Fisher however, the CEA remained focused on macroeconomic questions 
and largely eschewed analysis of the status of natural resources (Goodwin 1981a:24). 
Fisher would have more luck at RFF. In 1958, Fisher (then associate director of RFF) 
would bring to fruition an event which coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the first 
Governor’s conference on resource problems convened by President Theodore 
Roosevelt. The aim of Fisher’s RFF conference was to ‘shed light on resource 
conservation problems in the next fifty years by undertaking a critical review of the 
previous fifty (Jarrett 1958:viii), and the papers presented at the conference were 
published that same year by RFF under the editorial oversight of RFF staff member 
Henry Jarrett. As Jarrett rightly pointed out with respect to the papers presented at the 
conference:  
The essays do not lend themselves to summary; as noted earlier they range too 
widely and are too undogmatic. What can be said here is that they attest - if 
further proof be needed - the pervasiveness of resource conservation problems 
and the potential breadth of future conservation policies. (Jarrett 1958:xiii) 
Indeed, papers presented by noted economist John Kenneth Galbraith (1958) and 
Paley commission member Edward S. Mason (1958) - the former on the issue of 
consumption, the latter on the necessity of government intervention to correct the 
failure of the free market - strongly reiterated a pessimistic account of ongoing scarcity 
problems. In contrast to these, papers by Ernest S. Griffith, the Director of the 
reference Service of the Library of Congress and the Director of the USGS, Thomas B. 
Nolan (1958), struck remarkably upbeat tones, prefaced upon a considerable 
technological optimism. I will consider further selected papers from this conference in 
later chapters as they were involved in contemporary - or prefigured later - 
developments with respect to energy and the environment. For now it should be noted 
that the querulous nature of the debate in 1958 fed into ongoing RFF research, and in 
1963, RFFs work programme on Resources and National Growth, under the direction 
of former Bureau of Mines and RAND economist Harold J. Barnett, would culminate 
 Fisher would retain this position until his replacement by Charles Hitch in 1974.14
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with the publication of Barnett and Chandler Morse’s study Scarcity and Growth 
(1963). As Fisher made clear in his foreword to Scarcity and Growth, Barnett and 
Morse’s book was conceived as a companion publication to Neal Potter and Francis T. 
Christy Jr.’s Trends in Natural Resource Commodities (1963), a study similarly initiated 
under Barnett’s purview as part of the Resources and National Growth Program . And 15
together these reports were conceived as definitive empirical-theoretical analyses of 
natural resources and economic growth.  
The death of absolute resource scarcity 
In the case of Potter and Christy Jr. their RFF supported project resulted in a 
comprehensive set of economic time series data on major natural resource based 
commodities in the US from roughly the beginning 1870-1957. Following the format of 
the Paley approach in focusing on economic factors, they highlighted the difficulty in 
measuring natural resources directly and noted that ‘Natural resources are more 
“basic” than their products, but economic data on the products are more enlightening 
and more tractable than those on resources as such.’ (Potter & Christy Jr. 1962:2). 
Their focus on commodity prices is not prefaced simply upon a desire to make use of 
the most complete data available, but due to a specific understanding of technological 
progress: 
Thus we have come to the conclusion that the most useful as well as the most 
available data on natural resources are those which are indirect, relating to the 
products of the resources and not the resources themselves. Moreover, the best 
economic data are those which do not attempt to eliminate the factors of human 
knowledge and technology but reflect them in full. Measures of resources which 
attempt to exclude the effects of advancing technology could not reflect truly 
either the physical universe or man’s relation to it (Potter & Christy Jr 1962:2) 
They continue this line of argument in a footnote: 
If we look only at the physical, noncultural aspects of resources, it is clear that 
the scarcity of materials of nature is simply proportional to population. If the 
population doubles, scarcity doubles. If any ores are used, minerals are obviously 
(?) scarcer than before they were used. If we do not conjoin the factors of 
technology (including transportation) and discovery to those of expanding 
population and depletion, Malthusian conclusions are inevitable. The results of 
such oversimplification are obvious, and this seems to be the basis of many 
 Both these reports were related to a third RFF publication Resources in America’s Future, 15
also published in 1963 and undertaken by Hans H. Landsberg, Leonard L. Fischmann and 
Fisher himself. I will consider this study in more detail in the next chapter.
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popular predictions of calamity in discussion of population and resources. (Potter 
& Christy Jr 1962:2) 
Potter and Christy Jr’s time series is one of the best known empirical studies of 
scarcity (Kula 1998:114) and incorporated statistics on prices, output and 
consumption, as well as foreign trade and employment levels and collated this 
information for four aggregate natural resource-based commodities: agriculture, 
forestry, minerals, and total extractive resources. Measuring scarcity by reference to 
the price levels of these commodities, they maintained that the various natural 
resources, with the exception of forestry, had become less, not more scarce over time. 
Of course, in manifest contradiction to their clearly espoused theoretical assumptions, 
they finished their summary by stating: ‘In a word ‘, we offer statistics which have been 
ordered, simplified, and clarified. We do not offer conclusions, because these require 
still more facts, as well as a theoretical framework’ (Potter & Christy Jr 1962:2). The 
conclusions and theoretical framework ostensibly missing here would be provided one 
year later. 
Barnett and Morse made use of the statistical information from Trends in Natural 
Resource Commodities in their seminal study of resource scarcity (Baumgartner et al 
2006; Halvorsen & Smith 1984; Norgaard 1990). They combined Potter & Christy’s 
historical data with an analysis of contemporary perspectives on resource scarcity, and 
the classical political economic doctrines of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo. 
Beginning from the observation of continuing concerns over the depletion of 
resources, not just with respect to public policy, but in numerous academic disciplines 
such as the newly developed field of ecology, as well as demography, political science 
and indeed economics, they sought to test the classical political economy doctrines of 
increasing natural resource scarcity.  
In order to do this they argued like Potter and Christy Jr. that the long-run scarcity of 
natural resources is best assessed by looking at economic indicators (Norgaard 
1990:20). Drawing on the tradition of neoclassical economics, and specifically 
Walrasian equilibrium, with its reliance upon an assumption of an underlying uniformity 
of absolutely convertible matter (Walker 2007:180), they maintained that looking at 
changes in the physical quality and availability of resources do not account for the past 
and future effects of technological changes and substitution. Following Ricardo, they 
focused on the unit cost of extractive products in the four aggregate areas collated by 
Potter and Christy Jr. (agriculture, forestry, fishery and minerals), where the unit cost 
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was defined as a weighted labour and capital aggregate divided by net output. As well 
as unit costs, they considered the real prices of commodities, working on the 
assumption that the price trends would follow the cost trends, which, as revealed by 
Potter and Christy Jr., they broadly did. Barnett and Morse argued that if the scarcity 
hypotheses of Malthus and Ricardo were correct, these would be revealed in the form 
of increased cost in input to the extractive and agricultural sectors. 
They compared the predictions of commodity prices drawn from Malthusian and 
Ricardian models of fixed resource supply and declining economic quality with those 
generated by a model of resources in the progressive world using Potter and Christy 
Jr’s data - a model which was characterised by technological innovation, resource 
substitution, and the continued recovery and discovery of new types of resources 
(Perez-Carmona 2013:87). In the case of Malthusian absolute limits to natural scarcity, 
they claimed that such scenarios could only occur in primitive societies which were 
isolated and possessed only limited resource knowledge and production methods, 
and also failed to develop social taboos enabling voluntary population restriction (Kula 
1998:115).  
As such, they maintained that Malthusian scarcity is no longer relevant in the 
contemporary, ‘progressive world’ where ‘[a]dvances in fundamental science have 
made it possible to take advantage of the uniformity of matter/energy, a uniformity that 
makes it feasible without preassignable limit to escape the quantitative constraints 
imposed by the character of the earths crust.’ (Barnett & Morse 1963:11). They 
claimed therefore that Malthusian scarcity is obsolete (Daly 1991:40), and ‘[a] limit may 
exist, but it can be neither defined nor specified in economic terms [...]. Nature 
imposes particular scarcities, not an inescapable general scarcity’ (Barnett & Morse 
1963: 11; emphasis added).  
Ricardian scarcity, which involved unlimited resources in total, but with non-
homogenous and declining resource quality, could similarly only occur, argued Barnett 
and Morse, in a world that is closed to social, scientific and technical progress. And 
again, ‘[s]cience, by making the resource base more homogenous, erases the 
restrictions once thought to reside in the lack of homogeneity. In a neo-Ricardian 
world, it seems, the particular resources with which one starts increasingly become a 
matter of indifference’ (Barnett & Morse 1963: 11). In short, for Barnett and Morse 
resource scarcity of both a Malthusian and Ricardian nature was no longer applicable 
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in the contemporary world and continued concerns over resource availability were no 
longer warranted, as the growth of the economy was not ultimately constrained by 
resource scarcity . 16
Alongside their conclusions on the nature of resource scarcity, Barnett and Morse 
discussed how to apply the results of their analytical approach to other countries and 
into the future with respect to the issue of welfare. They are clear that the innovation, 
substitution, recovery and discovery of resources central to their understanding of the 
contemporary ‘progressive world’ are driven by the search for markets - and echoing 
the Paley report of a decade earlier - that the best means of extracting and increasing 
the availability of resources, and therefore human welfare, is at ‘least cost’ - through a 
free-market system.  
Of course, the curiously obvious circularity of argumentation here - with the findings of 
Potter & Christy Jr. being being used to test and verify the theoretical claims of Barnett 
and Morse, which themselves provide the a priori theoretical justification for precisely 
which data should be constructed by Potter & Christy Jr.  - didn’t much trouble the 17
economics profession, then or now. In fact, these two studies, (particularly Scarcity 
and Growth) would come to be widely read and influential. They would be taken as 
seminal economics texts, and formed the orthodoxy on natural resource use, providing 
the economic mainstream with proof that a general resource scarcity did not represent 
an impediment to continued and continual growth . As such, they would ultimately 18
help kill off the lingering fears of absolute scarcity and the necessity for conservation 
measures that might hamper growth, and in doing so, they further secured the 
ontological footing of the economy as a distinct sphere, divorced from a natural 
resource base, and driven by an inherent logic of exponential growth.  
 Chandler Morse later recanted this position according to Joan Martinez Alier (personal 16
communication).
 As Potter and Christy Jr. themselves make clear (Potter & Christy Jr. (1962).17
 see e.g. Baumgartner et al. (2006); Daly (1991:40); Dryzek (1997:46); Halvorsen & Smith 18
(1984); Kula (1998); Luks (2010:100); Norgaard (1990); Pearce (2002:58); Perez-Carmona 
(2013:87); Walker (2007).
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The growth of the economy 
The American vision of the future emerges from a past dominated by the imagery 
of the frontier, the symbolism of the American garden invaded by the conquering 
machine, and the conviction that the material universe can be mastered by 
ingenious men. As Seymour Lipset has suggested, America is the first new 
nation, or at any rate the first nation that has embraced the creative myth of 
starting from the beginning and making its own history, Americans know, either 
joyfully or ruefully, that this is the land of youth and novelty, of the bigger and 
better, of destruction and new construction. For most Americans even temporary 
stagnation is repugnant, and a permanent halt in the march of progress is an 
insupportable conception. (Lekachman 1966:179-180) 
By the start of the 1960s, to quote James Tobin for a second time, the growth of the 
economy resided in an ‘exalted position’ (Tobin 1964:1) amongst government goals 
and policies. In the US, affirmations of its status and necessity were made by 1960 
from the Joint Economic Committee of Congress; the US Chamber of Commerce; the 
American federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations; the 
Committee for Economic Development; the National Planning Association; and by 
Fortune magazine in a piece entitled ‘How the U.S. Can Get 50 Per Cent 
Richer’ (Arndt 1978:57).  
I argue throughout this chapter that the development of the economy as a discrete 
(ontological) object in the world - a metrological machine which, following Timothy 
Mitchell, is comprised of national account statistics and tables, monetary flows, 
economists and their theorems - resulted in a new and urgent political concern with 
growth in the US. In the first instance this developed out of a post-war fear of a return 
to depression, stoked by Alvin Hansen and his students, for whom the newly 
developed GNP provided a ready marker of the coming catastrophe, and where every 
recorded dip in economic activity represented the beginning of the long prophesied 
return to depression. By the end of the 1940s, the fear of depression had waned, but 
in its place the shift to Leon Keyserling’s expansion economics and the burgeoning 
security fears at the beginning of the cold war era converted the possibility of the 
growth of the economy into an absolute and overriding necessity. This, in turn, raised 
the question of the natural resource base of the US, and the impact of diminished 
materials availability on the growth of GNP. 
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Frederick Dewhurst, whose Historical statistics of the United States (Twentieth Century 
Fund 1947) would help to settle the notion of the economy, had already two years 
before this study, helped to develop the popular resurgence of a Malthusian concern 
with resource depletion in America’s Needs and Resources. Dewhurst’s twin concerns 
here highlight that the settling of the notion of the economy had not, at the end of the 
1940s and beginning of the 1950s, resulted in a comparable settling of the possibility 
of growth. In his panoramic survey of the environmental history of the 20th century, 
John McNeill argued that ‘…economic theory by 1935 to 1960 crystallised as a 
bloodless abstraction in which nature figured, if at all, as a storehouse of resources 
waiting to be used. Nature did not evolve, nor did it twitch and adjust when tweaked. 
Economics, once the dismal science, became the jolly science.’ (McNeill 2001: 
335-336).  
A fundamental part of this ‘bloodless abstraction’ is that in the post-war period 
absolute scarcity was ‘quietly abolished as a fundamental constraint upon 
economies’ (Walker 2007:179), and I have argued that this was initiated and indeed in 
large part undertaken by the President’s Materials Policy Commission, and its 
successor Resources For the Future. The development of price scarcity and natural 
resource reserves as working inventory broke the direct connection between material 
resources (as absolutely scarce) and economic growth. It meant that being no longer 
bound by physical and material constraints, the economy was seemingly freed to 
continue a trajectory of continuous growth - a trajectory that a presumption of fixed 
resource supply, based in the pre-economy work of the classical political economists, 
particularly Malthus, would have denied is possible. In this way, the Paley commission 
and RFF helped to further develop the economy as a separate sphere, an ontologically 
valid object de-linked from material resources and characterised by the potential for 
continuous, illimitable and self-sustaining growth, a growth that was delivered in the 
US during the remainder of the 1950s and 60s - at an average US growth rate of 7.19 
percent from 1950 to 1973 in current USD  - through the expansion of cheap and 19
abundant oil and other resources extraction following the least cost principle (Altvater 
2006; Pfister 2010). 
 Figures from United States Bureau of Economics Analysis. Available at: http://www.bea.gov/19
iTable.cfmID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=3&isuri=1&904=1950&903=1&906=a&905=1973&910=
x&911=0.
!72
From the Paley report in 1952, to Barnett and Morse’s 1963 Scarcity and Growth, the 
technical innovations wrought here in the way that natural resources were measured, 
considered scarce, and related to the growth of the economy supported the 
burgeoning development of growth theory within economics. Growth theory - initiated 
by Robert Solow’s A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth (1956)  20
assumed that nature is ‘infinitely expandable, infinitely convertible (or at least infinitely 
substitutable) and infinitely plowable’ (Walker 2007:178). As Jeremy Walker goes on to 
note, in his later models, Solow would maintain that some natural resources were 
required for economic growth, ‘but the amount of “growth” that could be 
accomplished with some unspecified initial quantity was again unlimited’ (Walker 
2007:178). The work of the Paley commission and RFF would enable Solow to claim 
that ‘the world can, in effect, get along without natural resources’ (Solow 1974:11), 
and ten years later fellow Riksbank winner Julian Simon would predict a future 7 billion 
years of economic growth, interrupted only in the instance of the extinction of the sun 
(McNeill 2001:336). Not content with a mere 7 billion years growth however, he would 
also claim the potential restoration of a lazarus earth: 
[t]here is no physical or economic reason why human resourcefulness and 
enterprise cannot forever continue to respond to impending shortages… and 
leave us with the bonus of lower costs and less scarcity in the long run. The 
bonus applies to such desirable resources as better health, more wilderness, 
cheaper energy, and a cleaner environment (Simon 1996:588) 
At around the same time as the economy was being secured through RFFs abolition of 
absolute material scarcity, Walt Whitman Rostow’s 1961 Stages of economic growth: a 
non-communist manifesto would help further the project of development. Rostow 
employed an ‘organismic’ metaphor in the book to describe the process of 
industrialisation. This aped the long discredited biological theory of embryological 
parallelism popularised at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries by 
the German biologist Ernst Haeckel’s claim that ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’. 
Rostow argued that the - newly historicised - national economy occupies a set of 
stages of development from embryo to maturity, and that the developmental pathway 
of North America and Western Europe was recapitulated, at different stages, in the 
less developed nation states of the world. Rostow imagined the universal mature 
endpoint of the national economy in the apparent consumer cornucopia realised in the 
US in the 1950s, a state achieved through a transition to a modern ‘Newtonian’ view 
 Which would ultimately win him the 1987 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 20
Memory of Alfred Nobel.
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of a systematically manipulable and transformable nature. This enabled the mature 
state of an economy to transcend senescence and decline, and instead, through the 
realisation of ‘unlimited production functions’, allow growth to become its normal 
condition. (Walker 2007:179).  
In his subsequent role as political advisor to Secretary of Defence Robert MacNamara, 
Rostow sought to make policy from what he preached, and advocated the systematic 
bombing of the Vietnamese countryside on the grounds that the forced migration into 
towns and cities would trigger the process of industrial modernisation. Applied in 
Cambodia via the bracing tonic of 2.8 million tons of ordnance, Rostow’s quack 
biological metaphor resulted in the skipping of the industrial modernisation stage of the 
economy in favour of the foetid charnel house stage of ‘year zero’ auto-genocide 
(Walker 2007:180-181). But aside from this somewhat piquant outcome, in 1971 
Simon Kuznets would publish his Economic Growth of Nations. Nearly thirty years 
after his development of GNP, and eight years after the 1963 RFF reports, Kuznets - 
who reviewed the entire manuscript of Scarcity and Growth - provided here an 
empirical bookend to the construction of the economy as an ontological discrete 
sphere defined by a propensity to and ability for, unlimited growth. 
In chapter five, I will investigate how the very success of the RFF economists would 
help bring about a new and unexpected political concern - the environment. Both 
through the provision of a secure object of politics, whose statistical markers of 
certainty would begin, from the mid-1960s begin to spell the certain destruction of the 
natural world, and through the impacts of the pervasive pollution that accompanied 
the growth of the economy, particularly through the expansion of fossil fuel use. Before 
I get to this point however, in the next chapter I’ll show how the conceptual 
innovations of the Paley report related to and impacted upon specific developments in 
the nascent energy industry. Interestingly, the Paley report itself and the developing 
federal focus on managing the system of energy through the least cost principle would 
have a rather more complicated impact on the largest, most important, and most 
powerful energy industry underpinning the growth of this economy: oil.  
From the early fifties until about 1957, the increasing focus on energy production at 
least cost to support the crucial growth of the economy would threaten the oil industry 
and its profits in general, and independent domestic producers most particularly. This 
threat would be brought to a peak in 1956 by the oil geologist Marian King Hubbert’s 
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presentation to the American Petroleum Institute (API) of his highly influential petroleum 
production lifecycle curve. The development and subsequent resolution of this threat, 
enabling the actual construction of a system of energy through the subsumption of 
alternate sources of power production by large oil producers as they converted 
themselves into global energy companies through the 1960s is what I will turn to next. 
!75
5. Energy 
Harold J Barnett helped kill off a concern with resource scarcity in 1963, and 
established in Scarcity and Growth that the continual expansion of the economy was 
not constrained in a general sense by material resources. But while Barnett’s study 
was rapidly established as canon within the economics discipline and then became 
the basis for an understanding of the economy and its potential for growth, his 
particular role in this overall story begins nearly 15 years earlier with a report that he 
wrote in 1949 as a staff member of the Interior Department. Energy Uses and 
Supplies, 1939, 1947, 1965 formed the basis of Interior Department public statements 
on fuel resources well into the next decade (Goodwin 1981a:37), and alongside 
another 1949 report by the Hoover Commission, would reiterate to the Truman 
administration not just the importance of natural resources to the future of the nation, 
but also the new relationship between the economy and energy - with the latter 
understood as a system of interchangeable fuel sources powering the newly settled 
former.  
Barnett began his report by maintaining that there are four features inherent to energy 
resources that justified their careful study and subsequent planning: first, most fuels, 
and certainly the most predominantly used fuels were finite in nature; second, 
production increases or fuel substitutions required long lead times; third, fuel resources 
required large investments for development; and finally, they were frequently produced 
in noncompetitive industries. While the report reiterated the importance of government 
and particularly Interior Department oversight over natural resource extraction and 
development, Barnett developed projections for both the supply and demand of the 
major fuels into the future through the use - for the first time - of Wassily Leontief’s 
novel neoclassical input-output modelling techniques (Goodwin 1981a:37). Using this 
technique, and operating under the assumption that a variety of technological 
advances will result in increased energy efficiency - an assumption, that as I have 
already shown was central to his later analyses - Barnett concluded that if national 
output grew as expected by 70 percent between 1947 and 1965, then total fuel 
requirements in 1965 would increase by 30 percent. This could be met, argued 
Barnett, by predicted increases in domestic hydropower, natural gas and crude oil 
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provision, as well as increased crude oil imports, although he expected coal supply to 
decline. In making these predictions, Barnett highlighted the new relationship between 
energy and growth that developed as a corollary of the making of the contemporary 
notion of the economy, and a concern with whether energy supplies were liable to be a 
limiting factor of the growth of the American economy was paramount here. He 
showed that there tended to be ‘a short-run fixed relationship between gross national 
product and energy use’ (Goodwin 1981a:39) and this implied that energy could 
indeed be a severe constraint on growth: 
If during the next decade GNP were to increase by a third, as the President’s 
Economic Report suggests, then energy requirements would increase about 
proportionately. This is neutral phrasing. Put another way, GNP is not likely to 
increase by a third unless energy is forthcoming in adequate volume, at low 
enough prices, and in the forms which the economy requires. (Barnett 1949, 
quoted in Goodwin 1981a:39)  
In October 1951 the then Secretary of the Interior, Oscar L. Chapman stated that “But, 
if another full-scale war should come, make no mistake about it, petroleum will be 
more vital to victory than ever before in our history” (quoted in IPAA 1952:2). In this 
chapter I detail how oil was not simply important with respect to the potential heating 
up of the cold war - a war defined and driven by the need for the growth of the 
economy. At the same time, international flows of oil crucially underwrote parallel flows 
of money, predominantly US dollars, and helped to maintain the postwar financial 
architecture established at Bretton Woods in 1944 (Mitchell 2011:111). From the early 
1950s on, the increasingly coordinated focus on the total energy system - above and 
beyond individual fuel sources - would come to threaten the continued provision of the 
economic incentives put in place in the US from the early 1930s that had made large 
scale, increasing and apparently low cost oil production possible. The system of 
quotas and tax treatments that had maintained the price of US oil also propped up the 
price of Middle Eastern oil through the so-called Texas basing point formula, therefore 
any threat to these incentives would ultimately threaten the profits of the international 
oil majors as well as domestic independents. This threat would reach a peak in 1956 
with the release of the pessimistic oil reserve estimations of the well-known and 
influential petroleum geologist M. King Hubbert. If taken seriously, Hubbert’s imminent 
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peak oil estimation  implied that price supports were no longer needed to maintain oil 21
production, and indeed that these should give way to conservation measures if a 
strategic reserve was to be maintained during the cold war. 
This is where the technical innovations of the Paley report would play a second role. 
Alongside helping to secure the economy as a kind of dematerialised sphere capable 
of infinite growth, I show how the abolition of absolute scarcity in favour of a relative 
price scarcity would also provide the basis with which the oil industry could contest 
and undermine both the methodology and the findings of Hubbert. Once this initial 
threat to oil industry profits from energy - understood as a total system - was 
successfully challenged, the massive expansion of the oil industry followed through the 
1950s and ’60s. This involved increasing foreign oil imports to the US, and an 
increasing share of the total US energy production vis-a-vis other sources. Alongside 
this, the development of an increasingly real, institutionalised system of energy took 
place as US domestic and international oil companies converted themselves from 
single fuel producers into energy companies proper, via the purchase of coal and gas 
producers as well as the uranium mining concerns on which nuclear power was 
based. Finally, the future of the energy system was secured by the construction of its 
past, through the work of analyses published in the early 1960s by Resources For the 
Future (RFF). These were developed as companion pieces to the reports of Barnett 
and Morse and Potter and Christy Jr. and would play a comparable role, settling the 
certainty of energy as a system. 
In the last chapter, I described how the development of the economy in its modern 
sense resulted in a new conception of growth - one that almost immediately turned the 
blear eye of the American economics and political establishments towards a focus on 
natural resources, and the impact any deficit in these would have on the new 
economy. In Carbon Democracy, Timothy Mitchell (2011) argues that it is not until the 
early 1970s that the industries, materials, transmissions systems and fuels that 
comprised the nation’s power sources are considered as a single system of energy. At 
this point the various blockages and shortages with respect to the production of 
individual fuels - wildcat strikes in the Appalachian mountains and increasing 
 Hubbert predicted that oil production would peak in the US sometime between 1966 and 21
1971 (1956).
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concentration in the coal industry, the delayed operation of nuclear power plants due 
to technical setbacks, oil tanker shortages and delayed construction of electrical 
power stations - ‘were suddenly linked together as aspects of a single “energy 
crisis”’(Mitchell 2011:178).  
In chapter 6 I will consider further the development of energy as a total system in 
crisis: the way this crisis was constructed, tied to the environment and environmental 
protection measures, and subsequently used to help undermine the new 
environmental regulations of the early 1970s on the grounds that they represented a 
‘growth ban’ that had been, and continued to be, partly responsible for the energy 
crisis itself. While the early 1970s saw the development of energy as a fragile system, 
and indeed as the explicit subject of presidential concern with Richard Nixon giving the 
first ever energy message to Congress on June 4th 1971, energy understood as a total 
system has a longer history than that implied by Mitchell. This history should in fact be 
considered as coeval with, and indeed crucially related to the development of the 
economy. The necessity for growth brought with it a specific concern on the resources 
required to power this growth, focused on a system of energy, composed of an 
interrelated and interchangeable set of fuel sources, and the complicated relationship 
between energy the economy and oil production is the focus of this chapter.  
Economy and energy 
With respect to Federal government oversight at least, prior to the middle of the 1930s 
fuels and power sources were treated largely separately, but from this point forwards, 
alongside the construction of the US national economy, a succession of groups 
concerned with the management and planning of natural resources as a whole were 
constituted in the US. The National Resources Board (1934-1935), the National 
Resources Committee (1935-1939), and the National Resources Planning Board 
(1939-1943), represented the first development of a novel concern with natural 
resources, and particularly energy, as a whole system bound to and substantially 
underpinning the newly developing national economy.  
The system of energy 
!79
The boards developed in the 1930s and early 1940s can be seen as reconditioning the 
conservation ethic of the New Deal era and reconstituting natural resource 
conservation with respect to the new economy. The broad objectives of these boards 
were often not entirely clear, but they were concerned in the first instance with the 
problems of depression and the antimonopolist sentiments of the New Deal, and as 
such sought out alternative mechanisms to the market as a means to allocate natural 
resources (Goodwin 1981a:6). In 1939, two years after Tinbergen’s first econometric 
model of the economy, and just five years after Kuznets' 1934 report to congress, the 
National Resources Committee, under the Chairmanship of Harold J. Ickes, published 
a major report that would maintain, for the first time, that the four main power sources 
in use in the US (coal, oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric power) comprised a closely 
interrelated system of energy. And as such, this system required the overarching 
attention of government: 
It is time now to take a larger view, to recognise more fully than has been 
possible in the past that each of these energy resources affects the others, and 
that the diversity of problems affecting them and their interlocking relationships 
require the careful weighing of conflicting interests and points of view. (Ickes, 
cited in Goodwin 1981a:7) 
At the same time as economic growth was being newly imagined in terms of the 
intensification of monetary flows within a defined national space, a system of energy - 
comprised of the formerly separate and separable fuel sources of coal, oil, gas and 
water - was being imagined as powering these flows. The committee reviewed each of 
these natural sources and recommended public policy for each of them: public 
supervision by control of process, distribution, or both to deal with the surplus of coal; 
the creation of a federal oil conservation board to counter the impending exhaustion of 
oil and gas; and the expansion of multiple-purpose planning by bodies such as the 
TVA to manage potential conflicts of interest with respect to water development. This 
new system of energy could not be grasped and managed in order to service the 
economy, the 1939 report argued, through the uncoordinated management of the 
individual fuels. Rather, it recommended the creation of an advisory planning group for 
the four sources of energy as one part of an overarching planning agency for the 
natural resources. This agency would be responsible for the production of a ‘national 
energy resources policy’ which amounted to more than ‘a simple sum’ of policies 
towards the individual fuels (cited in Goodwin 1981a:8).  
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While the outbreak of war would interrupt these particular proposals, the war itself had 
the overall effect of further reinforcing energy as a system of closely related, 
interlocking resources fundamental to the health of the economy. Moreover, during the 
war, and due in part to the massive exportation of mineral fuels to Europe to 
underwrite the war effort, the US discovered that its own natural resource 
independence was rapidly disappearing, and this led to further urgent questions 
regarding its growing dependence upon foreign sources of energy. Goodwin argues 
that the importance of the early investigations of the federal planning groups is two-
fold. First, they served to educate and sensitise individuals in the legislative and 
executive branches of government regarding the importance of energy resources in 
total - not merely as unrelated, singular materials. Second, they raised and publicised 
issues around the availability of mineral fuel stocks that would become a paramount 
concern at the end of the war, as the full scale of war induced resource depletion was 
evaluated and quantified. 
The postwar energy for growth 
Harold Icke’s 1945 ‘Post-war Resources Institute’, outlined in the last chapter, also 
included a focus on energy as a crucial theme. The dominant concern of the Institute’s 
energy panels was the interrelated nature of the interchangeable fuel sources and the 
problems that arose because of this. An example of this interrelationship was given 
with respect to the challenge that natural gas exploitation would present for the future. 
One speaker at the conference estimated that unrestricted gas consumption would 
result in shortages within about ten to twenty years, but during this time, increased gas 
use could seriously undermine the coal industry. Not only this, but industrial conversion 
to cheap gas could result in costly reconversion in a relatively short period of time once 
the gas started to run out (Goodwin 1981a:13). In order to tackle energy problems of 
this nature, the institute produced a set of six principles, upon which it was argued a 
national energy policy could be based. The first three principles were concerned solely 
with the relationship between fuels with respect to energy provision in toto: First, the 
most economic sources of energy should be used to minimise cost; second, plentiful 
and depletionless resources should be used whenever possible in place of scarce and 
depleting resources; third, sources of energy with special characteristics should not be 
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used for purposes for which other less specialised energy sources are available 
(Goodwin 1981a:13). 
The developing postwar concern with energy as a total system comprised of 
interchangeable fuel sources may have been clear enough for Ickes in 1945, but the 
effective institutionalisation of a concern with energy would have to wait for his 
successors, first Julius Krug and the influential Barnett report Energy Uses and 
Supplies, and then Secretary Oscar L. Chapman. In 1947, the same year that 
Frederick Dewhurst’s America’s Needs and Resources (1947) was released, Harold 
Ickes’ successor as secretary of the Interior, Julius A. Krug , began an administrative 22
reorganisation of the department - specifically in order to address more effectively the 
resource depletion issues that were then being made manifestly clear (Goodwin 
1981a:34).  
Crucial to this reorganisation was the strengthening of the Office of the Secretary and 
the creation within this office of a programme staff and committee led by Walton 
Seymour, a former associate of Krug’s at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). In 
October 1947 the United States Geological Survey (USGS) produced for Krug a report 
detailing the current fuel and energy situation of the US. As was current practice, this 
report made substantial use of industry data and maintained that the increasingly 
fraught concern with materials depletion was ill-founded. The report argued that 
ongoing fuel shortages were not due to long-term resource issues, but instead to 
transportation and steel production shortfalls (Goodwin 1981a:35-36). Krug remained 
unsatisfied, and as he complained to Seymour in April 1948, there was a pressing 
need for: 
[A] general study of the Nation’s energy and fuel requirements…and our best 
guess as to how these needs would be met…even some ‘guesstimates’ would 
be better than nothing. I don’t think any of the past projections by the principal 
industries involved a realistic appraisal of the total needs of our expanding fully 
employed economy operating at a tempo which can meet our domestic needs 
and our increasing commitments abroad (cited in Goodwin 1981a:36) 
 Harold Ickes had resigned from the post of Secretary in February 1946 in protest at the 22
mooted appointment of Edwin Pauley to the position of under secretary of the Navy. Pauley 
had been involved in the oil industry since his founding of The Petrol Corp in 1923, and Ickes 
maintained that this long association should disqualify Pauley from gaining authority over the 
valuable naval petroleum reserves (Goodwin 1981a:14).
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Eventually, In 1949, Seymour presented to Krug the long awaited Barnett study. This 
was followed on December 1st 1950, by Interior Department Order 2602, issued under 
Chapman, which established the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Mineral 
Resources within the Department of the Interior. This new office was comprised of 
three divisions, focused variously on Minerals and Fuels, Geography, and Oil and Gas, 
and resulted in the first permanent planning unit within the federal government 
concerned with energy in general (Goodwin 1981a:44-45). Over and above the 
individual fuel sources, the office had supervisory responsibility over the Bureau of 
Mines, the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the Oil and Gas Division.  
The Paley Commission report detailed in the last chapter also relied upon a notion of 
an integrated system of energy in establishing its understanding of the potential long 
term constraints on the growth of the economy. As the commissioners argued: 
the time will come… and perhaps well beyond 1975, when civilisation’s energy 
needs will outrun nature’s declining store of fossil fuels available for economic 
use. Before this happens, ways must be found to harness economically such 
unconventional sources as solar and atomic energy. (PMPC Vol.1 1952:106) 
This perspective was tempered however, by a rather more positive, and politically 
acceptable conclusion regarding the prospects for material provision and economic 
growth in the short term; and this is derived, in part, due to the commission’s 
understanding of the system of energy. The Paley approach emphasised the end use 
of resources (Maass 1953:206) and as such, grouped individual fuel sources under the 
rubric of energy. Energy would form a core component of the Paley analysis with 
nearly 20 percent of the summary report devoted to it (Landsberg 1987:90) and 
where: ‘The commission is strongly of the opinion that the Nation’s energy problem 
must be viewed in its entirety and not as a loose collection of independent pieces 
involving different sources and forms of energy.’ (PMPC Vol. 1 1952:129). Beyond the 
general policy recommendations, their development of integrated estimations for 
overall energy consumption in 1975 indicated how the Paley Commission approached 
energy flow from primary production to ultimate consumption. 
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Reiterating the relative novelty of energy understood as an interrelated system, the 
PMPC actually maintained that its comprehensive and systemic understanding of 
energy was a novel one, claiming that previous energy crises had been dealt with on a 
‘piecemeal basis’ (PMPC Vol.1 1952:129). The Paley approach should be seen as a 
further way in which mineral fuels were being bound into a total system of energy in 
the post war years, and the PMPC report was emphatic that ‘… on one point, the 
Commission is very clear: the hydra heads of energy policy must be reined 
together.’ (PMPC Vol.1 1952:130). As such: 
[i]deally, the Nation should have a comprehensive energy policy and program 
which embraces all the narrower and more specific policies and programs 
relating to each type of energy and which welds these pieces together into a 
consistent and mutually supporting pattern with unified direction.’ (PMPC Vol. 1 
1952:129) 
By the early 1950s then, the notion of a system of energy had been born in the US, 
phoenix-like, from the ashen fear of material and mineral fuel depletion during the 
conflagration of war. This system of energy should be seen in relation to the near 
simultaneous construction of ‘the economy’, and related to this new and increasingly 
central political object through energy’s core role in the enablement of continued and 
increasingly urgent economic growth. The development of this new political concern 
with energy for the economy immediately posed a heightened threat to individual fuel 
production - particularly and most importantly the oil industry. The oil industry, of 
course already famously truculent with respect to federal oversight, found the 
developing concern with energy in the Interior Department and more broadly of 
particular concern. Attempts in congress in 1949 to establish a Petroleum Policy 
Council ultimately went nowhere, and as Harold Barnett reported, the Chairman of the 
industry body the National Petroleum Council (NPC), Walter B. Hallanan, opened their 
January 1950 meeting by describing the Council as ‘a buffer to encroachment by 
Government officials’ (cited in Goodwin 1981b:98). In order to assess the meaning of 
the threat represented by energy to oil, it is necessary to understand both the central 
importance of oil in the postwar period, and the means through which the vast profits 
of the oil industry, both domestically and abroad, were secured. 
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Oil and the international economy 
At the same time as the economy and the system of energy were being stabilised in 
the US, a new international financial infrastructure was being constructed under the 
Bretton Woods agreements, and as Mitchell (2011) argues, central to the developing 
architecture governing monetary flows was the governance of parallel flows of oil. By 
the end of the second world war, the US had accumulated 80 per cent of the world’s 
gold supply. And by making the dollar the world’s reserve currency fixed to gold at $35 
per ounce, with other currencies pegged to the dollar, it was hoped that the explicit 
goal of the Bretton Woods agreements - to limit international financial speculation - 
could be achieved. However, dollar circulation would rapidly outpace the US gold 
supply, and what sustained the value of the dollar in practice was its international use 
for purchasing the commodities that formed the bulk of international trade, and most 
importantly, oil. Oil was sold in the currency of the international company that 
produced the oil, not the country where it was produced, nor the place where it was 
consumed, and of the seven major international oil companies (the oil majors or seven 
sisters)  only one was British owned (British Petroleum) and one Dutch-British owned 23
(Royal Dutch Shell), the rest were American. This meant that the vast majority of global 
oil sales were in ‘dollar oil’ and countries were required to purchase the fuel they 
needed by using dollars, and therefore, as Mitchell argues ‘The value of the dollar as 
the basis of international finance depended on the flow of oil’ (Mitchell 2011:111). 
Flows of oil, flows of money 
And the oil did flow. From the 1920s onwards, approximately 60 to 80 per cent of 
world oil production was exported, and by 1970, oil accounted for 60 per cent of all 
seaborne cargo (Mitchell 2011:37). The postwar reconstruction of Europe and Japan 
involved vast quantities of oil, in large part due to the conversion of their economies 
from domestic coal sources of power to imported oil: through rising automobile use, 
the conversion of railroads from coal to diesel, and significantly, under the impact of 
 Coined by Enrico Matei, the head of the Italian state oil company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi 23
(ENI), the seven sisters in the 1950s were: Anglo-Persian Oil (which became British Petroleum); 
Gulf Oil; Standard Oil of California (SoCal); Texaco; Royal Dutch Shell; Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (Esso); and the Standard Oil Company of New York (SoCony).
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economic assistance from the US (Stork 1975:59-60). Under the Marshall Plan and 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), European use of oil was intensified, 
and therefore reliance upon Middle Eastern imports controlled predominantly by the 
American oil giants was assured. For example, the transition from rail to road freight 
haulage in Europe was imposed when European requests for freight cars under the 
Marshall Plan were reduced from 47,000 to 20,000; whilst 65,000 trucks were 
allocated by the US, in spite of no requests for such (Stork 1975:60-61). By the middle 
of 1950, 11 per cent of the value of all ECA shipments consisted of oil, and Walter 
Levy, who resigned from Mobil Oil to head the oil division of the ECA claimed that ‘ECA 
has maintained outlets for American oil in Europe… which otherwise would have been 
lost.’ (quoted in Stork 1975:61) 
By the end of the war, oil was both, by value and volume, the largest commodity in 
world trade (Mitchell 2011:111), and by 1955 it was such a large component of British 
international trade that a report on the treatment of oil in its accounts maintained that 
‘the international ramifications of the oil industry (including its tanker operations) are so 
large and so complex as almost to constitute oil [as] a currency in itself’ (cited in 
Mitchell 2011:119-120). The importance of oil was clearly understood by the postwar 
planners, with the Bretton Woods architects John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter 
White arguing for the creation of a third institution alongside the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, an institution to manage trade in oil and other materials 
(Mitchell 2011:112). Concern with oil and key commodity trade as part of the 
management of financial movements was shared across the board, with Friedrich 
Hayek, founder of the Mont Pelerin Society and one of the intellectual leaders of the 
nascent neoliberal movement, arguing for an ‘international commodity 
standard’ (Mitchell 2011:112).  
Between the Bretton Woods talks in July 1944, and the meetings at Dumbarton Oaks 
to agree a successor organisation to the League of Nations later in that same year, a 
third meeting was held between the US and Britain in Washington in early August. The 
purpose of this meeting was to establish an International Petroleum Council. The 
council was envisaged as a form of ‘trusteeship’ to enable the developing Anglo-
American control of Middle Eastern Oil, pre-empting attempts at nationalisation by oil 
producing countries and constructing a postwar petroleum order, which in the words 
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of a State Department memo, would create a ‘worldwide system of actual 
administrative control of the world’s petroleum resources’ (cited in Mitchell 2011:118) 
Washington intended for a government agency to play the role of trustee, and the US 
Petroleum Administration for War had already established, in 1943, a government oil 
company, the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC), to take control of the oil 
reserves of Saudi Arabia (Mitchell 2011:114; Goodwin 1981b:68-71). Harold Ickes was 
to serve as President and chairman of the corporation, and preempting his broader 
energy concerns sought to acquire the California Arabian Standard oil company and 
develop a federal Petroleum Reserves Board charged with estimating and 
administrating national reserves of petroleum - whether domestic or overseas. Oil 
companies railed against this perceived attempt at the creation of a New Deal-style 
petroleum public utility (Goodwin 1981b:71-72), and ultimately both the PRC and the 
International Petroleum Council were abandoned. With the move away from 
trusteeship, control over Middle Eastern oil production by American oil companies was 
to progress under the rubric of strategic necessity. 
The central linkage between oil and the cold war would be made clear by the April 
1951 nationalisation of oil production in Iran under a bill developed by Mohammed 
Mossadeq, who in May of that year would be elected as Prime Minister. Driving the 
nationalisation were clear and popular misgivings regarding the exploitative oil 
concession granted by Iran to the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Anglo-
Iranian had been founded in 1908 as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company following the 
discovery of large oil fields after having been granted a 60 year concession in 1901. 
Between 1913 and 1951, Anglo-Iranian grossed $3 billion, of which only $624 million 
went to the Iranian government, the rest being transferred abroad as profit, and from 
1944 to 1950, the company’s profits increased tenfold while government revenue only 
increased fourfold (Stork 1975:50). Iranian nationalisation removed Anglo-Iranian from 
its position as exclusive Iranian producer, and opened up the possibility of an American 
presence  in the country, although the developments were also considered as a threat 24
to further extractive operations, coming as they did shortly after the nationalisation of 
 The US had been positioning itself as an alternative ally for the Iranians since the war. Iran 24
was a prime recipient of Truman’s Point Four aid programme and a programme for the 
Country’s economic development was undertaken by Overseas Consultant’s Inc. - a US 
company headed by Max Thornburg, former State Department Oil affairs advisor who was also 
employed by Standard Oil of California (SoCal) (Stork 1975:51).
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oil fields in Mexico and Bolivia. As Truman confided to New York Times columnist 
Arthur Krock ‘if…the Iranians carry out their plans as stated, Venezuela and other 
countries on whose supplies we depend will follow suit. That is the great danger in the 
Iranian controversy with the British’ (cited in Stork 1975:52). 
In the same month as Mossadeq’s election, the New York Times helped cast the 
Iranian nationalisation into the shadow of the cold war, and stressed the importance of 
Middle East oil to capitalist and socialist countries: ‘…the U.S. and Europe could 
hardly afford to see an important part of the Near East oil resources pass to the control 
of Russia, either directly or indirectly through nationalisation’ (cited in Stork 1975:52; 
emphasis in original). In response to the nationalisation, Anglo-Iranian demanded 
compensation for both current investment and lost future profits, egregious terms that 
were of course rejected. They then instituted a boycott, effectively preventing Iran from 
transporting and marketing its own oil. American oil companies, in solidarity with 
Anglo-Iranian, also participated in the boycott, bringing Iranian oil production to a 
virtual standstill.  
The economic hardship resulting from this boycott helped lay the festering groundwork 
for the CIA backed military coup which overthrew Mossadeq in August 1953 and 
restored the Shah to power. And along with the Shah came the five American oil 
companies - collectively controlling 40 per cent of a consortium along with Anglo-
Iranian (now renamed British Petroleum). While national security and strategic interest 
with respect to the cold war were presented as the ostensible reason underlying the 
American companies’ move into Iran , the cold war helped a different conflict, 25
between sterling and dollar oil, to be won decisively by the American oil companies. 
The subsequent global flow of dollar denominated oil would maintain both the value of 
the dollar and further imbricated US governmental involvement in assuring the vast 
profits of US oil concerns - profits that had been assured almost from the very 
beginning by Federal involvement. 
The high price of cheap Middle Eastern oil 
 Indeed, at the same time, the five US majors were given an exemption from a pending 25
antitrust suit launched by the Department of Justice on the grounds of national security (Stork 
1975:55).
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Oil production has always been renowned as a high profit, high risk venture. And like 
all the best lies, this is based in at least a partial truth. In what Joe Stork has referred to 
as the ‘bonanza years’ from 1948-1960 the major oil companies operating in the 
Middle East transferred approximately $12.8 billion abroad from total revenue of $28.4 
billion (Stork 1975:56). The basis for these vast profits was the low cost of producing 
oil in the Middle East combined with a price structure for oil based on the high 
production costs of the US. A Chase Manhattan study in the early 1960s estimated 
the average costs of maintaining and expanding production in the Middle East at 16 
cents per barrel, compared to 51 cents per barrel for Venezuelan oil and $1.73 per 
barrel in the US (Stork 1975:58), and it was through the cartel agreement made 
between the seven major international oil companies in 1928 (Mitchell 2011:166) and 
the cartel’s use of the so-called Texas basing point formula that global oil prices were 
tied to US prices.  
Until the second world war the US was the world’s largest supplier of crude oil and 
petroleum products and the basing point formula set the price of oil - produced 
anywhere in the world - at the same price as Texas oil, plus an entirely fictitious 
transport cost from the gulf of Mexico to the point of purchase. This formula meant 
that oil produced in the Persian Gulf cost the same to purchase as Texas oil shipped 
from the the gulf of Mexico. And it was enabled by the vertically integrated structure of 
the major oil companies, which controlled all aspects of the industry from initial 
prospecting, through production, refining, transportation and market sale, alongside 
the joint ventures and non-competitive planning between the oil companies (Stork 
1975:58-59).  
This system of pricing world oil lasted until the end of the second world war. In 1944 
the British Navy launched an investigation into oil prices and the use of the Texas 
basing point system. In response to this investigation oil companies dropped the 
fictional transportation cost from the gulf of Mexico, but retained the Texas point price 
- Middle Eastern oil was still priced equivalently to oil produced in the US, despite 
significantly lower production costs. In effect, the Persian Gulf became a second 
basing point (Stork 1975:59). This pricing mechanism remained in place until 1960 and 
the development of the Oil Producing and Exporting Cartel (OPEC), and it was the 
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difference between the Texas point price and cheap Middle Eastern production costs 
that enabled the vast profits of the international oil majors up to this point. But this 
wasn’t the only means through which these profits were guaranteed.  
A further way that the profits of the major international oil companies were maintained 
while risks ameliorated in the middle east was through the profit sharing agreements 
first pioneered in Venezuela in 1948, but which were brought to the Middle East by 
Aramco  in Saudia Arabia in 1950, and then to Iraq and other countries (Stork 26
1975:47). The massive increases in postwar production in the Middle East resulted in 
increasing income to the ruling families and governments of producer countries under 
the royalties system in place at the time. For example, in Saudia Arabia, The House of 
Saud saw its income from Aramco production jump from $1.7 million in 1944 to about 
$50 million in 1949, as production increased from 7.8 million barrels per year to 174 
million barrels.  
However, company profits increased by an even greater degree (from $2.8 million to 
$115 million) as company income per barrel was over $1.10 while the Saudi regime 
received only 21 cents. As a consequence, the Saudis pushed for a more equitable 
division of profits, and ultimately the oil companies, in concert with the US State and 
Treasury Departments, invented a new 50-50 profit sharing scheme. The Saudi throne 
would receive 50 per cent of the posted price of oil, but this would be considered an 
income tax, and not a royalty. This tax could then be offset against income tax in the 
US. This happy arrangement meant that In 1950, Aramco payments to the House of 
Saud leaped to $111.7 million, while taxes payable to the US treasury dropped by an 
equivalent amount - to nearly zero, maintaining Aramco profit margins at their previous 
levels (Stork 1975: 46-47).  
The profit sharing scheme, in line with the narrative of strategic necessity, was justified 
at the time on the basis that increased sharing of profits with inept and corrupt yet 
pliant regimes was necessary to ward off the threat posed by nationalists to the 
concessions held by the largely American oil majors (Stork 1975:47-48). However, this 
apparent method of ensuring the strategic security of supply actually operated by 
 At this time Aramco was composed of Esso (30%); SoCal (30%); Texaco (30%); Mobil (10%).26
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securing oil company profits, and amounted to an indirect transfer from the US 
treasury to the treasuries of oil producing countries. A point George McGhee, the then 
Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 
conceded in congressional testimony: 
Q: But upon recommendation of the National Security Council, the Treasury 
made the decision to permit Aramco to treat royalties paid to Saudi Arabia as 
though they were taxes… the impact on the national treasury was direct and 
dramatic…the effect of the decision was to transfer $50 million out of the U.S. 
Treasury and into the Arabian treasury. That was the way it was decided to give 
Arabia more money and to do it by the tax route. Isn’t that correct? 
McGhee: Yes, that is one way of looking at it. (Quoted in Stork 1975:48) 
The high profit margins of the international oil majors, enabled by the price support of 
the Texas basing point formula and ensured by the tax offset of the profit sharing 
scheme resulted in the further expansion of overseas oil production by largely US 
owned corporations, and the decisive shift in global oil extraction from the US to the 
Middle East. Oil production in the Middle East was (and still is) a highly lucrative 
industry not because of the high risks involved, but because of the closely integrated 
and cooperative nature of oil production combined with extensive governmental 
support. The basing point formula anchored the price of Middle Eastern oil until the 
early 1960s on the price of oil produced in the US. But how was the high US price 
itself maintained? 
The domestic US basis of expanding foreign production 
The oil industry and the production of petroleum in the US had, from the very first, a 
remarkably agnostic relationship with the received wisdom of the economics discipline. 
Early oil production at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries proved 
acidly resistant to market competition, leading ultimately to the imposed break up of 
J.D. Rockerfeller’s mammoth Standard Oil in 1911, as one of the first breakthroughs of 
the anti-trust Sherman act. Twenty years later the oil that gushed from the ground in 
the newly discovered Joiner field in East Texas would wash away the received 
neoclassical wisdom of supply and demand, and ushered in a series of controls in 
order to reduce supply and maintain prices. As Craufurd Goodwin notes (1981b:64),  
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the main argument presented to the public for the close, mutual relationship of the 
federal and state governments to the oil industry in the US at the time was based on 
the apparently singular nature of petroleum production. In this case, it was argued that 
unrestrained competition was uniquely destructive with respect to oil - leading to sub-
optimal rates of extraction and waste. The salutary lesson of the Joiner field in East 
Texas provided a popular imaginary to underwrite this. In late 1930 and early 1931 
prospectors in Texas struck oil in what would turn out to be the largest oilfield yet 
discovered. The vast quantities of oil pumped from the field caused the price of 
petroleum to collapse, and by August 1931, the Governors of Oklahoma and Texas 
had declared martial law, and sent the National Guard to occupy oilfields and shut 
down new wells in order to reflate prices (Mitchell 2011:196). 
Martial law was shortly replaced by a nationwide system of output limitations based on 
quotas (known as ‘allowables’) for states and state producers, where ‘the total national 
output would in theory add up to an amount corresponding to a desired price on the 
consumer’s demand curve.’ (Goodwin 1981b:64). Enforcing the quotas was achieved 
through the 1935 Connally Hot Oil Act which prohibited interstate movement of any oil 
which was produced above the quota. Nationwide statistics on demand were 
produced by the Bureau of Mines. This statistical information was then used by the 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission to determine quotas and thereby stabilise or 
adjust prices. Alongside the quota system, in 1932 the domestic oil industry convinced 
the US government to impose a tariff of 21 cents per barrel on imported oil. This 
brought about an immediate reduction in imports and hastened Mexico's 
nationalization of its American-owned oil industry in the Spring of 1938 (Vietor 
1984:93).  
The final aspect of government price support was the application of preferential tax 
treatments to incentivise production (Goodwin 1981:63; Stork 1975:59; Vietor 1984). 
The so-called ‘depletion allowance’ allowed for 27 and a half percent of profits from 
the production of domestic oil and gas to be exempt from income taxation, and was 
originally implemented in 1926. Coal and other mineral fuels received much lower 
allowances, on the grounds that technically, exploration risks were higher in the oil 
industry (Vietor 1984:20). The depletion allowance was additional to tax breaks for 
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‘intangible’ drilling costs which had been in place since the 1916 Revenue Act and 
were reconfirmed by Congress in 1954 (Vietor 1984:20). 
As Goodwin maintains, from the Depression onwards the regulation of the oil industry 
through production quotas, import tariffs and tax allowances in the US was mainly 
contrived by the industry itself - ostensibly to cope with oversupply and maintain oil 
prices. In maintaining prices in this way, the US government helped encourage and 
support consistently increasing levels of US oil extraction and expansive and 
expanding profit margins for the oil industry, at the same time as the overall purchase 
price of oil was dropping (Pfister 2010; Yergin 1991:785) As Vietor stated in 1984, 
estimates on the preferential tax treatment to the oil and gas industry alone range from 
USD 400 million to 2.5 billion annually over the fifty years they had then been in effect 
(Vietor 1984:20). Through the Texas basing point system and the integrated and non-
competitive structure of the international oil majors, even greater increases in oil 
production and profits were realised overseas, predominantly in the Middle East, given 
the much reduced production costs. The continued flows of oil, and continued flows of 
oil company profits, were made possible through the coordinated exclusion - by 
industry, the US government, and producer country governments - of oil production 
from competitive forces.  
After the war, these oil flows were of crucial importance to the international economy. 
The maintenance of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, and the stability of the 
Bretton Woods financial architecture was increasingly secured under the ambit of the 
developing structure of the cold war. Alongside the consistently, and sometimes 
explosively growing supply of oil, were the persistent predictions of long-term scarcity 
and the imminent depletion of US reserves - claims made by both government and 
industry. And yet, even with the spreading fear of generalised natural resource 
depletion at the end of the second world war, the oil industry was optimistic and sure 
of its ability to provide for the future needs of the country (Bowden 1982, 1985).  
By the early 1950s, approximately 50 billion barrels of oil had been produced in total in 
the US, and with projections of total oil reserves in the region of 150-200 billion barrels, 
the oil industry was looking forward to future production on the level of two to three 
times the total production of oil over the last 100 years (Bowden 1985:219). This 
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optimism was made clear in a report released in 1952 - the same year as the Paley 
report - by the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA). Although the 
report did not itself estimate remaining oil resources, as Bowden (1982:432) notes, it 
brought three lines of evidence to bear in support of its upbeat assessment of the 
industry’s future: First, the report argued that it was illogical to believe that the US was 
running out of oil, as such suggestions in the past had been proved false. Second, US 
oil production was at an all time high in 1952 and was continuing to increase. Third, 
US proven reserves were greater in magnitude in 1952 than at any time in the past.  
A second report released in 1952, this time by the National Petroleum Council (NPC), 
made similar claims with respect to the long term availability of oil supplies, but clearly 
stated the importance of price and production supports: ‘Increasing availability of 
petroleum can be counted on in the United States and worldwide provided reasonable 
economic incentives and a favorable climate for private investment are 
maintained.’ (NPC 1952:18) However, alongside this, the report also noted the 
potential threat to oil from other energy sources: ‘Energy from other sources at 
attractive prices may finally bring about a decrease in petroleum demand before any 
lack of prospects causes a decrease of available supplies.’ (NPC 1952:18). The 
developing notion of a system of interchangeable fuel sources comprising a total 
system of energy, a system that at least parts of the federal government were keen to 
regulate, and that was seen as fundamental to powering the newly sacralised 
economy, was beginning to be recognised as a threat to continued oil production and 
high profits in the industry. By 1956, claims by two men - the Soviet premier Nikita 
Krushchev, and the oil geologist and Technocracy Inc. founder M. King Hubbert - laid 
clear the threat that energy posed to the oil industry.  
Energy and the threat of peak oil 
Krushchev’s boast in 1956 to the Twentieth Party Congress was a further provocation 
to the ‘West’ and confirmed the central importance of growth to the cold war: ‘the 
great advantage of the socialist economic system, the high rate of development of 
social production, enable us to carry out in an historically very brief period the main 
task of the U.S.S.R. - to catch up and surpass the most developed capitalist countries 
in per capita output’ (Krushchev; quoted in Arndt 1978:48). Merely one year after 
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Krushchev’s ebullient speech, the USSR’s success in the space race with the launch 
of the first Sputnik would raise US fears of accelerating soviet industrial production to 
the level of a ‘hysterical anxiety’ (Lekachman 1966:161). This developing hysteria over 
the growth of the economy focused further attention on the availability of energy to 
power this growth and reiterated the explosive potential of atoms for the economy. 
Atoms for the economy 
During the August and September of 1949, Harold Ickes’ long delayed World 
Conservation Conference took place in Lake Success, New York. The renamed 
Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources was ultimately 
organised under the auspices of the UN, with Julius Krug heading up the US 
delegation. In his welcoming address, Krug stressed a number of opportunities for the 
years ahead with respect to energy: ‘1. The peacetime application of atomic energy. 2. 
More effective utilisation of solar energy. 3. Development of synthetic fuels, particularly 
from oil shales’ (cited in Goodwin 1981a:26). Noticeable by their exclusion from this list 
were the expansion of, and support for traditional oil and gas production; although this 
is unsurprising given Krug’s dissatisfaction with the oil industry’s ongoing assessment 
of the energy situation in the US, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter.  
Similarly, in 1953 Palmer Cosslet Putnam published his study of energy demands 
commissioned by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1949. Putnam, who was one of 
the Paley commission’s staff members researching energy resources, would continue 
the analysis of energy as a single system in this volume. Unsurprisingly for a study 
commissioned and published by the Atomic Energy Commission, Putnam argued for a 
widespread electrification of the US and a shift to increasing reliance on nuclear fuels 
to 60% of total energy input by 2050, on the grounds of imminent domestic fossil fuel 
peak production dates. Putnam reiterated the relative, economic scarcity notion of the 
Paley report when he stated that: 
There is no such thing as an absolute reserve of coal, oil, and gas. Reserves are 
relative. There is more coal, oil, and gas in the earth’s crust than will ever be 
used. It is not a question of emptying the bin. It is only a question of deciding 
how deep it is economical to dig. (Putnam 1953:117) 
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For Putnam, that depth would soon be reached. He projected that oil and gas would 
reach peak production between 1955-1960 then go into decline; bituminous coal 
would begin to decline before 1960, followed by all Eastern US coal by 1975. These 
projections of the decline of inexpensive mineral fuel sources, and the potential for the 
expansion of replacement non-mineral fuels as part of an overall system of energy 
came at a time of ever developing certitude over the necessary growth of the national 
economy. 1953 also saw President Eisenhower give his famous ‘Atoms for Peace’ 
speech to the UN General Assembly, where he claimed: ‘The United States knows that 
peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. The capability, already 
proved, is here today.’ (Eisenhower 1953). In 1955, the UN would host the 
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of the Atom in Geneva, otherwise 
known as the Atoms for Peace conference, and in 1957 Eisenhower’s proposal for an 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the aegis of the UN, and responsible 
under Article II of its statute for the drive ‘… to accelerate and enlarge the contribution 
of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’ (IAEA 1957). 
While atomic energy may not have been simply a dream of the future as Eisenhower 
pointed out, it certainly had the potential to be a nightmare for the oil industry. As the 
oil economist Morris Adelman later stated ‘The uncertainty of oil exploration infects, as 
it were, the economics of investment in competing supply sources. For example, 
investment in nuclear power is reasonable given one set of expectations of oil 
discoveries and costs, and wasteful given another.’ (Adelman 1972a:41). If doubt was 
cast over the future availability of mineral fuels, particularly oil and gas - until then the 
two fastest growing components of the energy system - then alternative sources of 
energy would have to be found, and this would present a clear threat to the historic 
systems of price and production supports that underlay the oil industry’s profitability. In 
1956, the same year that Krushchev would boast about the USSR’s unparalleled 
economic growth and the fundamental advantage of the Soviet economic system, the 
oil geologist M. King Hubbert presented a report at the annual Spring meeting of the 
Southern District of the American Petroleum Institute (API) that, in the context of the 
necessity for abundant energy to fuel economic growth, would come to be seen as a 
threat to the very basis of the US oil industry. 
Hubbert and peak oil 
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Just two years after he received the Arthur L. Day Medal of the Geological Society of 
America for his work in geophysics, Hubbert, then chief geology consultant for the 
Shell Development Company and director of the Shell Exploration and Production 
Research Division in Houston , predicted that the US was nearing the extraction of 27
half of its recoverable petroleum resources. His Peak Oil Thesis made use of a 
lifecycle curve methodology first introduced by D.F. Hewett in examining production 
statistics from major metals mining districts in Europe. Hubbert argued that while not 
all of the criteria identified by Hewett relate to fossil fuels, there is a fundamental 
principle that is applicable across both: ‘…like the metals, the exploitation of the fossil 
fuels in any given region must begin at zero, undergo a period of more or less 
continuous increase, reach a culmination and then decline’ (Hubbert 1973:41-42; cited 
in Bowden 1985: 212). This fundamental principle describes an industry life cycle 
curve, and in order to define the area under this curve for petroleum extraction, 
Hubbert both reviewed published estimates of reserves and made extensive enquires 
among respected exploration geologists. On the basis of the figures established 
through his research, Hubbert constructed his famous famous life cycle curve. 
Through his curve fitting procedure, Hubbert estimated that the total reserves of crude 
oil in the US measured approximately 150 billion barrels - a figure in line with other 
contemporary estimates (Bowden 1982; 1985), alongside a prediction that US crude 
oil production would peak sometime between 1966 and 1971, and then enter into 
continuous and inexorable decline (Hubbert 1956; Hemmingsen 2010).  
 Hubbert was also a co-founder in the 1930s of Technocracy Inc. and was centrally involved 27
in the technocratic movement of the time. Inspired by the institutional economist Thorstein 
Veblen, the scientific management principles of Frederick Taylor and Edward Bellamy’s late 19th 
century utopian novel Looking Backward, Technocracy Inc. gained notoriety briefly between 
1932 and 1933 but was otherwise a relatively marginal movement in the US. Reacting to the 
same circumstances that resulted in the construction of the economy, Technocracy Inc. sought 
to replace the price system and the monetary units that underpinned this with a currency based 
on a thermodynamic system of energy units (Hemmingsen 2010:535), pre-empting Howard 
Odum’s comparable concept of of ‘emergy’ by a quarter century (e.g. Odum 1996). Hubbert’s 
critique would also encompass the development of the economy from the 1930s onwards, and 
his concern precisely derived from the separation of the economy as a discrete ontological 
sphere. As Hemmingsen notes: 'Hubbert was convinced that business and government 
leaders had erred fundamentally in tying the financial system to monetary growth; in his view, 
physical and biological constraints made it impossible to continue such growth 
rates.' (Hemmingsen 2010:536) And as he would later state in an interview at the end of his life: 
‘It’s all interrelated, the biological thing, the ecological thing and minerals, it’s all part of a single 
complex. So what you’ve got is a contract between the physical, biological world and the 
monetary world’ (Hubbert quoted in Doel 1989c).
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Hubbert had been invited to speak by the API in recognition of his geophysical 
expertise and the importance of geophysical prospecting at the time. He was a 
former geophysicist for the USGS, former professor of Geophysics at Columbia 
University and former senior analyst at the Board of Economic Warfare in 
Washington, and as the letter inviting Hubbert stated, he was ‘eminently qualified to 
discuss future energy sources’ (Strang 1955; cited in Hemmingsen 2010:354). 
These bona fides gave Hubbert’s predictions real weight, and these predictions 
should be seen in relation to his long standing and broader concerns with the 
inability of the market-driven economy to optimally allocate resources - driven by 
his technocratic impulses, as outlined in chapter 2.  
Hubbert published his first forecasts of a US oil production peak in two periodicals 
circulated by Technocracy Inc. in 1938. Here he made similar claims to his later 
1956 forecast but with a peak oil production date of 1950 at the latest 
(Hemmingsen 2010:536). This prediction would be reiterated and updated ten 
years later, at a presentation to the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science in 1948 (Bowden 1985:211), which was published the next year in Science. 
His prediction here was in fact consistent with the claims that he would later make in 
1956, but also outlined his concern with population growth on the grounds that the 
exploitation of fossil fuels had enabled ‘one of the most disturbing ecological 
influences of recent millennia... the progressive increase of human 
population’ (Hubbert 1949:104). In opposition to Malthus, who saw the human 
proclivity to procreate as the force driving population expansion limited ultimately 
by the availability of land suitable for food production, Hubbert maintained that 
energy supply was both the driver of and ultimate limit to population growth 
(Hemmingsen 2010:535). 
Hubbert’s 1956 prediction of a peak in US oil production in the next 10 to 15 years 
received national attention in the petroleum press, with the magazine Petroleum Week 
featuring Hubbert’s speech under the headline ‘Is Oil Nearing a Production 
Crisis?’ (Hemmingsen 2010:540). This was in spite of both the public relations office of 
his employer - Shell Oil - phoning Hubbert from New York just prior to his taking the 
stage at the API meeting in Texas, and asking him to ‘Please tone it down some’ (Doel 
1989; cited in Hemmingsen 2010: 534). The paper upon which Hubbert’s speech was 
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based was also censored by Shell Oil, with specific predictions about the future of the 
industry in the pre-print version being replaced by much vaguer statements (Bowden 
1985:219). The impact of the Peak Oil Thesis was considered damaging enough to 
the oil industry to justify near universal condemnation of his methods and almost 
immediate rebuttals from both industry and the USGS and bureau of mines.  
As I indicated earlier in the previous chapter, pessimistic analyses of oil reserves had a 
history stretching back to the first USGS survey, and Hubbert’s ultimate reserves 
figures were comparable to other estimations at the time, so why was Hubbert’s 
prediction of the imminent decline of US oil production so universally reviled? The 
curve fitting procedure used by Hubbert - producing the estimated peak production 
date of just 10 to 15 years time flatly contradicted the optimism of the oil industry, as 
indicated in the IPAA and NPC reports of 1952; and as Bowden has argued: 
As suggested by its title, ‘Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels’, Hubbert’s 
analysis was more than a simple statement of pessimism about the future of the 
US oil and gas industry. It suggested that dependence upon fossil fuels, like 
earlier dependencies upon other non-renewable energy sources, must ultimately 
give way to a reliance upon renewable sources of energy, specifically nuclear 
energy. (Bowden 1985:219-220) 
Peak production and the threat to oil 
Hubbert concluded that nuclear power would be the only fuel source capable of 
meeting America’s energy needs ‘for at least the next hundred years’ (Hubbert, 
1956:36), and so presented the Peak Oil Thesis as a severe threat to the oil industry in 
general. This long term threat to the oil industry from other alternative fuel providers 
(due to the increasing price of increasingly scarce oil) within the overall system of 
energy included not just atomic power and increasing use of renewables, but also 
synthetic oil from coal - an energy option that was highlighted in the Paley report 
(PMPC Vol. 1 1952; PMPC Vol. 3 1952). This threat was supplemented by a more 
immediate and pressing concern within the oil industry itself: an imminent reduction in 
oil availability would mean that the system of government quotas, tariffs and tax 
exemptions encouraging the sustained high levels of domestic production would be 
unjustified (Mitchell 2011:188). In light of imminent peak oil, both the need to conserve 
domestic oil reserves (in part for strategic reasons), and the massively expanded 
overseas production would render government production props unsupportable. The 
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possibility of the removal of economic incentives for oil production was obviously not 
popular with either the domestic or international producers (who themselves relied on 
the maintenance of high domestic oil prices), and as the Humble Oil employed 
economist Richard Gonzalez argued: 
Our freedom and our way of life depend on the degree to which we can assure 
increasing supplies of domestic energy at reasonable cost. For at least our 
lifetime, oil and gas will be the most important and useful forms of energy. All of 
us have good reason to be concerned, therefore, that national policy shall be 
designed to encourage development of domestic petroleum resources in order 
that we may have sufficient energy for our economic progress and our national 
security. In a period when the United States is spending 40 billion dollars annually 
on defense, it would be foolish to jeopardize the domestic supply of the energy 
most vital to that defense by unwise policies. There are many good reasons why 
national policies designed to encourage the development of domestic oil and gas 
resources should be maintained, but the most important reason is that these 
policies are essential to provide petroleum for our future progress. (Gonzalez 
1957:21) 
The threat to domestic oil production from overseas oil was a longstanding issue for 
independent domestic producers, as can be seen by the imposition of the import tariff 
in response to the East Texas oil find in the 1930s, and in the post war period this had 
taken on new force. From 1946 to 1953, imports of cheap overseas oil rose from 5 
percent to 10 percent of domestic production (Barber 1981a:220), and as Barber 
notes (1981a:230), behind the scenes in the White House it had been made clear from 
the earliest days of the Eisenhower administration that any failure by the executive to 
protect the domestic oil industry from cheap oil imports would lead to action by the 
congress to do so. Congressional support for domestic producers was also not limited 
to the delegations of oil producing states, but also from those members of congress 
who represented states that did not have known oil deposits - as there was always 
hope of a big new discovery; and as the international majors had little interest in 
financing domestic prospecting, the possibility of big new finds was reliant on the 
health of the domestic independents.  
By 1955 an advisory committee to the Eisenhower presidency had recommended a 
voluntary limit on oil importation, and a provision of the Trade Agreements Extension 
Act of that year resulted in oil importers being required to supply information on the 
quantities of oil and petroleum products they were importing. This information revealed 
imports of oil substantially above the standard recommended by the advisory 
committee (Barber 1981a: 230-231). Further moves towards the voluntary limitation on 
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cheap overseas oil were interrupted by the Suez crisis beginning in late 1956. This 
resulted in the President directing the Secretary of the Interior to authorise 15 US oil 
companies to collaborate in organising petroleum shipments to NATO members; and 
resulted in an increase in US production to western Europe - from zero to 300,000 
barrels a day from the gulf of Mexico - over the course of November 1956. It also led 
to government support for the development of a new class of oil supertankers, which 
could carry several hundred thousand tons of oil (Barber 1981a: 234-235). The new 
supertankers, along with the development of standardised containerisation, slash ed 
transportation costs and again lowered the cost of imported oil in comparison to 
domestic oil, and resulted in increasing pressure on domestic producers (Mitchell 
2011-154-155; Pfister 2010).  
In August 1956, the IPAA filed a formal petition calling for further investigation into oil 
importation on the basis of a threat to national security, and Robert L. Wood, the 
Association’s President, would take his case directly to the White House in an 
audience with Eisenhower in September. Wood argued that excess imports were 
curtailing exploratory activity, resulting in abandoned wells and had “forced state 
conservation agencies to restrict domestic production below economic levels” (quoted 
in Barber 1981a: 223-234). Deliberation of this petition was resumed in the spring of 
1957 against the backdrop of the Suez crisis and this resulted ultimately in the Report 
of the Special Cabinet Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Imports, transmitted to the 
President in July 1957. While this report proposed that guidelines be established for 
each oil importer - stipulating a maximum import volume, these remained voluntary 
and non-binding (Barber 1981a: 239); therefore the threat to the domestic oil industry 
remained in place. By 1958 crude oil production in the US was down 460,000 barrels 
per day on 1957 levels (Barber 1981:246), and at the beginning of the 1960s 
importation of cheap overseas oil had increased to around 20 percent of total oil 
consumption (Landsberg & Schurr 1968:12).  
The continuing growth in the importation of Middle Eastern oil in light of the failure of 
the voluntary limitation schemes brought the federal government closer ‘to a formal 
alliance with regulatory commissions in the oil-producing states in buttressing the 
prices of domestically produced crude. Free entry of imports had for some time posed 
a threat to the survival of this price support mechanism’ (Barber 1981a:241-241). 
Increasing imports of crude oil and petroleum products into the US threatened not only 
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domestic producers however, but the international system of oil production itself - 
based as this was on the high price of US produced oil, transmitted internationally 
through the basing point system. If the US price supports for domestically produced 
crude oil were dismantled, then this would impact on the pricing regime underpinning 
Middle Eastern oil, and the vast profits of the international majors. Hubbert’s Peak Oil 
Thesis provided a further spur to both increased oil imports to the US and the removal 
of supports for domestic production in the short term, and the shift away from oil 
towards other energy sources in order to power the national economy in the long term. 
This threat had to be neutralised, and the way this was undertaken in the first instance 
was for oil industry representatives to attack Hubbert’s methods, and specifically his 
apparent insensitivity to economic factors. Re-emphasising the Paley approach to 
price scarcity and reserves measurement, alternative and much larger estimates of US 
oil reserves were generated in order to delegitimise the imminent Peak Oil Thesis. 
Overcoming Hubbert’s peak 
Oil company executives were the first to directly rebut Hubbert's estimates. A series 
of addresses and articles from 1956 to 1963 by Morgan Davis and Richard Gonzalez 
of Humble Oil challenged Hubbert’s findings from a price-oriented economic 
perspective (Bowden 1985: 220; Hemmingsen 2010:536). In 1956 Davis was the Vice 
President of Humble oil  and one week after the API meeting he sought to discredit 28
Hubbert's theory at a talk to a local geophysical society in Houston. According to 
Hubbert, Davis (trained as a geologist) and Gonzalez, a university of Texas economist 
hired by Davis, would continually refute Hubbert's speeches over the years ‘usually 
within a matter of a week or two’ (Doel 1989a). In line with the Paley approach they 
held a relative, price-based perspective on scarcity and maintained that ‘economic, 
rather than physical, factors account for the existence of scarcity in the 
marketplace.’ (Bowden 1985:221). In a 1957 paper published by Gonzalez in the 
Journal of Petroleum Technology he quotes a 1951 USGS report Fuel Reserves of the 
United states: 
 Davis would later become President and then Chairman of the board of Humble oil, Humble 28
oil was a majority owned affiliate of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and in 1960 Humble and 
Standard along with Standard’s other affiliates were consolidated into the single Exxon 
corporation.
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If the future can be judged by the past, oil and gas will be found in sufficient 
quantities for many years to come. In the United States adequate production has 
been a direct function of economic incentive. Until the unpredictable date at 
which that incentive fails to provide the needed supplies, there will be no 
convincing evidence that we have reached the limits of our ability to expand the 
potential ultimately recoverable reserves of petroleum. (USGS 1951:35; cited in 
Gonzalez 1957:18) 
Gonzalez and Davis argued that Hubbert’s production peak was an arbitrary one, and 
that instead of peaking, oil production trends would continue in a straight line and 
consequently the predicted date of oil running out would be pushed further and further 
into the future (Bowden 1985:220; Hemmingsen 2010:536). Indeed, Gonzalez quoted 
Interior Department figures indicating that 300 billion barrels of oil were recoverable in 
the US as opposed to Hubbert's lower estimations. He even argued that this larger 
figure might come to be seen as conservative due to improvements in production 
techniques and as additional discoveries are made in both old and new oil provinces 
(Gonzalez 1957:14).  
1958 saw the publication of an RFF study The Future Supply of Oil and Gas (Netschert 
1958) by RFF staff economist Bruce Netschert. Netschert reviewed a series of reserve 
estimates in order to come to an overall resource base figure in the order of 500 billion 
barrels - two and half times higher than Hubbert’s upper bound. In order to arrive at 
this figure, Netschert made use of a variety of reserve estimates, then multiplied these 
figures by three, on the basis of an estimated 32.7 per cent recovery rate by the 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission Committee on Secondary Recovery and Pressure 
Maintenance (Netschert 1958:22-24). While Netschert stated that the 500 billion barrel 
figure represented the total resource base, over and above the recoverable reserves, in 
a footnote he indicated how an economic approach to technological innovation implies 
higher reserve figures than the estimates he made use of, how this was prefigured by 
Gonzalez’ 1957 article, and how: ‘…the full implications of this conclusion, especially 
in terms of the results of increased recovery over the medium term, have not, in this 
writer’s opinion, received the recognition they deserve’ (Netschert 1958:24). 
Netschert’s analysis, embodying the Paley approach as it was further developed 
through the early work programmes of RFF, was based on a clear use of relative, 
price-based scarcity measures in his calculation of reserves. Although generally well 
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received in the academic press (see e.g. Maxwell 1958; Steiner 1959; Whitaker 1958), 
Netschert’s study would receive a blistering review by Hubbert himself in the Journal 
Science (Hubbert 1958). Hubbert had reviewed the manuscript of The Future Supply 
prior to its publication, a publication that went ahead without any of his explicit 
concerns being addressed (Doel 1989b), and in Science he concluded by stating that 
Netschert’s procedures resulted in: 
…estimates of reserves, and of future productive capability, for both oil and gas 
which, in light of present information, crowd the upper limits of plausibility. These 
conclusions, accordingly, imply the existence for the next several decades of a 
state of national self-sufficiency with respect to petroleum and natural gas which 
may be more illusory than real. Consequently, should they be accepted at face 
value and made the basis for national policy, the results could prove detrimental 
to the national welfare. (Hubbert 1958:196) 
This was not the sole impact of RFF that year however. As I discussed in the last 
chapter, 1958 was the year of the RFF’s Perspectives on Conservation conference, 
attended by the then Director of the USGS, Thomas B. Nolan. In his paper for the 
conference, Nolan referenced Hubbert’s calculations as interesting, but simply noted 
that these are a far cry from the discredited earlier pessimistic estimates of total oil 
supply from twenty years earlier. Nolan’s repeated optimistic assertions regarding the 
future supply of oil (and indeed all material resources) were founded squarely on his 
understanding of technology and technological progress inherited from neoclassical 
economics (Walker 2007). In fact, Nolan made clear here that the economic 
conception of technology is little other than rank alchemy: ‘Indeed, it seems entirely 
probable to me that in the future we may be able to invent, or produce out of 
abundant materials, new substances that have predictable, specific and desired 
properties’ (Nolan 1958:59).  
In the early 1960s more direct critiques of the Peak Oil Thesis shifted from the oil 
industry to the USGS, with assistant chief geologist Vincent McKelvey  becoming a 29
champion of price-based reserves calculations against Hubbert. In 1963 McKelvey 
leaked an anonymous, unauthorised USGS report to the Oil & Gas Journal. This report 
sought to prove that you could, in fact, turn base metals into gold, and produced a 
reserves figure of 590 billion barrels, three times greater than Hubbert’s estimate of 
 Mckelvey would later become director of the USGS before his removal in the early 1970s.29
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200 billion, based in part on the presumption that technological advances had kept 
price and availability of petroleum constant, despite the increasing difficulty of 
extraction (Hemmingsen 2010:537).  
Similarly to Morgan Davis and Richard Gonzalez, John Ryan, an economist for 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, would maintain in papers published in the Bulletin of the 
American Association of Petroleum Geologists and the Journal of Petroleum 
Technology in the mid 1960s that Hubbert’s analyses crucially ignored the role of 
economics (Bowden 1985:220-221) and failed to take into account changes in pricing 
and technology (Hemmingsen 2010:536). As Bowden (1985) and Hemmingsen 
(2010) note however, the criticisms of Hubbert’s Peak Oil Thesis were not based 
solely on economic interpretations of scarcity measures. Hubbert was also 
critiqued on the basis that his reliance on production statistics failed to take into 
account oil geology. This critique was made by L.G. Weeks of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, and was also used by John Ryan and Vincent Mckelvey. Ryan in fact 
described the peak oil model as a ‘statistical exercise and is not the result of 
geological or engineering analysis’ (Ryan 1965; cited in Bowden 1985:221).  
However, these critiques were made alongside and as part of the much higher 
estimations of US oil reserves, based upon the shift to the Paley approach’s 
relative, price-based scarcity measures. In line with the Paley report itself then, 
these high reserve estimations would enable pessimistic evaluations of the 
availability of US natural resources - in this case, specifically M. King Hubbert’s 
analysis, to be challenged, opposed, and ultimately buried  under the weight of 30
contrary statistics.  
 Until Hubbert’s Peak Oil Thesis was resurrected in the early 1970s, and which will be 30
covered in the final chapter of this thesis.
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Oiling the system of energy 
In 1961, Morgan Davis testified at hearings into a potential National Fuels Study. 
Representing not only Humble Oil, of which he was President at the time, but also the 
American Petroleum Institute, the Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Association, and the 
Western Oil and Gas Association, Davis argued: 
Fundamentally, no basis exists at this time for concern about the soundness 
of relying on competition among fuels to serve the public interest, since it 
appears obvious that this policy has resulted in development of an 
abundance of energy at reasonable prices…No shortage of domestic fuels 
exists or is remotely in prospect, provided adequate incentives are 
maintained… [T]here is no basis in the past record or present situation to 
require any new policy with respect to fuels and energy. (cited in Barber 
1981b:293) 
The large reserve estimations developed since 1956 - that made use of the economic 
factors that Hubbert excluded - proved, to Davis’ satisfaction that US oil production 
was not likely to peak any time soon; and the ‘adequate incentives’ that Davis referred 
to had been significantly bolstered two years before with the imposition of a mandatory 
quota system for oil imports. 
The restriction and expansion of oil 
Against the backdrop of the ongoing failure of voluntary oil import controls, 
Eisenhower’s Presidential Proclamation 3279 implemented a mandatory import quota 
system on March 10, 1959. Under the system, petroleum could only be legally 
imported into the US under license from the Department of the Interior, and this 
‘closed the remaining gap in a regulatory apparatus supporting the price of domestic 
crude oil’ (Barber 1981a:251). The Interior Secretary was charged with ensuring that 
imports did not exceed the predetermined proportion of expected domestic demand, 
set in the first instance at 9 per cent and subsequently modified to a ceiling of 12.2 per 
cent (Vietor 1984:120). The quota system was based on the assumption of the 
coexistence of both domestic and imported oil in America, and aside from the 
overland exemptions for oil from both Canada and Mexico - with the latter having oil 
shipments diverted to Brownsville, Texas, where they were transported twelve miles 
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back across the border to Mexico by truck, then re-imported, overland - the 
mandatory import restrictions were ultimately not hugely protective. By linking oil 
imports to domestic demand, this enabled a growing volume of oil imports to power a 
growing economy (Barber 1981a:253; Vietor 1984:130), and in fact from 1960 to 1970 
the percentage of overseas oil actually increased slightly from 20 percent to 22.7 
percent of total oil consumed (Landsberg & Schurr 1968: 12; de Marchi 1981:476).  
What the quotas very clearly were, however, was a means to maintain federal 
production support of domestic oil. And this was based on the new, large oil reserves 
figures estimated by industry, RFF and the USGS. These indicated, contra Hubbert, 
that domestic oil could be effectively exploited without imminent depletion through the 
maintenance of US oil prices. The quota system itself would last until the beginning of 
the 1970s and would become, as Mitchell argues, a mechanism for maintaining the 
postwar international financial system (Mitchell 2011 170-171). Through the restriction 
of oil imports into the US and the counter-flow of dollars abroad, the quota enabled 
the US government to limit reserves overseas, and thereby support the price of the 
dollar. Of course, by the start of the 1970s the postwar financial architecture was 
pushed to breaking point and at the same time as a new financial regime was being 
developed, so too was a new mechanism for the pricing and control of oil. The 
developments of the early 1970s in the energy industry - the ways in which they both 
led to the construction and subsequent reconstruction of the environment by 
economists - is explored further in chapter 6.  
The implementation of mandatory import controls underwriting the profit margins of 
domestic oil producers through the reinforcement of federal price controls required 
that US domestic oil producers could claim large reserves of untapped oil, that could 
be exploited if adequate incentives were in place. At the same time this helped 
maintain the vast and increasing production of Middle Eastern oil by the largely 
American owned international oil majors through the transmission of the comparatively 
high US oil price via the basing point system. As argued in the previous section, the 
threat of peak oil was a threat to oil profits given the development and broad 
understanding of the system of energy understood as interchangeable fuel sources. 
Price supports made no sense in the face of depleted oil reserves. In the face of this 
threat - and given the ongoing pressure on the growth of the economy, with both the 
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potential and advocacy for a shift to alternate forms of energy, including nuclear - 
reserves measurements were recalibrated in line with the Paley approach of economic 
price-based scarcity. This resulted in much larger estimates than that given by Hubbert 
and the previous pessimistic figures going back to 1909 and the first USGS survey, as 
detailed in the last chapter. This enabled the construction of the system of energy to 
be converted from a threat to oil company profits, into an opportunity.  
In 1959 the threat to oil industry profits from the potential exploitation of alternate fuel 
sources within an interchangeable system of energy was overcome through the 
implementation of mandatory oil import quotas. The quotas, alongside the other 
production support measures implemented by federal and state governments - such 
as the depletion allowance, ensured the expansion of oil production and consumption 
vis-a-vis other forms of energy simply through the ‘soundness of relying on 
competition among fuels to serve the public interest’ as Morgan Davis so aptly put it in 
his 1961 testimony (Barber 1981b:293). From this point on, the expansion of energy 
and energy use in order to feed the necessary growth of the economy was 
accompanied by the parallel expansion of oil. In the US, from 1950 to 1970 total 
energy used doubled from 34.6 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs) to 67.8 
quadrillion BTUs. At the same time, oil consumption more than doubled, from 13.3 
quadrillion BTUs (38 percent of total energy used) to 29.5 quadrillion BTUs (44 percent 
of total energy used).  
During these years, coal production flatlined, going from 12.34 quadrillion BTUs (36 
percent of total energy used) to 12.26 quadrillion BTUs (just 18 percent of total energy 
used) . Throughout this period, nuclear energy would contribute a negligible amount 31
to the expanding energy system. Between 1950 and 1973 the international (non-
domestic US) oil industry grew ninefold by an average annual rate of 10 percent, and 
coal went from providing 75 percent of total energy used in Western Europe in 1955 to 
just 22 percent by 1972. Meanwhile petroleum had risen from 23 percent to 60 
percent (Pfister 2010:103-104).  
 Figures from United States Energy Information Administration. Available at: http://31
www.eia.gov/beta/MER/?tbl=T01.01#/?f=A.
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This expansion of oil vis a vis other fuel sources within an overall system of energy 
went hand in hand with two further developments. First, energy was further secured in 
its systemic form through the simultaneous provision of a future and history by RFF 
economists. Second, and as an unforeseen consequence of the imposition of 
mandatory oil quotas in the US, the oil companies would ultimately convert themselves 
into ‘total energy’ companies (Stork 1975) through a series of mergers and 
acquisitions of competing energy sources through the 1960s. 
Securing the future and history of energy 
When Secretary of the Interior Chapman issued Order 2602 that established the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for Mineral Resources in 1950, a complementary increase in 
research and analysis staff was already being undertaken in the Bureau of Mines and a 
key concern here was the need for a strong economic research unit. This unit, tasked 
with going beyond the compilation of statistics, was to produce plans to enable future 
mineral requirements to be met through the deployment of economic analysis, and 
was headed up by the first chief economist in the Bureau - Sam H. Schurr (Goodwin 
1981a:45). Schurr, along with members of his staff from the Bureau of Mines was also 
called upon by the Paley commission to detail - as I have already shown - the 
somewhat complicated tax treatments afforded to mineral fuels production (Goodwin 
1981a:56, 1981b:146). Schurr not only held positions at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) and Interior Department, he also worked for the Cowles 
Commission and in the economics division of RAND, and in 1954, Schurr became 
Director of the Energy and Mineral Resources Program at RFF .  32
In 1960, RFF published Energy in the American Economy - a study undertaken by 
Schurr with Bruce C. Netschert. This work provided a detailed historical analysis of 
energy production, consumption and reserves in the US from 1850 onwards, and 
projected trends in these areas up to 1975, thus giving both the approach to energy 
as a total system, and the interconnection between energy and economy an empirical 
basis. The type of broad statistical and interpretative review undertaken in this work 
had been wholly lacking up to this point (Darmstadter 2003:4), and the dataset for this 
book was incorporated into the expanded second printing of the Historical Statistics of 
 Schurr would ultimately be given the International Association of Energy Economics 32
‘Outstanding contribution to the profession’ Award in 1981 and was only the third recipient of 
the American Institute of Mining, metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers (AIME) Mineral 
Economics award in 1968.
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the United States, also in 1960. In the same way that the 1949 version transcribed the 
economy into historical existence, the 1960 version did the same for the system of 
energy, relating this explicitly and directly to the economy, rediscovered through the 
history of the nation.  
Three years later one of the key contributor’s to Energy in the American Economy, 
Hans H. Landsberg, would make further use of the history of energy, composed of the 
economic and statistical data compiled here, in Resources in America’s Future  33
(Landsberg et al. 1963). Landsberg was also a member of the RFF staff at the time, 
and this study, which was co-edited by RFF director Joseph Fisher and Leonard L. 
Fischmann, would examine the role of natural resources in the U.S. economy as well 
as to projecting their long-term availability. And it was conceived and undertaken in 
relation to the RFF studies discussed in the last chapter - Barnett and Morse’s Scarcity 
and Growth (1963) and Potter and Christy Jr.’s Trends in Natural Resource 
Commodities (1962). Landsberg, who had actually been a colleague of Schurr’s on a 
productivity project within the NBER in the 1930s, would similarly go on to work for 
RAND and would act as economic advisor to Maurice Strong during the 1972 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment, a conference which will be briefly touched on 
in the next chapter . 34
In Resources in America’s Future, Landsberg et al. (1963) indicated that economic 
growth would continue through 1980-2000, and require a: ‘tripling of requirements for 
both energy and metals by the year 2000, almost a tripling of timber, and almost a 
doubling for farm products and for withdrawal depletions of fresh water’ (Landsberg 
1964:11). In projecting the size and shape of the future economy, the report’s authors 
made use of several different markers of growth, including: population; GNP; personal 
consumption expenditures; business investment; government spending; the Federal 
Reserve Board Index of Industrial Production; and technological change (increasing 
efficiency of industrial production). While the authors were clear that these markers 
should be considered as projections and not predictions (Landsberg 1964) they also 
had the consequence of helping to settle both the objectivity of the separate sphere of 
the economy, describable through a given set of metrics, and the energy to power this 
 This was also published in 1964 in a briefer, simpler format produced by Landsberg and 33
intended for policy makers and lay readers.
 In 1983 the International Association of Energy Economics awarded its ‘Outstanding 34
contribution to the Profession’ award to Landsberg.
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economy, understood as comprised of a system of interchangeable fuel sources. 
Resources in America’s Future required the development of a statistical appendix of 
more than 500 pages, but the authors conclusions can be summarised in a few short 
sentences: 
Will these unprecedented amounts [of resources] be forthcoming? The answer is a 
qualified yes. With due regard to the requirements of other countries, the indications 
are that the American people can obtain the natural resources and resource products 
that they will need between now and the year 2000… neither a long view of the past, 
nor current trends, nor our most careful estimates of future possibilities suggest any 
general running out of resources in this country during the remainder of the century. 
(Landsberg 1964:11-12) 
In line with Scarcity and Growth, Resources in America’s Future helped secure an 
understanding of the economy as an object capable of unlimited growth, and 
unimpeded by material resource constraints. Alongside this however, it helped 
construct the system of energy as similarly capable of unlimited growth. This growth 
had, however, through the 1950s and early 1960s been the result of the massive 
expansion of oil production and consumption, as indicated above, and would 
continue, as explored below, through the development of the large oil corporations into 
‘total energy’ corporations. At the beginning of the 1960s, RFF would, through the 
provision of these reports and ongoing research, provide interpretative analysis on 
energy that previously only the Bureau of Mines and the industry itself had undertaken. 
Here, the pioneering work of Hans Lansdberg and Sam Schurr was fundamental to 
making RFF into a preeminent body in the fields of 'energy, resources, and 
environmental economics' (Darmstadter 2003:3) in the 1950s and 1960s. 
During his 1964 election campaign the Johnson administration created a plethora of 
new task forces. These were designed to both bring new recommendations to federal 
policy and to display the vitality and vivacity of Johnson as a presidential candidate. 
One of these task forces was given the job of evaluating natural resource policies and 
was chaired by RFFs president, Joseph Fisher, and included several other RFF staff 
members including Sam H. Schurr. On November 11th 1964, just after Johnson’s 
landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the RFF task force submitted its ninety-page 
report Resource Policies for a Great Society to the President. The report covered a 
variety of policies covering diverse areas such as forest management, pollution 
abatement and flood control and outlined eleven basic categories of recommendations 
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for policy issues. The eleventh and final category was that of overall energy policy, and 
reiterating the notion of energy as a total system, the report began with the basic 
premise that it was ‘important to realize that there is widespread substitutability among 
the Nation’s basic energy resources - coal, oil, natural gas, water power and nuclear 
power. As a result, policies affecting any one of these resources will inevitably also 
produce important consequences for others’ (cited in Cochrane 1981:347).  
Following this understanding of energy as a system of interchangeable fuel sources the 
task force recommended that a special presidential commission on energy policy be 
instituted in order to develop a set of coherent national energy objectives. This 
recommendation was strongly rebuffed however in the Interior Department’s response 
to the task force: ‘If the nation’s energy economy was in a state of disarray and not 
functioning in a reasonably satisfactory manner, rigorous across-the-board 
investigation by a Commission on Energy Policy would be indicated. But no such 
conditions prevail nor are they immediately in prospect.’ (cited in Cochrane 1981:350). 
The development of an overall energy policy would have to wait until the beginning of 
the 1970s, when the energy economy of the US was indeed brought to an apparent 
state of disarray, but in the meantime, a lack of federal coordination would enable the 
further expansion of the oil industry through the construction of ’total energy’ 
companies. 
The oil industry becomes the energy industry 
While the quota system was installed in the US in order to protect the price of 
domestic oil in the face of increasing overseas imports, this measure also had the 
effect of increasing the supply of crude oil from the Middle East to Europe and other 
markets as access to the US was curtailed. As production increases had been driven 
by the disparity between high prices determined in the US - propagated globally by the 
basing point system rather than any putative demand - and the low production costs 
in the Middle East, the increased oil supply to Europe rapidly led to a surplus and 
subsequent pressure to cut prices. The downward pressure on market prices in 
Europe was further exacerbated by both Britain’s 1959 monetary crisis - resulting in an 
inability to pay for oil imports, and by the reemergence of the Soviet Union as a major 
supplier of oil (Stork 1975: 87). In order to defend profit margins, the oil majors chose 
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to reduce the posted price of oil. The posted price was an arbitrary benchmark figure 
set by the large oil companies. The price of oil in the US was determined by 
government production and import quotas. This price was conveyed globally by the 
Texas basing point system, and further trading of oil was usually between the large 
companies and their affiliate refiners or between the majors at low prices under long-
term contracts (Mitchell 2011:167). As outlined above, the posted price was important 
as it was the determining factor for the profit sharing agreements between the 
international oil majors and the oil producing countries from the early 1950s onwards. 
By reducing the posted price in 1959 and again in 1960, the oil majors were able to 
make the oil producing countries pay for the erosion in profits from the European 
market by reducing the amount they paid in taxes under the profit sharing agreement 
(Stork 1975:87-88). 
In response, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Iran formed the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel in 1960. Copying the collective 
arrangements between US states - formalised in 1935 as the Connally Hot Oil Act - to 
restrict production, the Cartel members sought to press for a restoration of the posted 
price of non-US oil to pre-1959 levels. The oil companies initially refused to 
acknowledge the new organisation, and concrete policy by OPEC was not developed 
until its fourth conference, in 1972 (Stork 1975:94). Throughout the 1960s, OPEC was 
unsuccessful in restoring the posted price of oil. It did however, prevent any further 
drop in the posted price. In the face of falling selling prices throughout the decade due 
to continual over-production and the maintenance of the US import quota, oil 
company profits began to fall. Putting further pressure on prices was the entrance of 
small independent and state-owned refineries and marketing operations in the 
expanding European market. These refineries were happy to purchase crude from 
independents and thereby further increased the oil surplus in Europe. Stork estimated 
in 1975 that total oil company profits (while still enormous) were approximately static 
through the mid to late 1960s while production of oil from the Middle East increased 
from 2.6 billion barrels in 1963 to 5.5 billion in 1969. The falling rate of return per barrel 
was a concern to the oil companies, and in response, they simply stopped being oil 
companies. 
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Through the 1960s oil firms made use of their continued high profits to actually 
construct an interrelated system of energy through the purchase of controlling interests 
in rival power producers, thereby converting themselves into ‘Total Energy’ companies 
(Stork 1975:121-125; Mitchell 2011:179). This tactic first became visible in the coal 
industry with Gulf Oil acquiring the thirteenth largest coal producing in the US, 
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal in 1963; Continental Oil buying the giant Consolidation Coal 
in 1966; and Occidental Petroleum taking over over Island Creek Coal (the the third 
largest producer in the US) in the same year that Standard Oil of Ohio purchased the 
tenth largest producer, Old Ben Coal. At the same time other major coal producers 
were taken over by large industrial firms and by the end of the 1960s, eleven of the 
largest fifteen coal companies were controlled by outside corporate interests, mostly 
oil companies. Other oil companies sought to purchase coal reserves and land leases. 
Standard Oil of New Jersey bought 7 million tons of reservers, while Atlantic Richfield 
became the largest holder of federal coal land leases at 43,500 coal acres. Not only 
did coal companies increasingly come under the control of oil interests, but the large 
coal firms also increased their share of coal production from an estimated 40.9 per 
cent to just under 66 percent (Stork 1975:121-122).  
In the case of nuclear, by 1970, eighteen of the twenty five largest petroleum 
companies had interests in at least one phase of the mining and processing of 
uranium, with oil companies accounting for 40 percent of the investment in uranium 
reserves. Two key stages of uranium processing were also controlled exclusively by the 
oil companies Kerr-McGee and Atlantic Richfield (Stork 1975:122). At the beginning of 
the 1960s, major oil companies already controlled the majority of America’s natural gas 
production through the co-location of oil and gas fields. However, throughout the 
1960s they consolidated their control of the industry and by the late 1960s two dozen 
oil firms produced three quarters of America’s natural gas (Mitchell 2011:179).  
The overcoming of potential peak oil - and the threat this presented to oil company 
profits - resulted in three subsequent developments from the late 1950s through to the 
late 1960s. The provision of economically informed reserves calculations following the 
Paley methodology enabled the construction of mandatory import controls in the US 
and the subsequent maintenance of the price of both domestic and overseas oil, 
although in the case of the latter this would subsequently fall due to overproduction 
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and glut in the European markets, in part due to restricted access to the US. The 
protected profit margins and production supports allowed the further expansion of 
both Middle Eastern oil in comparison to domestic oil as well as the expansion of oil in 
the rapidly growing total energy production and consumption. At the same time, the 
systemic understanding of energy as comprised of interchangeable fuel sources was 
further secured through the simultaneous provision of a future and history by RFF 
economists. In parallel with their work on general materials scarcity and the growth of 
the economy, reports released by RFF at the beginning of the 1960s assured the 
growth of the economy by providing the certainty of limitless potential energy. Lastly, oil 
companies would convert themselves into ‘total energy’ companies through a series of 
mergers and acquisitions of competing energy sources through the 1960s, driven in 
the first instance by falling profit rates due to the unforeseen consequences of the 
imposition of mandatory oil quotas in the US, this development literally institutionalised 
the system of energy in the form of the massive multi-modal energy corporations. 
The energy for growth 
In 1972, RFF would publish Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economist 
Morris A. Adelman’s The World Petroleum Market (1972a) . This study was both 35
initiated by, and financially supported through the work of Sam H. Schurr, at the time 
still the Director of the Energy and Mineral Resources Program at RFF and also 
professor of economics at MIT. Here and in another 1972 publication in Foreign Policy, 
Adelman investigated the international oil industry from an economic perspective 
(Adelman 1972a; 1972b) which as Darmstader notes, shed light on the 'complex web 
of transactions and behaviour characterising that market.' (Darmstadter 2003:8). 
Adelman reconfirmed what is now commonly referred to as the ‘cornucopian’ view of 
oil reserves (Dryzek 1997), arguing that for the purposes of economic calculation, the 
supply of oil was inexhaustible, and reserves that were depleted by extraction were 
replenished by exploration. Echoing the Paley approach detailed in the last chapter, 
Adelman argued: 
 Adelman was actually the first person to infer market prices for oil in the mid-1960s, using 35
figures published by a group of independent largely German oil dealers and deducting known 
refining and shipping costs. Here Adelman was the first person to independently reveal the high 
profits and low costs of Middle Eastern oil production (Mitchell 2011:168).
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A stream of investment creates additions to proved reserves from a very large in-
ground inventory. The reserves are constantly being renewed as they are 
extracted. How much was in the ground at the start and how much will be left at 
the end are unknown and irrelevant. (Adelman 1972a; cited in Mitchell 2012:188)  
As we saw in the last chapter, the construction of the economy from the 1930s - and 
its eventual settling as a secure and discrete object removed from specifically material 
constraints in the postwar years - was dependent upon the reconstruction of material 
scarcity in line with economic conceptions. Initially undertaken by the Paley 
commission and later by the work of RFF, this was largely completed by the middle of 
the 1960s.  
In this chapter I detailed how the construction and settling of the economy was 
accompanied by the parallel development of energy as a system of interchangeable 
fuel sources capable of powering the growth of the economy in perpetuity. The prewar 
development of a Federal concern with the regulation of the energy system, would, in 
the postwar years come to threaten the continued profits and expansion of the oil 
industry - profits that had developed and were maintained through continued support 
by the state and federal government in the form of production subsidies, quotas and 
special tax treatments. The necessity for the expansion of energy to feed the economy 
at least cost threatened both ongoing support for the oil industry as well as a shift to 
alternate power sources, if as M. King Hubbert famously argued in 1956, oil 
production in the US was rapidly approaching peak production - a peak from which it 
would rapidly fall. 
The development of the system of energy didn’t just threaten domestic US oil 
producers, but also overseas oil production in the Middle East. Here, the vast profits of 
the largely American owned oil majors were underwritten by the disparity of oil prices 
and the low production costs in their monopoly concessions. With no market price for 
oil until the mid 1970s, prices were determined through collusion, anti-competitive 
practice, monopoly, and as I detail here, through the transmission of the high American 
price of oil overseas through the Texas basing point system. This global flow of oil also 
came in the postwar years to underwrite a different flow - that of dollars, the global 
reserve currency, and in doing so, helped ensure the stability of the Bretton Woods 
financial architecture. The threat presented to oil by energy was challenged and 
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ultimately overcome after 1956 through the work of oil industry economists and then 
the USGS, reasserting the Paley approach to resource scarcity and reserves 
estimation. This helped maintain pressure for the oil industry’s preferred system of 
regulatory unfettered, but aided, private enterprise. This aid was most clearly 
represented in 1959, by the implementation of a mandatory oil import quota system at 
the end of the Eisenhower administration.  
This chapter has detailed how the Paley approach to scarcity was a crucial part of a 
sociotechnical system that enabled the massive expansion of fuel extraction, 
processing and consumption through the 1950s and 1960s. The reassertion of 
economic scarcity and the high reserve estimations that resulted enabled the 
continued provision of high oil production and high oil industry profits even in the face 
of falling oil prices, through the maintenance of government quotas, tariffs and tax 
provisions. Growth was coming to be seen as no longer constrained directly by the 
raw matter of the earth, but rather mediated by the availability of seemingly limitless 
energy - that curious amalgam of the neoclassical economics interpretation of 19th 
century physics, with a variety of fuel sources understood as components of an 
interrelated system bound together through the notion of relative scarcity and its 
resultant price-based drive for technological innovation.  
In turn, the high profits this enabled allowed the further expansion of oil - through the 
increasing share of oil in overall energy production and consumption and continued 
increases in Middle Eastern production and exportation. In 1960 and 1963 RFF 
published analyses that further certified the conception of energy as a system divorced 
from any particular fuel matter by the concurrent retrojection of its history and 
projection of its future trends. This settling of energy as a total system would go hand 
in hand with further expansion of oil through the construction of an actual, avowedly 
non-market system of energy via the increasing control of gas, coal, nuclear and even 
geothermal production by the large petroleum producers (Stork 1975:121-123). 
In chapter six I will show how the system of energy, stabilised through the 1950s and 
1960s by the massive expansion of petroleum production consumption within what 
would become total energy companies, was suddenly, at the the end of the 1960s and 
beginning of the 1970s, made to look fragile. This apparent fragility led rapidly to an 
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equally apparent energy crisis. The ultimate outcome of this crisis was more certain 
however, and in part involved the reconciliation of the economy and the environment 
through the reconstruction of the latter, securing once more the concern with 
economic growth as the acme of politics. In the next chapter however, I cover how the 
environment came to be seen as at odds with the economy in the postwar years, and 
how the development of environmental concern would call into question not simply the 
possibility of growth, but the potential impact of growth’s evident certainty. 
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6. Environment 
Donora, Pennsylvania, would witness the last gasp of the pre-war, pre-national 
economy understanding of air pollution in the US. Throughout the first half of the 20th 
century, Americans viewed the air quality in their wheezing industrial towns and cities 
as simply a periodic local problem, best addressed by local governments (Bailey 
1998:91). This would begin to change in the post-war years and through the 1950s. In 
Donora, during October 1948, a particularly severe air pollution event would kill twenty 
and result in 6,000 cases of illness. In response, local congressional representatives 
Augustine B. Kelley, Herman P. Eberharter and Robert J. Corbett introduced a variety 
of bills concerned with the hazards and health effects of air pollution. These bills were 
limited solely to the provision of further research on the issue and the Donora incident 
’caused a ripple of concern but was soon forgotten’ (Stern 1982; cited in Bailey 
1998:91).  
The cloying smog that had come to plague Los Angeles with increasing frequency was 
somewhat harder to dismiss as a merely local concern however. In chapters 3 and 4, I 
described how a new conception of growth arose in the postwar years in response to 
the development of the economy. Ultimately the economy was secured as a discrete 
object in the world, independent from any particular material resources and with its 
growth as a central political focus. This was undertaken through the application of new 
economic understanding of scarcity and at the same time the construction of energy 
as a limitless system of interrelated fuels capable of powering this growth in perpetuity. 
The California smog was an early indication of not merely local, but the nationwide 
blight of air pollution caused by factories and cars, burning the fuel necessary to 
power the growth of the economy.  
In Beauty, Health, and Permanence, the American historian Samuel P. Hays argued 
that the increased concern with environmental issues evident in the US since the end 
of the second world war is the result of fundamental changes in the American 
economy (Hays 1987; Bailey 1998:15). For Hays, the growth of the economy from the 
1950s onwards enabled the development of a new middle class for whom ‘quality of 
life’ became a pressing issue. The development of a ‘recreational consumerism’ (Bailey 
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1998:15) that placed a strong emphasis on outdoor leisure pursuits resulted in this 
class interacting with and enjoying the wilderness of ‘the great outdoors’ in ways 
previously unheard of. As part of the developing business and consumption of 
‘recreation’, an unprecedented four million pleasure boats were purchased in the US in 
the 1950s alone (Flippen 2000:2), and increased levels of car ownership - by 1965 the 
ratio of adults to cars in the US stood at 1.66:1 (Landsberg & Schurr, 1968) - 
facilitated access to wilderness areas, further exposing the American public to the 
natural environment. This access was facilitated through the development of Federal 
road building projects including the Highways Act of 1956, while the rapidly increasing 
number of cars also enabled the development of mass suburbanization (Flippen 2000; 
Hays 1987:23; Paterson 2007), placing ever more Americans in a non-urban, natural 
environment while simultaneously threatening this environment through the constant 
expansion of suburban space (Flippen 2000; Warren 2003).  
As Bailey argues, Hays’ fundamental insight here is that the development of the 
environment as an object of politics in the post-war period is not simply as a reaction 
to the depredations of economic growth, but is ‘a product of that very growth’ (Bailey 
1998:15), and this chapter builds upon a literal understanding of this claim, albeit 
somewhat at odds with Hays’ intended meaning. I maintain that it is not simply 
fundamental changes in the American economy that resulted in the development of 
environmental concern, rather that the generation of concern with pollution at a 
national level, and its role in creating a political and popular concern with the 
environment, must be seen in a more complex relation to the development of the 
economy and a corollary energy system required to fuel the necessary growth of this 
new central object of politics.  
Since the very beginning of Federal attempts to regulate and lessen the impact of air 
pollution in the 1950s, there has been controversy over the financial cost and impact 
on the economy of pollution control (Bailey 1998). This is not confined to the issue of 
air pollution however: ‘the federal government has made major environmental 
decisions throughout its history and that economic criteria as well as criteria of 
substantive environmental purposes have been applied to the decisions that have 
been made’ (Andrews 1984:45). In this chapter I begin by looking at the development 
of the economic technology of benefit-cost analysis. Originally devised by the Army 
Corps of Engineers for the assessment of water development projects, this technique 
would be expanded and restructured alongside the development of the economy.  
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In the 1950s, benefit-cost analysis would be translated into contemporary welfare 
economic theory and focused ever more closely on the single objective of economic 
efficiency. This would become a central target of the conservationist backlash against 
the large multipurpose water projects that were first developed in the New Deal era. 
This resurgent postwar conservationism was joined at the beginning of the 1960s by 
the development of a broader environmental concern - focused on the pervasiveness 
of pollution. In 1966, the economist Kenneth J. Boulding presented his paper The 
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth at RFF’s sixth research forum, which was 
concerned with the topic of ‘Environmental quality in a growing economy’. Here 
Boulding would reiterate the earlier analysis of John Kenneth Galbraith, and Boulding’s 
concept of the Spaceship Earth signified not only that the growth of the economy 
could have negative impacts on the environment, but that it necessarily did so, and 
that this was only likely to get worse. 
The Spaceship Earth, iconically represented by the Apollo 8 Earthrise picture in 1968, 
would help galvanise the nascent popular environmental movement and result 
ultimately in both the growth of limits - as the incoming Nixon administration undertook 
an unprecedented expansion of social and environmental regulation in the US - as well 
as the limits to growth, with a report of the same name being famously released by the 
Club of Rome to coincide with the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm in 1972. at the beginning of the 1970s these events would 
help position the economy, driven by a logic of growth, in fundamental opposition to 
the environment, defined by finite limits (Mitchell 2011). 
The benefits and costs of water 
In the last chapter, I outlined the 1939 report to Congress published under the 
auspices of Harold Ickes of the National Resources Committee which brought together 
for the first time the four main power sources in the US under the rubric of a system of 
energy. As I also pointed out that the report made recommendations regarding each 
individual power source, and that for hydroelectric power, the committee advised the 
expansion of multiple purpose planning bodies as a means to manage the potentially 
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conflicting interests in ‘flood control, public water supply, stream pollution, irrigation, 
and navigation’ (cited in Goodwin 1981a:8). While this report represents, as I argued, 
an early shift towards managing energy as an interrelated system in order to service 
the newly developing notion of a national economy, it also highlights the early 
development of a new understanding of the environment - brought to light through 
economic measurement in the service of overall national economic growth. Key here is 
the development of the technique of benefit-cost analysis that was pioneered by the 
Army Corps of Engineers. This technique, or analytical technology, was initiated at the 
turn of the 20th century, but would be rethought and reconfigured at the same time as 
the development of the economy and energy; and ultimately translated into an 
economic tool capable of being brought to bear on federal environmental development 
projects impacting on the new economy as whole. 
The Army Corps of Engineers and multiple-purpose water development 
In the US, as early as the 1780s, and then later throughout the 19th century, 
congressional debates over the prices and terms on which public lands would be 
rendered into private hands considered both the economic benefits and the 
distributions of gains and losses in these decisions. In 1808 Secretary of State Albert 
Gallatin brought out a report on a navigation programme for the new nation - from that 
time onward, public water agencies have found it necessary (and desirable) to 
compare estimated benefits with the costs of proposed development projects (Kneese 
2011). Since the 1820s, Congresses and Presidents have also been involved in 
debates over the use of federal funds for regional environmental projects such as 
canal, dam and levee building. In these cases economic issues have been at least as 
prominent as substantive environmental concerns (Andrews 1984:45). At the 
beginning of the 20th century however the Army Corps of Engineers began to develop 
a specific technique in order to evaluate potential water development projects. The 
Rivers and Harbours Act of 1902 established within the Corps a board of five engineer 
officers (the Board of Engineers) who were tasked with the submission of 
recommendations on river and harbour improvements to the Chief of Engineers. These 
recommendations were to be based on surveys and engineering reports (Hammond 
1960:3-4; McKean 1958:18) and required that: 
!122
…the board shall have in view the amount and character of commerce existing 
or reasonably prospective which will be benefited by the improvement, and the 
relation of the ultimate cost of such work, both as to the cost of construction and 
maintenance, to the public commercial interests involved, and the public 
necessity for the work and propriety of its construction, or maintenance at the 
expense of the United States (cited in Hammond 1960:4) 
Alongside the early development of the Corps of Engineers evaluation techniques, the 
increasing electrification of the US from the turn of the century had resulted in a large 
number of mergers amongst the nation’s electricity producers and privately owned 
hydroelectric dams. The developing potential for monopoly in the electric power 
industry - an increasingly visible issue following the break up of Standard Oil in 1911 - 
would result in the Water Power Act of 1920, which established federal regulation over 
hydroelectric power production (Andrews 1999:143). Around the same time, the Rivers 
and Harbours Acts of 1917 and 1928 had increased the Corps budget for flood 
control, and the reports of the Board of Engineers, although without much pretence at 
rigour, were expected to recommend only projects whose promised benefits were 
greater than their costs (Porter 1995:154).  
In the wake of the great Mississippi flood of 1927, Congress authorised the Corps of 
Engineers to prepare what became known as ‘308’ reports (Porter 1995:154-155). 
These were comprehensive reports of the United States’ river basins, undertaken in 
order to provide an inventory of America’s water-resource problems and potentials. 
The reports were based on reconnaissance surveys and estimates of project costs but 
were not intended to be the basis for authorising federal improvements, and they did 
not provide construction recommendations (McKean 1958:18). Following on from the 
Water Power Act, the creation of the Federal Power Commission in 1930 led to the 
development of the massive federal water resource projects such as the Bonneville 
Power Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), public institutions 
which had oversight over the major grand-scale dams being built at the time (Goodwin 
1981a:4). These were designed not only to achieve electrification but also irrigation, 
land reclamation, flood prevention and industrialisation as well as other goals - as a 
multiple-purpose planning measure for whole drainage basins undertaken on a 
regional basis (Goodwin 1981a:8). The Corps 308 reports would provide ‘…a backlog 
of specific projects for accomplishment with Federal funds for emergency relief during 
the depression in the early 1930s’ (Annual report of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army 
1951:229; cited in McKean 1958:18), and were the best available data on large-scale 
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projects. These reports thereby laid the foundation for the nation-wide multiple-
purpose water resource development programme that developed during the decade 
(Andrews 1999:164). 
At this point however, the evaluation techniques put in place by the Corps were 
confined to tangible, local costs and benefits such as capital outlay and avoided flood 
damage estimates (Hammond 1960:4; Lohmann 2009:516). The development of 
large-scale water resource projects such as the TVA, and the initiation of the big dam 
era from around 1935 (Billington Jr. et al 2005:383) required the expansion of this 
limited and unduly restrictive technology in order to ensure that these New Deal 
measures were undertaken in support of the newly constructed economy. In 1934, 
Harold Ickes, then the head of the National Resources Board (NRB), appointed a 
Water Resources Committee whose report in December of that year would 
recommend ‘the development of an equitable system of distributing the costs of 
water-resource projects, which should include not only private but social accounting - 
a striking revision of costing technique’ (National Resources Board 1934:28; cited in 
Hammond 1960: 4-5). Drawing on information from the 308 reports (McKean 
1958:18), the committee argued that: 
…The problem of equities, benefits, and costs is a complicated and difficult one, 
and one of the most important fundamentals of action is the formulation of 
general principles governing the relations between them… Especially is it 
desirable to initiate promptly the study of the part played by intangible factors…
Complicated factors of cultural and economic relationships would be involved in 
such a study but it appears reasonable to explore the possibility of constructing 
a generalised formula which would serve in any particular project by substitution 
of ascertainable values for such of the terms of the formula as are pertinent.
(National Resources Board 1934:267; cited in Hammond 1960:5) 
The development here of a seemingly objective decision technology enabling the 
Corps of Engineers to publicly justify the fairness of its selected water projects (Porter 
1995:149) - taking into account an expanded set of non-local, intangible costs and 
benefits - should be seen in relation to the parallel development of the economy and 
energy, in this case in the form of the large federal hydropower projects. Again, under 
the auspices of Harold Ickes, his National Resources Board helped undertake, within 
the Army Corps of Engineers, the pre-war expansion of benefit-cost analysis from a 
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limited engineering technique into one incorporating intangible economic factors and 
capable of bearing on nationally important water development projects. 
The NRB’s proposed inclusion of ‘Intangible factors’ such as aesthetic impacts and 
recreation opportunities into a ‘generalized formula’ that would allow commensuration 
across private, social and environmental factors (Lohmann 2009:18) was formalised in 
the following years. First, through the Rivers and Harbours Act of 1935, which 
authorised the Chief of Engineers to continually update 308 studies, taking into 
account both ‘economic factors and accumulated engineering data’ (Annual report of 
the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army 1951:229; cited in McKean 1958:18). Then through 
the 1936 Flood Control Act. Section I of the act endorsed the NRB’s 1934 
recommendations and subsequently mandated that federal investments might be 
made in projects under its authority ‘if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue 
are in excess of the estimated costs’ (Hammond, 1960:6).  
It is at this point then, that the use of a formal-benefit-cost analysis for water-resource 
development is traditionally dated (Andrews 1984:45; Baram 1980), and this 
technology would shortly make its way into other federal bodies responsible for 
multiple-purpose water development projects (Hammond 1960:6; McKean 1958:19). 
Within these organisations, not only were ‘intangible factors’ such as aesthetic loss 
due to the creation of a reservoir weighed against others such as the new pleasure 
gained from fishing there, but the incorporation of indirect, secondary benefits and 
costs resulted in an attempt to ‘travel down the chain of economic 
causation’ (Hammond 1960:7-8). For example, the Bureau of Reclamation developed 
analyses that not only calculated the benefit derived from the wheat that could be 
grown on land irrigated by a potential dam, but also included the value of the bread 
that could be baked with this wheat (Hammond 1960:7-8; Lohmann 2009:516).  
From its turn of the century starting point as an engineering evaluation technique used 
by the Army Corps of Engineers focused solely on primary, tangible, local benefits and 
costs, benefit-cost calculations were reconstructed through the addition of ‘intangible 
factors’ and indirect benefits and costs into an analytical economic technique capable 
of being brought to bear on the new, grand-scale water development projects - 
projects that would have an impact on the equally newly constructed national 
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economy. And it was the use of this technology that would underpin Ickes’ 
recommendations on hydropower to Congress in his initial 1939 report on energy in 
the US. 
The search for consistency 
The main problem with this newly reconstructed and apparently objective economic 
technology however, was that it didn’t seem very objective. Between 1936 and 1939, 
the Chief of Engineers issued numerous instructions to district offices on how to 
prepare benefit-cost analyses (McKean 1958:19), but no single overarching method 
was forthcoming. More importantly than intra-agency inconsistencies in analysis was 
inter-agency conflict (Campen 1986:17). The Flood Control Act authorised the 
Agriculture Department’s Soil Conservation Service and the TVA to also make use of 
benefit-cost analysis in establishing and justifying the feasibility of water development 
projects. In 1939 the Reclamation Project Act provided the Department of Interior’s 
Bureau of Reclamation with the authorisation to undertake irrigation and related water 
improvement projects if the project costs could be either repaid by the users of water, 
or offset against other purposes such as flood control, navigation or wildlife 
preservation. This resulted in the Bureau beginning to undertake benefit-costs 
analyses for the first time.  
The Bureau had been established originally as a part of the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) by Theodore Roosevelt after the passage of the 1902 Newlands 
Reclamation Act, to undertake irrigation projects funded by the proceeds of western 
land sales separately from the Army Corps of Engineers (Andrews 1999:141). It had, 
up until 1939, been bound by the concept of ‘financial feasibility’ in its projects 
evaluations - a standard, that as Hammond noted, was considered more rigorous than 
the Corps’ benefit-cost procedures (Hammond 1960:6). ‘[F]inancial feasibility’ had 
been employed here in order to avoid the so-called ‘pork-barrel’ or politically and 
locally motivated spending that had become an infamous fixture of regional water 
projects and Army Corps activities. By the end of the 1930s however, The Army 
Corps, the Soil Conservation Service, the TVA and the Bureau of Reclamation had all 
developed a variety of non-standard and mutually inconsistent benefit-cost 
calculations, and as I indicated in the last section with respect specifically to the 
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Bureau, its use of indirect benefits and costs differed substantially from its own 
previous ‘financial feasibility’ based analyses. 
These mutually inconsistent calculations were politically contested and driven by a 
desire to maximise the extent of an agency’s involvement in any specific water 
development project (Campen 1986:17; Lohmann 2009:516; Porter 1995:161). Porter 
maintains that this issue developed in part because of the division of federal 
responsibility in the 1936 Flood Control Act which gave the Corps of Engineers 
authority over downstream projects, and the Soil Conservation Service was given 
authority over upstream projects. The Soil Conservation Service favoured smaller 
upstream dams in comparison to the Corps favoured large downstream dams, and 
these differences in priorities were played out over differing calculations.  
From 1939 onwards the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers found 
themselves at loggerheads over a proposed reservoir for the King’s River in California. 
This resulted in a ’political quagmire' as both the Bureau and the Corps sought to 
monopolise benefits numbers to ensure their construction of the potential dam, and 
would result in California Congressman Alfred Elliott bluntly stating that: ‘Hitler could 
not have selected better people to sabotage the American interests than those who 
have done that in the San Joaquin Valley’ (cited in Porter 1995:169). The people he 
was referring to were the Bureau of Reclamation, who had undertaken a cost-benefit 
analysis showing irrigation benefits for the dam were larger than expected flood control 
benefits, and thereby staking a claim for Bureau oversight - and requiring costs to be 
repaid by water users.  
In the end, the dam would be built by the Corps, but the disposition of water provided 
by the subsequent reservoir was to be negotiated by the users of that water and the 
Bureau, leading to rancorous disputes lasting until the early 1960s. Alongside these 
interagency clashes over the form of benefit-cost analyses, the Corps of Engineers - 
and the calculations they performed - came under attack from both hydroelectric 
utilities owners and the railroads who accused the agencies involved of undertaking 
‘pork-barrel’ projects. Overall, bureaucratic battles, internecine conflict and pressure 
from the powerful electricity and rail interests over disparate benefit-cost calculations 
resulted in a search for a standardised benefit-cost technique that could be applied 
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throughout the whole of the federal government (Porter 1995:162-175) and ‘[benefit-
cost] analysis had to be transformed from a collection of local bureaucratic practices 
into a set of rationalized economic principles.' (Porter 1995:149). 
As Richard J. Hammond noted, before America’s entry into the second world war, 
there had been no attempt to develop consistency across agency calculations, or 
independent verification of these (Hammond 1960:7) . By 1943 however, President 36
Franklin Roosevelt had issued Executive Order 9384, which required federal agencies 
to submit to the Bureau of the Budget reports ‘relating to or affecting federal public 
works and improvement projects’ (cited in Hammond 1960:7). That same year, an 
‘interdepartmental dinner group of officials from federal water agencies’ (Porter 
1995:182)  was formalised as the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee 37
(FIARBC), and in 1946, this group established a Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs 
under pressure from the Bureau of the Budget, specifically ‘for the purpose of 
formulating mutually acceptable principles and procedures for determining benefits 
and costs for water resources projects’ (cited in Hammond 1960:9). In 1950, this sub-
committee published an interim report entitled ‘Proposed Practices for Economic 
Analysis of River Basin Projects’, or, as it was more commonly referred to, the 
celebrated Green Book. 
The Green Book 
The Green Book aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of benefit-cost techniques 
undertaken in each of the agencies involved, and from this, to ‘develop a systematic, 
consistent, and theoretically sound framework for the economic analysis of river basin 
projects and programs’ (FIARBC 1950:1). As a means to reconcile conflicting types of 
benefit-cost analysis across a variety of federal agencies involved in multiple purpose 
water planning and development, the Green Book failed utterly (Porter 1995:185), and 
its goal to provide a systematic and consistent framework for calculation did little to 
 Indeed at the time the generation of the electricity required to produce aluminium for wartime 36
airplanes was a prime concern (Klein 1999:1).
 This group included representatives from the Army Corps of Engineers; the Departments of 37
Agriculture, Commerce and Interior; and the Federal Power Commission (Hammond 1960:9, 
footnote 16).
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lessen inter-agency competition and the production of wildly differing figures for water 
projects. Although it was never officially adopted by the parent committee of by federal 
agencies, the Green Book was still highly influential (Campen 1986:17; Hammond 
1960; Kneese 2011:59; Porter 1995:185), and it proved much more successful and 
significant in providing the basis for a heretofore missing theoretical framework for 
benefit-cost analysis - in the form of the new welfare economics (Kneese 201159; 
Porter 1995:187-188).  
The Green Book itself never made explicit reference to welfare economics however, 
nor to any specific economic theorist, papers or canonical texts in spite of its reliance 
on economic theory, likely due to its production by bureaucratic and not academic 
economists (Porter 1995:188). But the simple importation of the concepts and 
language of the discipline was clear. The report’s call for projects to be developed in 
the order of their economic efficiency (FIARBC 1950:5) and the use of both utility and 
generalised scarcity is clear from the exposition of basic concepts: 
The phrase "goods and services" as commonly used in the economic sense is 
utilized in this study to encompass all objects and activities which have the 
power of satisfying human wants and which may be increased or decreased in 
amount (or value) as a result of a project. Goods and services which fulfill human 
needs and desires and which are limited in supply have economic value. Any 
goods and services for which there is no need or demand have no economic 
value. In order for the effects of a project to have economic value in terms of 
benefits or costs it is necessary that there be a need or demand for the goods 
and services produced by or used for the project. (FIARBC 1950:7) 
The initial impetus for the development of a specific technique to evaluate the benefits 
and costs of water development projects, which was written into the 1902 Rivers and 
Harbours Act, was, as I have shown above, radically transformed in the 1930s 
alongside the development of the national economy - made measurable through the 
new national account statistics. The requirement for the non-local evaluation of large-
scale multiple purpose projects followed the lead of Harold Icke’s National Resources 
Board and involved the incorporation of intangible factors and indirect benefits and 
costs not benefit-cost calculations. This development was formalised by the 1935 
Rivers and Harbours Act and the 1936 Flood Control Act. However, this did not result 
in a generalised benefit-cost formula, and attempts to reconcile conflicting calculations 
and analyses made by the federal agencies involved in water development projects 
would eventually result in the publication of the the FIARBC’s Green Book. While this 
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publication failed to reconcile conflicting forms of analysis between agencies, it did 
succeed in implicitly translating the technology of benefit-cost analysis into welfare 
economics. As Porter claims: ‘The transformation of cost-benefit analysis into a 
universal standard of rationality, backed up by thousands of pages of rules, cannot be 
attributed to the megalomania of experts, but rather to bureaucratic conflict in a 
context of overwhelming public distrust.’ (Porter 1995:189)  
Maass claimed that the Bureau of Budget bureaucrats and the members of the 
FIARBC were not acting in a vacuum, but were reflecting the conceptual basis of the 
new welfare economics with its focus on efficiency considerations, and within welfare 
economics, the exclusive focus on efficiency resulted ultimately from the ready 
availability of benefit cost data which were provided automatically through market 
prices (Maass 1966:213). However, as Porter argues, the reason for the application of 
welfare economic theory to water development planning by bureaucratic economists, 
particularly those at the Bureau of Agricultural economics, is unclear: ‘[c]itations by 
Mark M. Regan, the most important author of the “Objective Analysis” that provided a 
template for the Green Book, do not suggest a direct translation from high 
theory.’ (Porter 1995:188; italics added).  
Regardless of this lack of clarity, the Green Book presaged the huge expansion of the 
employment of economists in the Corps of Engineers (Porter 1995:186), and while 
economic expertise in benefit-cost analysis was almost non-existent outside of the 
bureaucracy at the start of the 1950s, three institutions: The Harvard Water Program, 
the RAND Corporation, and of course the newly formed RFF would, in the late 1950s 
provide the missing translation of benefit-cost analysis from simply a prosaic water 
resource technology into the practical application of welfare economic theory. An 
application that could be used not just in the evaluation of potential water development 
projects but throughout federal government.  
Welfare economics, efficiency, and the conservationist backlash 
In 1958 three seminal applied economics texts systematically brought modern 
neoclassical welfare economics squarely to bear on benefit-cost analysis (Campen, 
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1986:17; Hanley & Spash 1993:4-5; Hufschmidt 2011:44; Pearce 1971:14; 2002:58; 
Porter 1995:188 ). Water Resource Development, written by the Harvard economist 38
Otto Eckstein and published as part of Harvard’s Economic Studies series, 
represented an updated version of Eckstein’s 1955 doctoral thesis on the economics 
of project evaluation in the Federal water-resource programme. Eckstein also 
collaborated with John V. Krutilla of RFF on Multipurpose River Development, 
produced as part of RFF’s studies in water resources. The third book was Roland N. 
McKean’s operations research text, Efficiency in Government Through Systems 
Analysis, which was produced as a RAND Corporation research study.  
Bringing welfare to water 
Eckstein was the first to undertake a comprehensive appraisal of the benefit-cost 
studies of water resource development from a welfare economics perspective (Kneese 
2011). In the same year that Eckstein completed his PhD, Arthur Maass of the Harvard 
Graduate School of Public Administration instituted the Harvard Water Program (Reuss 
2003). This was focused upon the analysis of current water planning techniques and 
aimed to bring together government water planners and academics in the fields of 
engineering, economy theory and public administration in order to improve 
multipurpose water planning and project evaluation procedures. Eckstein, alongside 
Robert Dorfman and later Stephen A. Marglin provided economic input to the 
programme, which was funded by an initial grant of USD 150,000 from the Rockefeller 
Foundation.  
Although Eckstein would spend time at RFF as a temporary staff member through 
1956, it was under the auspices of the Harvard Water Program that he eventually 
published the updated version of his thesis in 1958 . After a brief history of federal 39
water planning and development projects Water Resource Development begins by 
outlining a general theoretical framework for benefit-cost analysis from the point of 
view of welfare economics. It then goes on to discuss general issues of benefit-costs 
practice ‘such as the form of the benefit-cost criterion, interest rates, and adjustments 
 Porter also refers to two papers by Julius Margolis (1957, 1959) in his summary of early 38
economic analysis of benefit-cost analysis. The first of Margolis’ papers considers indirect, 
secondary benefits in relation to economic externalities; while his 1959 paper is a review of the 
three 1958 texts.
 Eckstein would also later go on to be a member of the CEA from 1964-1968.39
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for risk which are encountered in all fields to which the analysis is applied’ (Eckstein 
1958:17). With the theoretical concepts derived from welfare theory stated, Eckstein 
moved to a comparison of the theory against the analytical practices of the federal 
agencies involved in water development in the areas of flood control, navigation, 
irrigation, electric power generation, and finally in multipurpose cases. From this 
comparison, Eckstein was able to ‘propose certain changes which would make the 
practices consistent with the theory, and thus also consistent with each 
other’ (Eckstein 1958:17).  
Eckstein concluded his study by stating that the surveyed current benefit-cost 
procedures fall far short of the welfare theory ideal and ‘[a] benefit-cost ratio of 1.0 
does not mean that a project will actually produce more benefit than its cost even if the 
forecasts of prices prove to be correct, and hence the analysis is not yet a proper 
means for determining how much money should be spent on the various programmes 
(Eckstein 1958:273)’. However: 
…benefit-cost analysis is an extremely promising evaluation method for public 
expenditures, which, in the limited cases where it can be applied, could put 
policy judgements on a much firmer economic basis than is usually possible. 
While we have many reservations about specific details of procedure, this point is 
fundamental: with so large a share of the total investment of the country 
channeled through public bodies and hence subject to political decision making, 
it is most desirable that benefit-cost techniques, properly designed, be applied 
as widely as possible, and that the findings be given a heavy weight in policy 
formation. This conclusion presupposes that the analysis is used to evaluate 
projects and not merely as a propaganda device. (Eckstein 1958:273-274) 
Multiple Purpose River Development by John V. Krutilla and Eckstein built, in part, 
upon the latter’s work on water development, but focused more specifically on 
multiple-purpose river basin development projects and their economic efficiency. 
Krutilla had joined RFF in 1955 after working previously for the TVA, and by 1958 he 
was the research associate in charge of economic research in the water resources 
area at RFF. This text proved to be one of the most important outputs from that RFF 
research stream. Like Water Resource Development much of the text is taken up with 
the outline of the theory of efficiency in the economists’ perfectly competitive economy. 
However, they also invoke the notion of economic external effects (otherwise known as 
!132
externalities) drawing from postwar work by William Kapp (1950) and Tibor Scitovsky 
(1954). As Mishan defined them:  
External effects may be said to arise when relevant effects on production or 
welfare go wholly or partially unpriced. Being outside the price system such 
external effects are sometimes looked upon as the by-products, wanted or 
unwanted, of other people's activities that immediately or indirectly affect the 
welfare of individuals. (Mishan 1965:6) 
Calel (2011:9) traces economic thought on externalities back to Adam Smith, whereas 
for Kula (1998:68) the concept of externalities proper should be dated to Alfred 
Marshall and his Principles of Economics (1890). However, for Marshall, externalities 
were only used to refer positively to the benefits accruing to ‘economic units’ (Kula 
1998:68) through general industrial development. It would not be until Marshall’s ‘star 
pupil’ (Calel 2011:10), Arthur Cecil Pigou, that externalities would be expanded to 
account for costs as well as benefits. Kula notes that Pigou makes use of the case of 
woodlands damaged by sparks from railway engines (Pigou 1920), and in his 
Economics in Practice (1935) Pigou gives a number of other examples of externalities, 
including the now classic economic pedagogic case of soot from factory chimneys 
making dirty nearby washing that is hung out to dry. Pigou’s proposed response to the 
issue of externalities was for government intervention to correct what he viewed as the 
faulty ‘intertemporal allocation of resources’ (Kula 1998:83) - which would come to be 
Ronald Coase’ later bête noire (1960). However, for Pigou, externalities were rare, 
anomalous events. 
Krutilla and Eckstein point out that while externalities were regarded at the time by 
many economists as quite limited in the economy overall, in the water resources field 
external effects were a pervasive phenomenon (Krutilla & Eckstein 1958:44), and I will 
return to this question regarding economic externalities later in this chapter as well as 
in the following one. Krutilla and Eckstein’s perspective on the pervasiveness of 
externalities in river basin management was driven by an understanding of basins as 
integrated systems, incorporating a systems analysis and operations research 
perspective (Hanley & Spash 1993:4) - an approach made more explicit in McKean’s 
text. This theoretical approach was then applied to a series of case studies in order to 
elucidate: the comparative efficiency of differing approaches to the Hell’s Canyon 
project; integrated system development on the Alabama-Coosa river system; and the 
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analysis of the distribution of benefits and costs in the Williamette river development 
programme. They concluded, similarly to Eckstein, that while an economic efficiency 
basis for water resource development may not necessarily be considered socially 
desirable, nevertheless: ‘efficiency is a significant value in our society; in decisions 
regarding multiple purpose development, the public interest requires that efficiency 
considerations be given due weight’ (Krutilla & Eckstein 1958:277). 
The general purpose of Roland N. McKean’s Efficiency in Government Through 
Systems Analysis (1958) was broader than the other two texts. It aimed to contribute 
to the improvement of quantitative analytical tool of benefit-cost analysis in general and 
to extend the use of this tool beyond just the focus on water resources. This more 
general focus was due to RAND’s already established programme of research on 
economic efficiency with respect to the military, and McKean, who had been a 
research economist at RAND since 1951, brought the economic techniques being 
developed by the corporation for the analysis of military expenditures to the water 
development field (McKean 1958:vii). The study was produced as the third volume in 
the Operations Research Society of America’s Publications in Operations Research 
series and made broad use of operations research and systems analysis techniques. 
As defined by McKean, ‘Operations research’ developed from statistical techniques 
deployed during the second world war in the comparison of military tactics. In the post 
war period these techniques were developed and applied to enlarged systems of 
interrelated components, such as military development and procurement problems, 
and were developed under the rubric of ‘systems analysis’.  
McKean’s study differs from the Eckstein and Krutilla & Eckstein texts not only in its 
thoroughgoing application of operations research and systems analysis however, but 
also in its general approach to efficiency. In the case of the Eckstein and Krutilla & 
Eckstein, they follow contemporary neoclassical welfare theory in defining efficiency 
specifically as Pareto-Optimality, by incorporating all purported benefits as well as 
costs, potential projects can be assigned a rank order. In the case of McKean, he 
develops and clarifies a subset of benefit-cost analysis that does not rely upon the 
complete specification of benefits. This subset focuses solely on cost comparisons 
amongst regulatory and development options, where optimal economic allocation is 
not necessarily the goal. Within this form of cost-effectiveness analysis, a programme 
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is deemed efficient if its benefits exceed its costs, but this does not mean however, 
that the programme is Pareto Optimal, and nor does it provide a preferred order of 
projects to be undertaken.  
While all three of these texts retained a concrete emphasis on water resource 
development, they were each written with a broader audience of cost-benefit analysts, 
government personnel and operations researchers in mind, and undertook a synthesis 
of the theoretical welfare economics literature with the practical concerns of water 
resource use and development (Pearce 2002:58). The essential step undertaken here 
was the use of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion - established during the 1930s 
and 1940s (e.g. Hicks 1939, 1943; Kaldor 1939) - in order to evaluate projects 
according to the benefit-cost principle: 
justifying projects or policies on the basis that benefits exceed costs is wholly 
consistent with there being losers, i.e., those who suffer the costs. The Kaldor-
Hicks compensation criterion had established that projects were nonetheless 
justified because gainers could compensate losers, such that losers would be no 
worse off, and gainers would still have a net benefit. This implies that, provided 
the compensation takes place, no one is actually worse off, thus meeting the 
long-established Pareto criterion for an improvement in overall well-being. 
However, actual compensation need not occur: It is necessary only that it could 
take place. (Pearce 2002:59) 
Benefit-cost analyses are frequently, and particularly in the economic and political 
mainstream, characterised as simply the practical application of welfare economics 
theory (Campen 1986:15). This is not the case however, and it was not until these 
landmark 1958 publications that an explicit theoretical framework and justification for 
benefit-cost analysis was established - over twenty years after the Flood Control Act of 
1936 had brought about its regular application (Campen 2006:17). Kneese has argued 
that 1958 represents the peak of the refinement of benefit-cost analysis of water 
projects, and that at this point, with the era of big dam projects in the US drawing to a 
close  there were few major projects left as candidates for evaluation by the 40
technique. ‘Benefit-cost analysis is, however, not dead; it just moved to other fields of 
activity’ (Kneese 2011:59), and it was its translation into welfare economics that 
enabled this movement. 
 The era of big dam projects would run for a roughly thirty year period from 1935 to 1965, 40
(Billington Jr. et al 2005: 383).
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Making a portable economic technology 
Crucially, in tying the pragmatic technology of benefit-cost calculations to the 
contemporary discipline of welfare economics that was stabilised in the late ‘30s and 
early ‘40s, benefit-cost analysis was converted from the simple handmaiden of federal 
dam building and water course projects into a transportable analytical technology, 
capable of being deployed in multiple milieu. This translation was completed and made 
explicit in the three texts published in 1958 under the auspices of the Harvard Water 
Program, RAND and RFF. What began as a limited and prosaic engineering technology 
developed by the Army Corps in the first decades of the 20th century, was by the late 
1950s, translated into the broader field of welfare economics. Coterminous with the 
settling of the economy as an ontologically discrete sphere defined by its potential for 
limitless growth, and the construction of a system of energy for powering this growth, 
benefit-cost analysis was developed into an economic technology that could be 
transported from water development projects and applied to any federal decision 
making that would potentially impact on this growth. 
From the late 1950s on, benefit-cost analysis rapidly became an established academic 
discipline and a respectable economic speciality (Porter 1995:187) . Transportation 41
studies - particularly of highways programmes - and RAND’s ongoing economic 
quantification of military spending programmes through the development operations 
research analysis, would provide complementary means through which benefit-cost 
analysis was expanded from its limited, watery origins. However ‘it was not the crucial 
point of reference for the economists who around 1960 began measuring the benefits 
and costs of almost every form of government activity. The analysis of water projects 
was.’ (Porter 1995:187). In 1961 the Panel of Consultants to the Bureau of the Budget 
released their report ‘Standards and Criteria for Formulating and Evaluating Federal 
Water Resource Developments’. The Panel included John Krutilla of RFF and the 
Harvard Water Program economists Maynard M. Hufschmidt and Stephen Marglin; 
and one year later, the Harvard Water Program published its own comprehensive 
multidisciplinary report Design of Water Resource Systems, which considered 
economic efficiency issues and benefit-cost analysis in some depth.  
 By the middle of the 1960s, Prest and Turvey’s (1965), by their own admission, incomplete 41
survey of the benefit-cost literature, resulted in a bibliography that included ninety references.
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In November 1963 the Brookings Institute held a major conference on the topic of 
benefit-cost analysis at the request of the Bureau of the Budget. Papers presented at 
this conference applied the technique to such diverse topics and areas of federal 
government action as ‘urban highways, urban renewal, outdoor recreation, civil 
aviation, government research and development, and public health’ (Maass 1966:208). 
The conference papers were published in 1965 as the volume Measuring Benefits of 
Governmental Investments, edited by the Harvard Water Program economist Robert 
Dorfman (Dorfman 1965). That same year saw the publication of further benefit-costs 
texts (e.g. Haveman 1965; Prest & Turvey 1965) as well as the establishment of a unit 
within the Bureau of the Budget dedicated to adapting and applying benefit-cost and 
cost-effectiveness analyses to a range of government programmes. (Maass 
1966:208).  
As Porter argues, benefit-costs techniques were also at this time brought into the 
economic analysis of public health. Here the economist Burton Weisbrod, using lost 
productivity as a measure of the value of days and even lives lost to sickness, 
concluded that the polio vaccination was of doubtful net benefit. Education was also 
studied, and here the use of gross returns from the labour market in the benefit-cost 
calculations indicated that while high school, college, and unsurprisingly, MBA 
programmes should be endorsed, graduate education in science and engineering 
should not (Porter 1995:188).  
Through the 1950s and 1960s an increasingly wide array of potential benefits were 
developed as surrogate measures of national efficiency driven by the desire of the 
agencies involved in the developments to justify their own projects, and the 1963 
Bureau of the Budget sponsored conference helped this process through the further 
theoretical development of benefits proxies as well as the application of these to ever 
further fields of federal government endeavour (Andrews 1984:49). In the following 
chapter, I will consider the further spread of benefit-cost analysis through the late 
1960s, a spread which had been limited up to that point by the Bureau of the Budget’s 
sole focus on a national efficiency objective; and it is this concern with national 
efficiency, and the response to this, that I turn to next. 
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National efficiency and the conservationist backlash 
The 1934 National Resources Board Committee under Harold Ickes recommended a 
revision to the costing techniques used to evaluate candidate water resource projects 
for federal funding, and this represented a fundamental break from the prior focus in 
the Army Corps of Engineers on purely tangible, local benefits and costs. This radical 
change, undertaken in order to ensure that the large-scale water resource projects 
being undertaken under the New Deal adequately reflected the needs of the newly 
defined, measured and prescriptive national economy. By incorporating intangible 
factors and secondary, indirect benefits, ‘[t]he damage a project did to homes and the 
resulting loss in tax revenue, according to this idea, could be commensurated with and 
balanced against not just irrigation or power production, but also increased recreation 
opportunities, aesthetic improvements, and other unmarketed factors (Lohmann 
2009:516).  
However, the use of the unmarketed factors was largely curtailed through a focus on 
national efficiency, as proscribed informally in the 1950s Green Book, which relied 
overwhelmingly on the efficiency ranking function (Maass 1966:212). This was then 
officially propagated through the federal agencies by the Bureau of Budget in 1952’s 
Budget Circular A-47. Shortly after the publication of the Budget Circular, agency 
manuals would begin to be revised to reflect more closely national efficiency concerns, 
and as Andrews states, ‘in practice only demonstrable economic benefits and costs 
based on market values were included in the analyses’ (Andrews 1984:46), and 
throughout the 1950s the executive agencies ‘painted themselves into the efficiency 
box…In this way benefits to all became virtually restricted to benefits that increase 
national product’ (Maass 1966:212-213). These guidelines for economic analyses of 
water resource projects would remain in force for the remainder of the 1950s (Campen 
1986:17).  
For Maass, the subjection of benefit-cost analysis to the single objective of economic 
efficiency - and its overarching concern with the growth of the economy - fails, first 
and foremost to take into account the complexity of the majority of governmental 
functions. Maass was particularly concerned with the failure to consider issues of 
income redistribution, which could be safely ignored by economists through the simple 
invocation of Kaldor-Hicks compensation. The issue of consumer sovereignty was also 
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a clear concern for Maass and he raised questions about the nature of institutional 
settings, their impact on consumer preferences, and how these can develop at odds 
with community preferences. While these points would be revisited in later academic 
critiques of benefit-cost analysis and its usage (see e.g. Sagoff 1990, 2004), during the 
1950s and into the 1960s a backlash developed against benefit-cost analysis and the 
agencies that used this to determine the viability of large-scale water development 
projects on the grounds of its narrowness and explicit exclusion of broader, non-
efficiency factors. As Richard Andrews claimed: ‘The very narrowness of [benefit-cost 
analysis] criteria that made it an effective weapon against the worst pork-barrel 
subsidy proposals also made it seem the insensitive villain that ignored environmental 
and social values displaced by development projects’ (Andrews, 1984:49), and in 
1950 the Echo Park controversy would ultimately bring this critique to the national 
stage. 
In April of that year, Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman approved the building of 
the Echo Park Dam by the Bureau of Reclamation after initial resistance from the 
National Parks Service. The dam, which would span the Green River in Colorado, was 
to be a major hydroelectric development project located within the Dinosaur National 
Monument. This decision immediately provoked a vocal response from wildlife 
preservation groups, wilderness societies and the conservationist movement who 
feared that the dam would not only destroy an area of unique wilderness, but set a 
precedent for the further incursion of water development projects into America’s 
national parks and monuments. On July 22nd, Bernard DeVoto, who was a writer for 
Harper’s Magazine and served on Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman’s Advisory 
Board, wrote an exposé on the Echo Park Dam project in the Saturday Evening Post 
entitled ‘Shall We Let them Ruin Our National Parks?’ (Billington Jr. et al 2005: 397).  
Shortly thereafter, the leaders of thirty-two separate wildlife and conservationist 
organisations created a lobbying group, the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, 
to bring the fight for Echo Park to Washington. This group would contest the 
construction of the dam for the next six years, and when Congress took up the issue 
of authorising the the dam, the protests against it would attain national status, and 
sought to highlight the opposition of environmental and wilderness concerns to the 
national efficiency focus of the Bureau’s benefit-cost analyses.  
!139
As Fred M. Packard, the executive secretary of the National Parks Service sought to 
highlight ‘The issue is clear-cut, in spite of the fog of technical data and irrelevant side 
issues that have confused its comprehension by Congress and the public’ (cited in 
Billington Jr. et al 2005:398). David Brower, the Director of the Sierra Club  42
devastatingly critiqued the evaporation figures that formed part of the Bureau’s 
calculations. The projected price figures for power generation from the dam were also 
revised upwards and aesthetic arguments about the inundation of a national 
monument were raised and juxtaposed to the (now increasingly shaky) benefit-cost 
calculations. As a result of this opposition, when President Eisenhower formally 
authorised the Colorado River Storage Project on April 11th, 1956, he did so without 
the Echo Park Dam (Billington Jr. et al 2005:398). 
The Echo Park controversy was a galvanising moment in the history of the post-war 
conservation movement (Billington Jr. et al 2005: 399). Throughout the remainder of 
the 1950s, both the technique of benefit-cost analysis, focusing exclusively on national 
efficiency, and the federal agencies that made use of it to justify large environmental 
development projects, came under increasing attack from conservation groups on the 
grounds that this economic technique failed to adequately take into account 
environmental benefits and costs. The major decision technology used by the Army 
Corps of Engineers, the Soil Conservation Service, the TVA and the Bureau of 
Reclamation to approve water development projects was becoming increasingly 
contested for its narrow focus. The overriding concern with the growth of the economy 
, through the use of the national efficiency criterion in benefit-cost calculations for 
environmental development projects, was being increasingly seen as a problem.  
In 1946, the Army Corps of Engineers originally presented a plan to develop the 
Arkansas river in Oklahoma, at the request of Oklahoma Governor Robert S. Kerr. Kerr 
was not merely State Governor however, he was also owner of Kerr-McGee Oil 
Industries, and had a huge financial stake in the development of the river as a means 
to transport oil at lower cost than via rail freight. In testimony Kerr argued ‘Let us not 
 Brower would later go on to found Friends of the Earth in 1969, when he was ousted from 42
his position at the Sierra Club on the grounds of his drive for a more politically active 
organisation.
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confine this hearing to the minor subject of comparative water-rail freight costs. Rather 
let us think about building a greater nation’ (quoted in Porter 1995:164). Invocation of 
the growth of the national economy was not however enough in 1946 for the project to 
go ahead. By 1962, Robert S. Kerr was no longer a State Governor, but a Senator and 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Rivers and Harbours. In this position, he 
sponsored guidelines and legislation that established new and broader categories of 
benefits that could be applied to national efficiency focused benefit-cost calculations 
(Andrews 1984:46 footnote 4; Porter 1995:164).  
The subsequent development of the Robert S. Kerr lock and dam alongside the 
Robert S. Kerr reservoir, which naturally enough facilitated the cheap transportation of 
Kerr-McGee Oil, was the kind of project that would result in the The Nation branding 
the Corps of Engineers the army of ‘Pork Barrel soldiers’ in 1966 (cited in Billington Jr 
et al 2003:400). It would also help further develop a popular and conservation oriented 
backlash against benefit-cost procedures as environmental costs were still excluded, 
and the cost component of equations considered only investment costs: capital, 
operation, maintenance, and not the full social and environmental effects of disruptions 
to communities and ecosystems (Andrews 1984:49). This backlash would only get 
stronger through the 1960s as the issue of pollution caused by economic growth 
became the rallying banner of the burgeoning environmental movement.  
The polluted Spaceship Earth 
While the 1963 RFF reports Scarcity and Growth and Resources in America’s Future 
(Barnett & Morse 1963; Landsberg et al 1963) signalled the death knell of concerns 
with resource scarcity and helped secure the economy as an object capable of 
continued, and exponential growth powered by a limitless system of energy, One year 
before a popular book had been produced that ignited a concern not with a lack of 
growth, but with growth itself. In 1962, the former researcher for the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Rachel Carson, would publish her book Silent Spring. Originally 
serialised in three parts in the New Yorker, Silent Spring highlighted the ecologically 
catastrophic impact of the introduction of DDT and other chemical pesticides into 
contemporary agriculture and sold half a million copies in hardback alone, staying on 
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the New York Times Bestseller list for 31 weeks (McCormick 1995:55). This book, 
frequently credited as marking the beginning of the environmental revolution 
(McCormick 1995:65; Pearce 2002), ‘arguably opened the eyes of the American 
public’ (Flippen 2000:4) to the problems that accompanied unalloyed economic and 
industrial growth in postwar America. Pollution, however, was already at this time a 
national issue, thanks to the California smog. 
Pollution becomes pervasive 
The portmanteau term ‘smog’ was first coined in 1905 by a doctor in London, it would 
come to prominence however on the west coast of America. Originally mistaken for 
Japanese gas attacks during the second world war (McNeill 2001:72), it would then be 
blamed on both wartime industrial production, and then household furnaces, before its 
eventual identification as largely caused by automobile emissions. The nature of its 
production significantly undermined the feasibility of local control efforts, and as 
Christopher Bailey pointed out, local governments were unwilling to broach the 
broader issue of increasing car ownership and use (Bailey 1998:91). The California 
smog problem also began to foul popular culture, making a recurring appearance in 
the works of Raymond Chandler, alongside a parade of breathless dames. In 
response, the state’s congressmen and women attempted to introduce a variety of 
bills on research, prevention measures and tax relief for the purchase of air pollution 
control equipment (Bailey 1998: 91-94).  
In his 1955 State of the Union message, President Eisenhower announced that he 
would soon propose ‘strengthening programs to combat increasingly serious pollution 
of our rivers and the growing problem of air pollution’ (Eisenhower 1955; cited in Bailey 
1998:95). Presidential support for anti-pollution measures resulted in twenty four 
pollution control bills being introduced in the House that same year, and Eisenhower 
signed the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act into law on July 14th 1955. Bailey states that 
while care was taken to preserve primary responsibility for air pollution control at the 
level of the state, the provision for federal surveys, the publication of reports by the 
Surgeon General, and the authorisation of USD 5 million for demonstration projects, 
grants for local control agencies and research by the Public Health Service, meant that 
the 1955 Act prefigured the shift in responsibility for air pollution from the local level to 
the federal government (Bailey 1998:96-97; Jones 1975:31-32).  
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Throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, expanding heavy industry and energy 
production, particularly in areas utilising high sulphur coal, resulted in increased and 
visible industrial air and water pollution. (Flippen 2000). The appearance of pollution in 
print - thanks to the serialisation of Carson’s Silent Spring - was added to in December 
1962 when a smog disaster in London, estimated to have killed up to 700 people, was 
widely reported in the US media (Bailey 1998:104). Subsequently, the next year, the 
same year as the RFF reports, President Kennedy stated in a special message to 
Congress transmitted on the 7th of February 1963 that: ‘In light of the known damage 
caused by polluted air, both to out health and to our economy, it is operative that 
greater emphasis be given to the control of air pollution by communities, States and 
the Federal Government.’ (quoted in Bailey 1998:106). By the end of that year the 
1963 Clean Air Act (CAA) had been passed.  
The passage of the act was actually greased by the death of oilman Robert S. Kerr, 
whose fondness for pork and role in the development of benefit-cost analysis I 
discussed above. Kerr had been, at the time of his passing, Chairman of the Senate 
Public Works Committee. His replacement would reorganise the committee, creating a 
Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution under the Democratic Senator 
Edmund Muskie. Muskie was a staunch environmental advocate and as well as being 
central to the passing of the 1963 CAA, he would play a role in the massive expansion 
of federal environmental regulation after the election of Richard Nixon in 1969. The 
1963 CAA, like the 1955 Act, left primary responsibility for controlling air pollution up to 
state and local governments, however for the first time, and mirroring the developing 
understanding of pollution as a pervasive, non-local issue, the Secretary of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare was empowered to take legal action 
against interstate polluters (Bailey 1998:108; Jones 1975:71-76). 
Alongside air pollution due to the burning of fossil fuels by the manufacturing industry 
and by chemical pesticides, the mass use and inadequately or unregulated discharge 
of chemicals was brought startlingly to the national attention when the Cuyahuga river 
in Cleveland caught fire in June 1969. Alongside industrial growth, the increasing 
growth in both consumption and population density in the US were not matched by 
the development of adequate waste treatment services, resulting in more, and more 
obvious environmental despoliation. Moreover, municipal dumps often had poor 
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pollution controls and expensive, sanitary landfills were rarely funded adequately 
(Flippen: 2000). Not only were domestic energy production, the growth of the national 
economy, increasing consumption and population density resulting in continual 
pollution problems, but by the end of the 1960s, the overseas and offshore production 
and transportation of oil would also result in highly visible environmental catastrophes.  
In 1967, the Torrey Canyon Supertanker ran aground off the Cornish coast of England, 
resulting in what was then the world’s largest oil spill; and in 1969, a Union Oil drilling 
platform in the Dos Cuadras offshore oil field six miles from the California coast 
experienced a blowout, resulting in the largest oil spill seen in US waters at the time. 
Within ten days, up to 100,000 barrels of crude oil had spilled into the Santa Barbara 
Channel and onto beaches in southern California. Pipeline breaks and further leakage 
in the surrounding area would result in a near continuous, if minimal, oil spillage 
throughout the remainder of 1969 and into 1970. The Santa Barbara Channel oil spill 
received widespread media coverage, galvanised environmental action in Richard 
Nixon’s home state of California, and resulted in the newly inaugurated President 
visiting affected beaches just one month into his first term (Hamblin 2013:190).  
Throughout the 1960s, pollution developed into an increasingly pressing issue in the 
US, and within a country shaken by the ructions of anti-Vietnam war protests, an 
increasingly vociferous and politically potent movement crystallised around the 
environment. The Apollo space programme, conceived in early 1960 - just three years 
after the USSRs Sputnik success - resulted in the launch of Apollo 8 out of the earth’s 
orbit in 1968, and the famed Earthrise picture taken by the astronaut William Anders 
during the fourth orbit of the moon would give the environmental movement its very 
own motif. Anders stated that after taking the picture “[t]hen I felt like some watcher of 
the skies, when a new planet swims into his ken”, and as the famed science fiction 
novelist Arthur C Clarke would claim, this image ‘[f]or millions on earth… must have 
been the moment when the Earth really became a planet’ (McCormick 1995:80). The 
image of planet Earth - singular, self-contained and fragile in the void of space, would 
not only galvanise an environmental movement, but it came to epitomise the 
development of a new approach to the environment, one focused on the closed 
ecosystem, and named three years earlier, as the Spaceship Earth. 
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The coming Spaceship Earth 
In July 1965, the then US ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson gave a speech to 
the UN economic and social council in Geneva on the problem of global urbanization. 
In the speech, Stevenson made use of the metaphor of the earth as a spaceship ‘on 
which humanity travelled, dependent on its vulnerable supplies of air and 
soil’ (McCormick 1989:67). This speech was drafted by the former editor of The 
Economist, Barbara Ward , who would, in 1966 publish the book Spaceship Earth, 43
based on her 1964 George B. Pegram lecture series at Brookhaven National 
Laboratories. In Spaceship Earth, Ward ascribes the genesis of the spaceship 
metaphor to the idiosyncratic engineer, thinker and inventor of the geodesic dome, 
Buckminster Fuller. Fuller, who had been expelled from Harvard University twice only to 
be eventually invited back as Honorary Professor of Poetry, was the author, in 1964, of 
a manifesto he titled The operating manual for spaceship earth. It would not be until 
two years later however, that the Spaceship Earth would make its most celebrated and 
influential appearance in a paper presented by the economist Kenneth E. Boulding 
entitled The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth at an RFF conference (Pearce 
2002:60). 
In 1966, Allen Kneese was the director of research programmes in both water quality 
and the quality of the environment at RFF, and on March 8th and 9th the organisation 
held its sixth research forum on the topic of ‘Environmental quality in a growing 
economy’; this forum was Planned by a staff group led by Kneese. Henry Jarrett would 
again act as editor for the book ultimately produced from the event, as he did for the 
the 1958 RFF forum on conservation. He noted in his introduction to the edited volume 
that resulted from the forum that the changing emphasis from resource concerns to 
those of the effects of environmental pollutants - understood within RFF as a transition 
from environmental quantity to environmental quality - resulted in the following 
question: 
Granting that most of the pressures upon the natural environment have been 
direct or indirect results of a prosperous and expanding economy, does it follow 
 Barbara Ward was the former editor the the magazine The Economist, and would go on, at 43
the prompting of Maurice Strong, to write the book Only one earth (1972) for the 1972 UN 
conference on the Human Environment with microbiologist Rene Dubois.
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that further erosion of environmental quality must continue to be the price of 
further economic gains?’ (Jarrett 1966: xii) 
Not only is economic growth queried here in relation to its environmental impacts and 
pollution caused, but by using the markers of growth developed in the 1963 
Landsberg et al. RFF study Resources in Americas future - namely population growth, 
automobile ownership, personal consumption expenditures, and the federal reserve 
board index of industrial production - Jarrett maintained that ‘[t]he underlying causes 
of these discomforts and hazards are to be seen in the same statistics that most of the 
time are hailed as indicators of economic growth’ (Jarrett 1966: ix). Here then, the very 
assurances of continued growth provided through the metrics and measurements of 
the early 1960s RFF studies that seemed to kill off concerns over resource scarcity are 
instead taken to starkly constitute the new problem of the environment. The problem 
here is not whether economic growth can continue, but that the very certainty of this 
growth, and the pollution associated with it, is the more pressing concern.  
As Jarrett also stated ‘[i]f RFF projections from 1980 and 2000 are anywhere near the 
mark, the forces of economic progress working to degrade the environment will 
become steadily stronger.’(1966: ix). In order to address this issue, six topics were 
chosen for the forum. For each of these, an expert in the field was invited to prepare a 
paper highlighting current issues or prospects, and what might be done to alleviate or 
address them, and another was asked to respond critically to this paper or expand 
upon the issues raised there. The first topic to be addressed over the two days - 
resource development, usage and its impact on the environment - would result in the 
forum’s most important output, Boulding’s paper The Economics of the Coming 
Spaceship Earth . 44
Expanding on a brief earlier Spaceship Earth piece he had written (1965), Boulding, 
who would later become President of the American Economics Association, 
synthesised the early systems theorist Claus Von Bertalanaffy and the new discipline of 
ecology within an economic perspective, and made three innovative claims. First, he 
 Although the Spaceship metaphor had been used earlier by Buckminster Fuller and Barbara 44
Ward, Boulding maintained that he thought up the metaphor independently, although it was so 
appropriate and timely that it was, in essence, an idea whose time had come (Boulding 
1993:311).
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argued that economists in particular had failed to come to grips with the transition 
from the earth as an open system with an economy maintained in the midst of a 
throughput from inputs to outputs, to the earth as an effectively closed system, where 
‘the outputs of all parts of the system are linked to the inputs of other parts. There are 
no inputs from outside and no outputs to the outside; indeed, there is no outside at all’ 
(Boulding 1966:2). Using the colourful vernacular of spacemen and cowboys, Boulding 
states that established measurements of economic success do not make sense in the 
Spaceship Earth (Kula 1998:130). The reason for this, according to Boulding, is that 
the economy or ‘econosphere’ is merely a subset of the ‘world set’ or total ecosphere, 
and while we tend to treat the the former as an open system, the latter is not. Here 
then, Boulding combines a concern with ‘the economy’, with the ecological approach 
outlined by Howard and Eugene Odum (e.g. Odum 1959), and explicitly subsumes 
‘the economy’ under a global ecology.  
Second, Boulding would echo the critique of production statistics and GNP as 
measures of welfare made by Galbraith in his 1958 Affluent Society and paper on 
consumption presented at the RFF forum on conservation in the the same year. Here 
however, Boulding would maintain that given that the global ecosphere is a closed 
system, pollution is a paramount and continual concern and it is this that evidenced 
the ‘shadow of the future spaceship’ for Boulding, not any potential exhaustion of 
material resources. From Los Angeles ‘running out of air’ due to the prevalence of 
smog, to Lake Erie becoming a ‘cesspool’, to the issue of DDT raised by Rachel 
Carson (Boulding 1966:12), pollution was the fundamental concern in a spaceman 
economy. Under conditions of continuing growth, pollution is pervasive. This diagnosis 
of pervasive pollution within a ‘cowboy economy’, driven by consumption and 
production as the basis of welfare, led to Boulding’s prescription for the need to 
transition to a ‘spaceman economy’ in concordance with the essentially closed nature 
of the earth. Whereas in the current ‘cowboy economy’, the throughput of materials, 
energy and information - as measured roughly by GNP - was to be maximised, for the 
latter: 
[t]he essential measure of the success of the economy is not production and 
consumption at all, but the nature, extent, quality, and complexity of the total 
capital stock, including in this the state of the human bodies and minds included 
in the system. In the spaceman economy, what we are primarily concerned with 
is stock maintenance, and any technological change which results in the 
maintenance of a given total stock with a lessened throughput (that is, less 
production and consumption) is clearly a gain. (Boulding 1966:8) 
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The maintenance of stock - material, energy and information - forms the basis of 
welfare in a spaceman economy (McCormick 1995:80), and throughput - production 
and consumption - is to be minimised (Boulding 1966:8). As Boulding later noted, 
‘[t]he spaceship metaphor stresses the earth’s smallness, crowdedness, and limited 
resources; the need for avoiding destructive conflict; and the necessity for a sense of 
world community with a very heterogenous crew’ (Boulding 1993:311) 
Third, Boulding recognised in the penultimate paragraph of his paper that certain 
problems of immediate and local pollution were well known to economists under the 
rubric of external diseconomies (externalities). The concept of externalities, as outlined 
above, had been, with exception of Kapp (1950) and Eckstein & Krutilla (1958), 
understood as a strictly limited and local phenomenon. Eckstein & Krutllla’s argument 
that this was not the case with respect to river basins was not typical of the broader 
literature developed by welfare theorists at the beginning of the 1960s however. As 
argued by Mishan (1965) and later Ayres & Kneese (1969) - who I will return to in the 
next chapter - the importance of externalities was generally minimised in the academic 
literature  at this point. Externalities were considered as exceptional cases, minor and 45
negotiable deviations (Ayres & Kneese, 1969:282; see also Calel 2011:10-11). This 
remained the prevalent perspective within the post-war welfare economics discipline 
(see also Pearce 2002:59-60) .  46
Instead, Boulding considered the concept of externalities fundamentally inadequate to 
deal with the large scale and harder to solve problems of pervasive pollution within the 
Spaceship Earth. Boulding made clear that the persistent, worsening pollution due to 
the ongoing expansion of an open ‘cowboy economy’ within a closed ecosphere is 
not specific, local and comparable to the practical and immediate concerns focused 
captured by the notion of externalities. Rather: ‘The problems which I have been 
raising in this paper are of larger scale and perhaps much harder to solve than the 
more practical and immediate problems of the above paragraph’ (Boulding 1966:13). 
 see e.g. Buchanan & Stubblebine (1962); Coase (1960); Davis & Whinston (1962); Turvey 45
(1963).
 This was, in fact, well displayed by contributions to the RFF forum by Ralph Turvey and 46
Roland McKean (both of whom we have already come across in relation to the development of 
benefit-cost analysis) to the 1966 RFF forum. For Turvey and Mckean externalities are still 
described as a strictly limited set, given in terms of specific examples.
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The RFF conference was the first time that Boulding gave structure to the conceptual 
outline of the Spaceship Earth. But it was not his most eloquent exposition of his 
approach to the environmental problem. In testimony to Congress on the Energy 
Reorganization act of 1973, Boulding simply stated (and as I already quoted in the 
introduction): ‘Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite 
world is either a madman or an economist’ (U.S. Congress 1973). By the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the new and urgent fear of the near apocalyptic environmental 
despoliation of the Spaceship Earth had become a significant object of US politics as 
well as popular and academic concerns. The conservationist backlash against federal 
water projects that began in the 1950s - focused on the use of benefit-cost analysis 
and the myopic justification of projects according to their potential to aid the growth of 
the economy - was joined by the increasingly obvious consequences of this growth 
during the 1960s. Crucially, the notion of the Spaceship Earth signified not only that 
the growth of the economy could have negative impacts on the environment, but that 
it necessarily did so, and that this was only likely to get worse. 
Environmental limits and the antigrowth movement 
Shortly after his visit to the California beaches affected by the Santa Barbara oil spill, 
President Nixon announced during his annual message to Congress that:  
The great question of the ’70s is, shall we surrender to our surroundings, or shall 
we make our peace with nature and begin to make reparations for the damage 
we have done to our air, to our land, and to our water? Restoring nature to its 
natural state is a cause beyond party and beyond factions. It has become a 
common cause of all the people of this country... Clean air, clean water, open 
spaces—these should once again be the birthright of every American. If we act 
now, they can be. (President Richard Nixon’s annual message to Congress, 
January 22, 1970) 
This message not only echoed the ongoing Vietnamese conflict, but also the 
antagonistic relationship between growth and the environment conceptualised by the 
Spaceship Earth, and projected, graphically, by William Anders Earthrise photograph. 
This antagonism was only further inflamed by the ways that Nixon and his 
administration chose to take his own advice, and act. 
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Nixon and NEPA 
Prior to 1970, the US federal government’s regulatory focus had almost exclusively 
been on ‘economic regulation’ and was concerned predominantly with price setting by 
natural monopolies and other economic practices. Contestation over major water 
development projects and the examples of the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act and the 
1963 Clean Air Act are exemplary here. Specific pollution concerns and a broader 
understanding of the environment as a whole were increasingly considered as national 
and even global concerns, but federal regulation provided few incentives to encourage 
air and water quality regulation at the state level, and the public investment 
programmes that it did provide were generally seen as ineffective (Andrews 1984:52). 
In an attempt to outflank his likely Democratic rivals, Senators Edmund Muskie and 
Henry “Scoop” Jackson (who were themselves in competition with each other to write 
the strongest environmental legislation possible in the Senate), Nixon signed into law 
1969’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on the first of January 1970 (Bollier & 
Claybrook 1986:94; Flippen 2000), his first major executive action of what he would 
later dub ‘the environmental decade’.  
NEPA contains three principal components: a statement of National environmental 
policy, provisions for the implementation of this policy by federal agencies, and the 
establishment of a Council on Environmental Quality to oversee environmental policy 
(Liroff 1976:4). The first of these emphasises environmental quality as a National 
priority for the US. Section 101 (a) of the act recognises the’ profound impact of man’s 
activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment’ and commits 
the federal government, in cooperation with state and local governments and other 
concerned public and private bodies to use ‘all practicable means and measures, 
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and 
promote general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and 
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfil the social, economic, and other 
requirements of present and future generations of Americans’ (NEPA 1969).  
Second, it introduced environmental protection into the mandate of all federal agencies 
and required ‘analysis of environmental impacts for major federal rule makings, 
programme decisions and specific projects’ (Froehlich et al 1991:42). This analysis 
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could take one of two forms. An agency could either prepare an Environmental 
Assessment that supported a “finding of no significant impact” with respect to rule-
makings, decisions and projects, or prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 
An EIS must both describe significant impacts on the environment, and identify 
alternative actions that would minimise these environmental impacts, and as an 
analytical requirement intended to control the behaviour of administrative agencies this 
environmental tool developed the conceptual logic of the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) of cost analysis first instituted in the Department of Defence 
under Robert McNamara in the early 1960s (Andrews 1976; 1984:50).  
As reported in Flippen (2000) from an interview with John Whitaker (Deputy Assistant 
to the President for Domestic Affairs) no one in the White House at the time 
appreciated the importance of the Impact Statement requirement - which was the only 
‘true coercive portion of the bill and the one in which environmentalists placed so 
much faith’ (Flippen 2000:48). Flippen also points out that while Nixon would come to 
regret this oversight, it was not possible for him to oppose or veto the bill, as this 
would cast him as anti-environment - a political position considered largely impossible 
after April’s massive ‘Earth day’ protests (Flippen 2000:48). Important here was that 
the EIS requirement institutionalised the adversarial basis of the environment and 
environmental regulation to economic expansion in explicitly weighting environmental 
costs against economic benefits (Baram 1980:476). And environmental assessment 
and impact statements rapidly became the focus of environmentalist opposition, 
particularly to large scale energy production facilities such as dams and mining 
projects (Andrews 1984:49-50; Billington Jr. et al 2005:401; Hays 1987:143). 
Third, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established in Title II of NEPA to 
oversee and coordinate federal environmental efforts, with Russell E. Train, former 
head of the legal advisory staff of the Treasury, as its President. Although the CEQ had 
no budgetary powers or agency veto, its tasks included advising the President, 
monitoring the compliance of other agencies with NEPA, and the provision of public 
information on environmental issues. With respect to the first of these tasks, the CEQ 
produced annual reports for the President and Congress on National ‘Environmental 
Quality’. These documents, which ran from 1970 to 1997, reported on five areas: (1) 
the status and condition of the major natural, manmade, or altered environmental 
!151
classes of the Nation; (2) current and foreseeable trends in the quality, management 
and utilization of such environments and the effects of those trends on the social, 
economic, and other requirements of the Nation; (3) the adequacy of available natural 
resources for fulfilling human and economic requirements of the Nation in the light of 
expected population pressures; (4) a review of the programmes and activities 
(including regulatory activities) of the Federal Government, the State and local 
governments, and nongovernmental entities or individuals with particular reference to 
their effect on the environment and on the conservation, development and utilization of 
natural resources; and (5) a programme for remedying the deficiencies of existing 
programmes and activities, together with recommendations for legislation (NEPA 
1969:Title II, sec.201).  
The first report, transmitted July 1 1970, stressed the importance of misplaced 
economic incentives in causing pollution. It maintained that economic incentives are to 
be demonstrated and evaluated, but used in conjunction with environmental standards 
- not as a substitute (CEQ 1970). In a similar vein, the 1971 report argued that 
‘property rights do not extend to the right of individuals and firms to pollute air and 
water’ (CEQ 1971:113). This report also made explicit use of a benefit-cost balancing 
approach but reiterated the centrality of standards and enforcement, where any 
economic incentives are to be understood as supplementary measures. 
As Richard Andrews has argued, NEPA was ‘a profoundly important vehicle’ (Andrews 
1984:50) designed as ‘a government-wide policy framework - in effect, a “super-
mandate” - to ensure that all federal agencies would incorporate environmental 
concerns into their actions.’ (Andrews 1999:286). Army Corps of Engineers designed 
projects would immediately begin to be significantly altered, delayed and even 
cancelled (Andrews 1976:68-69) under the impact of NEPA requirements to explicitly 
analyse non-monetary costs and benefits of governmental action (Andrews 1984:50). 
Importantly, NEPA required that this analysis be undertaken not just for public 
investment decisions (such as water development projects), but for both regulatory 
and management decisions as well. This was reaffirmed by early court decisions that 
maintained ‘that all environmental impacts must be reasonably balanced along with 
economic and other objectives in federal regulatory decisions.’ (Andrews 1984:50). It is 
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to the framework of one of the most important federal environmental regulatory 
decisions that I now turn. 
The limits to air pollution 
The expansion of federal regulation initiated under Nixon was not merely in response to 
the growing public outcry over environmental despoliation and the desire for increasing 
environmental protection and conservation. The Nixon Administration viewed the issue 
of clean air in particular as one that could be used both as a means for political 
advantage, to further the administration goals of regulatory reform within independent 
agencies, and to counter the growing concern that environmental regulation in some 
states but not in others left regulated industries at a competitive disadvantage 
(Mazurek 1994:2). The combination of political response to environmental concern, 
and the executive’s desire to expand federal oversight over regulation resulted in the 
Clean Air Act of 1970.  
As I outlined in the last section, the CAA was actually first passed in 1963, but was 
amended so substantially by the Nixon administration in 1970 that the original law is 
rarely referred to. The basis of this 1970 CAA is an ‘action-forcing regulatory 
strategy’ (Liroff 1986:19) which was oriented towards achieving so called National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six 'criteria pollutants' for which 
environmental impact information was already known . The CAA specified two types 47
of standards for the NAAQS. The primary standards were health based, designed 
explicitly without regard to economic cost, and considered stringent enough to prevent 
injury. Secondary standards were designed to prevent negative effects on public 
welfare that were not directly health related, and included economic and aesthetic 
considerations (e.g. diminished soil or water productivity, reduced visibility).  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was also instituted in 1970 with the former 
Assistant Attorney General William D Ruckleshaus as its first administrator. The EPA 
was developed in part to undertake the provisions of the CAA, and it published its 
 Sulphur Dioxide, Carbon Monoxide, Nitrogen Oxide, particulates, hydrocarbons, and 47
photochemical oxidants. A standard was also later established for lead (Liroff 1986:21).
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initial ambient air quality standards in April 1971, giving state governments nine 
months to prepare Statutory Implementation Plans (SIPs). These plans were to detail 
how the state would bring areas that were currently in non-attainment with the NAAQS 
into attainment, and how areas already in attainment would have that level of air quality 
maintained. Several additional constraints were placed on the states with respect to 
their SIPs. First, and most importantly, the statutory deadline of May 31st 1975 was set 
for attainment of the primary standards. Second, states had only nine months to 
develop SIPs and submit them to the EPA for approval. Third, new stationary sources 
of emissions were to be subject to New Source Performance Standards (NSPS).  
The NSPS emphasised ‘control by technological input’ (Cook:1988:36) and they were 
intended to force polluters to develop new, but achievable technology in order to attain 
ambient standards. Alongside these standards for ‘stationary sources’, the 
subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee - 
chaired by Senator Muskie - would amend the CAA to include standards for ‘mobile 
sources’ (from cars). Muskie took standards developed by the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare for exhaust emissions for hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and 
nitrogen oxides that were due to come into effect in 1980. Muskie brought this 
deadline forward to January 1st, 1975 under the CAA, bring this closer in line with the 
deadline for attainment of the primary standards for ‘stationary sources’ later in the 
year (Bollier & Claybrook 1986:102-103). 
As further environmental regulations were developed the role of the EPA was 
expanded, and for the first time in US history, the diverse multiplicity of numerous 
environmental and polluting concerns was considered under the aegis of a single 
political object, ‘the environment’. In fact, Nixon had attempted on several occasions 
to institutionalise the relationship of energy and environmental regulation through the 
development of a joint energy and environment department, but this was continually 
rebuffed by a truculent congress, resulting in the Nixon administration implementing 
the EPA with a sole environmental remit. By 1977 seventeen new social and 
environmental regulatory agencies had been created. From 1970 to 1977 the 
aggregate budgets of these increased from an estimated 1.5 billion USD to 7.3 billion 
USD (Andrews 1984), and these new agencies oversaw more than a dozen major new 
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regulatory statutes, involving an approximate tripling of the pages in the federal register 
(Miller & Yandle 1979). 
As part of the unprecedented increase in the amount and scope of social and 
environmental regulation from 1970 onwards, the CAA was deeply unpopular with 
industries that found themselves both newly regulated, and under increasing 
international competitive pressures. Business responded to these events by lobbying 
against both individual pieces of legislation and the increase in regulation as a whole 
(Meidinger 1985:468). The “Muskie numbers” for car emissions as they were known 
were vigorously attacked by US auto makers (Bollier & Claybrook 1986:103). Of 
course, this lobbying actually began before the bill was passed, as evidenced by Lee 
Iacocca the Vice President of Ford, who warned, during the debate over the passage 
of the 1970 CAA, that if the bill were to become law US auto production could come 
to a halt after January 1st 1975. And even if production were to continue, the CAA 
would force ‘huge hikes in car prices and do irreparable damage to the American 
economy’ (Iacocca, cited in Porter and van der Linde 1995:107).  
Bailey (1998:167-168) argues that industries affected by the legislation (e.g. 
automobile, steel and energy) rapidly developed a four-pronged response to challenge 
the new legislation. First, they highlighted putative costs of compliance, following the 
auto-industry lead, and argued that air pollution controls were responsible for higher 
prices and unemployment (see also Jones 1975:248-249). Second, they advocated 
for a pro-industry stance from the Nixon administration. Nixon, ever the paragon of 
principle, immediately responded by creating the National Industrial Pollution Control 
Council (NIPCC) by executive order in 1970 under the Department of Commerce. The 
NIPCC provided privileged access to the business leaders that composed it, and in 
defiance of federal laws, was closed to non-members. It was widely seen as a back-
door for business lobbying against environmental action and immediately set about 
undermining and challenging the EPA (Andrews 1984:63). Third, affected industries 
challenged regulations in the courts, with automakers suing the EPA after a petition to 
delay emissions standards was ignored by EPA administrator William Ruckleshaus 
(Bollier & Claybrook 1986:103). Fourth, they sought to persuade Congress to amend 
the law and sympathetic legislators began to introduce amendments designed to 
weaken legislation.  
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This concerted attack on the new environmental legislation, and the newly formed 
agencies instituted to implement it, certainly achieved success in terms of deadline 
delays, at least for auto standards (Bailey 1998:168-169; Bollier & Claybrook 
1986:103), but this critical, anti-environmental backlash was rapidly overtaken by a 
new popular concern. Although not wholly swept away, the industry organised 
response to the growth of limits would have to contend with the explosive new fear of 
the limits to growth. 
The antigrowth movement 
Boulding’s Spaceship Earth launched a raft of further books and studies examining the 
relationship between economic growth and the environment. Increasing debate on and 
development of the notion of hard ecological limits to economic growth focused on the 
wasteful lifestyles of people in modern economies, and maintained that these lifestyles 
must be changed in order to safeguard the planetary ecology. As Pearce maintains, 
‘[g]radually, the unsustainable lifestyle issue became synonymous with the pursuit of 
economic growth, and the antigrowth movement was born’ (Pearce 2002:60). Within 
the economics discipline, the long-term feasibility and even desirability of economic 
growth, settled in 1963 by Barnett & Morse, was subject to attack in the wake of 
Boulding’s well-publicised work (Perez Carmona 2013: 88-89). In 1967, the British 
economist Ezra J. Mishan published The Cost of Economic Growth . Here he 48
condemned the ‘growthmania’ of economics and politicians, and with the exasperated 
air of a curmudgeon, pointed out the costs of growth: 
Our environment is sinking fast into a welter of disamenities, yet the most vocal 
part of the community cannot take their eyes from the trade figures to remark the 
painful event… In the endeavour to arrest this mass flight from reality into 
statistics, I hope to persuade the reader that the chief sources of social welfare 
are not to be found in economic growth per se, but in a far more selective form 
of development which must include a radical reshaping of out physical 
environment with the needs of pleasant living, and not the needs of traffic or 
industry, foremost in mind. (Mishan 1967:32)  
 This book expands on brief comments made by Mishan in a 1960 review of A.N. Agarwala 48
and S.P. Singh’s The Economics of Underdevelopment (1958). Here Mishan stated: ‘The 
precondition of sustained growth is sustained discontent’ (Mishan 1960:194). Although 
completed in 1965, before Boulding’s Spaceship Earth piece, Mishan was unable to find a 
publisher for The Cost of Economic Growth until 1967.
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In 1968 Paul Erhlich, who had been greatly influenced by the postwar works of 
Fairfield Osborn and William Vogt (Desrochers & Hoffbauer 2009), published The 
Population Bomb, reinvigorating a neo-Malthusian discourse concerned with 
population growth and the absolute scarcity of resources. This was followed in 1970 
by the publication of Yale University lectures given to the School of Forestry as part of 
a 1968-69 symposium on ‘Issues in Environmental crises’. Published under the 
guidance of Visiting Professor and former Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall , 49
The Environmental Crisis included contributions from Ehrlich and Kenneth Boulding - 
with the latter presenting a critique of GNP from his Spaceship Earth perspective, and 
reiterating the importance of pollution over resource exhaustion:  
Resources for the Future says, “We’re all right Jack. We’ve got a hundred years.” 
Its report points to our fossil rules and our ores, and reassures us that they will 
be adequate for a century. After that, the deluge. I would not be a bit surprised if 
we ran out of pollutable reservoirs before our mines and ores are exhausted. 
There are signs of this happening in the atmosphere, in the rivers, and in the 
oceans. (Boulding 1970:164) 
The same year that Simon Kuznets published his Economic Growth of Nations (1971), 
within the nascent field of ecology, Howard Odum’s Environment, Power and Society 
(1971) showed again the importance of waste product buildup in closed environments, 
and this aspect of pollution was located with respect to the laws of thermodynamics 
by Barry Commoner in his widely read text The Closing Circle (Odum 1971; 
Commoner 1971). Alongside these analyses, Joseph Schumpeter’s student Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen published The entropy law and the economic process (1971). 
Georgescu-Roegen’s own student, Herman E. Daly (1971), developed his notion of the 
‘stationary-state economy’ again that same year, and these attacks on ‘the economy’ 
as a dematerialised object capable of infinite growth were joined by a Cowles 
discussion paper by William D. Nordhaus and James Tobin entitled Is economic 
growth obsolete? (1971). The latter was published by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research a year later and began as follows: 
A long decade ago economic growth was the reigning fashion of political 
economy. It was simultaneously the hottest subject of economic theory and 
research, a slogan eagerly claimed by politicians of all stripes, and a serious 
objective of the policies of governments. The climate of opinion has changed 
dramatically. Disillusioned critics indict both economic science and economic 
policy for blind obeisance to aggregate material "progress," and for neglect of its 
costly side effects. Growth, it is charged, distorts national priorities, worsens the 
 Udall was Secretary of the Interior from 1960-1969.49
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distribution of income, and irreparably damages the environment. Paul Ehrlich 
speaks for a multitude when he says, "We must acquire a lifestyle which has as 
its goal maximum freedom and happiness for the individual, not a maximum 
Gross National Product." (Tobin & Nordhaus 1971:1) 
The environment and The Limits to Growth 
By the beginning of the 1970s, the concept of national efficiency and the benefit-cost 
techniques that sought to establish this as the means to evaluate federal 
environmental - particularly water - development projects, had been widely contested 
on the grounds that they failed to incorporate environmental impacts into their 
calculations. At the same time, the unforeseen side effects of the growth of the 
economy, in the form of widespread pollution, become an important matter of political 
concern, and the certainty and logic of economic growth itself - established through 
the abolition of absolute resource scarcity by economists from RFF - had come to be 
seen as the very engine of this concern. From 1966 and the publication of Boulding’s 
Spaceship Earth essay, through to the late 1970s, an increasingly vociferous counter 
narrative to the limitless growth of the economy was established within the heterodox 
economics establishment, ecology and broader academe. And to quote Fischer-
Kowalski: 
In these approaches the material and energetic flows between societies (or 
economics) and their natural environment became a major issue, governed by a 
worry that a “cowboy economy” might not be compatible with “Spaceship 
Earth”… The common picture of cultural evolution as eternal progress started to 
give way to a picture of industrial economic growth as a process that potentially 
implied the ultimate devastation of human life. This must be considered as a 
basic change in worldview, and it took hold of a wide range of intellectuals 
across many disciplines. (Fischer-Kowalski 1998:70) 
In spite of the breadth and depth of the antigrowth critique, made by well respected 
and influential scientists and economists, the late 1960s-early 1970s debate over 
growth remained a predominantly academic one (Perez-Carmona 2013:89) until it was 
brought to wider public attention with the publication in 1972 of the Club of Rome 
sponsored Limits to Growth Report (Meadows, et al. 1972). With the publication of this 
report, the antigrowth perspective became a widespread public and popular discourse 
(Arndt 1978; Hamblin 2013; McCormick 1995). The Club was an informal think tank 
comprised of thirty economists, mathematicians, engineers, natural scientists, 
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philosophers, civil servants and businessmen who had first gathered in Rome in 1968 
under the auspices of a leading manager at the firms Olivetti and Fiat, Dr Aurellio 
Peccei (Kula 1998:136). The remit of the group was to consider the future problems of 
humanity, and to this end, they commissioned the MIT systems theorist and modeller 
Jay Wright Forrester and later a team from MIT led by the young assistant professor of 
management and systems dynamics, Dennis Meadows. Forrester developed a model, 
utilising the new technology of computer simulation and capitalising on Boulding’s 
concept of the Spaceship Earth, that could examine what he and his team considered 
were the five basic factors that limit economic growth: population growth, agricultural 
activity, natural resource availability, industrial activity and pollution (Kula 1998:133). 
Using figures drawn from Kuznets’ Economic Growth of Nations and the US Bureau of 
Mines 1970 report Mineral Facts and Problems, The Limits to Growth described how 
the quality of life will decrease progressively as economic growth and population 
numbers increase, and therefore ‘…economic growth, with or without growing human 
numbers, is not only a questionable benefit, it is potentially harmful—even 
disastrous’ (Kula 1998:136). In order to save this situation, The Limits to Growth 
recommended the implementation of a series of specifically antigrowth targets, 
including: 
…30 per cent reduction in birth rates; 50 per cent reduction in pollution 
generation; 75 per cent reduction in natural resource depletion; 40 per cent 
reduction in capital formation; 20 per cent reduction in food production, as it 
fuels population growth’ (Kula 1998:135) 
The first results of the report were circulated in early 1971, and were analysed by a 
special ecological commission of the Italian senate. The Ecologist magazine released 
an advanced copy of the report in January 1972, and the final results were published 
in May 1972 to coincide with the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm. This ensured that the apocalyptic vision of the The Limits 
to Growth represented a watershed report on the grounds that it incorporated both 
resource depletion and pollution into its analysis - developing the world’s first 
integrated assessment model (Barry 2007; Calel 2011). The Club of Rome followed up 
this report with a second study, Mankind at the Turning Point (Mesarović and Pestel 
1974), which was less pessimistic than the first (Kula 1998:144), but by this time the 
limits literature had been bolstered by the popular and influential Small is Beautiful 
(1973) by the economist E. F. Schumacher, alongside collections of essays published 
!159
by Daly and Kenneth N. Townsend entitled The Steady-State Economy (1973 [1993 ) 50
and Mancur Olson’s and Hans Landsberg’s RFF sponsored collection The No-Growth 
Society (1973).  
In 1974, Nordhaus drew from both Boulding’s metaphor of cowboy economies as well 
as energy reserve figures produced by M. King Hubbert in a piece in the American 
Economic Review. Here he argued that limits theses should be taken seriously and 
that atmospheric pollutants and the greenhouse effect could constrain economic 
growth before physical scarcity would become a problem (Nordhaus 1974a). This 
overall critique was further bolstered in 1977 with the publication of Daly’s Steady-
state economics, and Mishan’s The economic growth debate. And Hubbert himself in 
1976 extended his Peak Oil Thesis to the notion of economic growth in general, 
and argued, in an essay entitled Exponential Growth as a Transient Phenomenon 
(1976[1993]) that humanity was currently in a transitional state characterised by 
exponential growth. Shifting to a sustainable no growth future required neither new 
energy or material resources or new physical and biological knowledge, but it did 
require a massive cultural shift: 
Our principal constraints are cultural. During the last two centuries we have 
known nothing but exponential growth and in parallel we have evolved what 
amounts to an exponential-growth culture, a culture so heavily dependent upon 
the continuance of exponential growth for its stability that it is incapable of 
reckoning with problems of non growth. (Hubbert 1993:125) 
On May 14th & 15th 1973 the EPA hosted a National Conference on Managing the 
Environment, held in Washington, D.C. Conceived as a forum within which the 
problems that had developed regarding the coordination of environmental 
management could be addressed by public officials and private managers. In his 
opening address to the conference, acting administrator Robert W. Fri outlined the 
central concern then vexing the EPA: 
It is particularly important to examine critically the great American shibboleth 
known as growth. It is our own special sacred cow, and in its most exaggerated 
form it makes environmental management difficult if not impossible. It is the 
antithesis of stability… We may have to make do - indeed, we must learn to 
want to make do - with smaller cars, with less energy, with recycling our wastes 
 Republished under the title Valuing the Earth (1993).50
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instead of throwing them in the city dump, and adjusting the size of our families 
to responsible norms. (EPA 1973:6-7) 
Fri went on to further develop this ecologically founded concern with the material world 
throughout his address, but ended on an upbeat note when in finishing he claimed 
that ‘I believe we will realize once again our true dependence on the biological world. 
Environmental attitudes will be built-in, so to speak, not a topic for debate or study but 
a way of life’ (EPA 1973:7). A concern with the question of growth was shared at the 
conference through the circulation of a speech delivered in October 1972 by the EPA’s 
first administrator William Ruckleshaus, who just one month before the conference had 
departed from the EPA in the wake of Nixon’s political demise. Ruckleshaus’ focus 
would similarly echo the language of closed ecological systems, spaceman economies 
and the limits to growth. Within the Spaceship Earth, the finite limits first indicated by 
Boulding, and later by the antigrowth movement popularised by the Club of Rome, 
would inadvertently take President Nixon’s ‘great question of the ’70s’ to heart, and 
place the environment fundamentally at odds with the economy (Mitchell 2011). This 
opposition would not last.  
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7. The nature of growth 
In 1975, almost exactly two years after the 1973 EPA conference, On May 12th 1975, 
the then EPA administrator and former President of the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), Russell Train gave the first pronouncement on a new concern for 
environmental regulators in a letter sent to Senator Muskie. While the Senator was still 
focused on producing stringent environmental legislation, no longer was former 
administrator Robert Fri’s concern with the harmful impact of economic growth on the 
environment the sole or even the central focus of the EPA. Instead an urgent fear of 
environmental regulations’ harmful impact on economic growth had taken hold: 
Under the existing Clean Air Act, if a national ambient air quality standard for any 
pollutant is being exceeded in an air quality control region after the attainment 
date, then no further construction or expansion of sources of that pollutant could 
be permitted in that region. This provision of law coupled with the fact that a 
substantial number of regions did not attain one or more of the standards on 
time posed a dilemma for the Committee. On the one hand, protection of the 
public health remains the predominant goal of the Clean Air Act and the 
Committee. On the other hand, a complete prohibition on new growth or 
expansion in non-attainment regions would pose very serious problems. The 
economic impact on certain urban areas of such a growth ban could be quite 
harmful (Train 1975). 
The growth ban referred to here, with the imminent May 31st deadline for US states to 
attain the air quality standards (NAAQSs) of the CAA, seemed to lay bare the inherent 
conflict between economic growth and environmental protection with the ‘regulatory 
unreasonableness’ (Bardach & Kagan, 1982) of the uniform air quality standards of the 
1970 CAA imposing an unacceptable cost burden upon America’s energy and 
manufacturing industries. The growth ban did not however, simply provide the graphic, 
real-world evidence of certain immutable economic laws on the inefficiency of 
government regulation. In spite of the claim by Pérez  Henríquez that economic 
development ‘was clearly being hampered by environmental regulation’ (2013:51), the 
reverse of this is more accurate. Where states did not meet the 1975 deadline, and 
most did not, it was the regulatory deadline that was deferred, not growth (Meidinger 
1985:453). The apparent crisis represented by the growth ban was also strangely 
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invisible to the American public, with no references being made to it in the Washington 
Post or the New York Times during the whole of the 1970s .  51
With respect to at least one aspect of growth - employment - the effects of regulation 
on both job losses at existing installations and potential jobs lost from the failure of 
new operations were likely small through the entirety of 1971-1982 (Tietenberg 
1985:95-96). In fact, if job gains within industries producing pollution control 
equipment are taken into account, the overall impact of the regulations on employment 
were positive (Portney 1981; cited in Tietenberg 1985:96). But neither is the growth 
ban simply a legitimising fiction - Rusell Train’s concern in 1975 was certainly real 
enough. As environmental economist and long time RFF associate Thomas Tietenberg 
claimed in the second edition of his highly influential Emissions trading: an exercise in 
reforming pollution policy, the 1975 deadline resulted in the still young EPA facing a 
political and industrial backlash that required serious consideration of the crucial 
question: ‘Was it possible to solve the air quality problem while allowing further 
economic growth?’ (Tietenberg 2006:7).  
In this penultimate chapter, I investigate not how this question came to be answered, 
but how it came to be seen as crucial in the first place. What would fundamentally 
change the EPA’s perspective on economic growth and environmental pollution? And 
how would Robert Fri’s core concern with the harmful impact of economic growth on 
environmental stability be converted into Russell Train’s equally urgent concern with 
environmental regulations’ harmful impact on economic growth? Here I highlight the 
importance of two transformations. In the first instance, energy, which as I showed in 
chapter 4 was settled through the 1950s and 1960s as a dematerialised, stable 
system, was suddenly made to look fragile and crisis ridden from 1969 onwards. The 
reason for this sudden fragility was fairly well recognised at the time, although this 
explanation has been evidently lost to the mists of time and the fog of economic 
obfuscation: 
 Indeed there is only one reference, in either of these papers throughout the whole of the 70s, 51
80s and 90s, and this is in 1983 in the Washington Post. Similarly, the first explicit references to 
the growth ban would not appear in the academic literature until the publication of books by 
Richard A. Liroff (1986) and Brian J. Cook (1988).
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The so-called energy crisis in the United States is nothing more or less than a 
well-coordinated attempt by the oil companies (now the “energy companies”) to 
extort higher prices and profits from the consuming public for all energy and fuel 
resources in order to maintain their profit margins, once dependent on total 
control of low-cost crude oil in the Middle East and elsewhere.’ (Stork 1975:125) 
Or, as Allan Hamilton, then treasurer of Exxon (previously Jersey Standard) made clear 
in 1972: ‘Unless and until the real nature of the crisis is understood, and profit levels 
become such that the industry is confident that its investments will bear fruit, the 
supply of energy required will not be forthcoming’ (Hamilton, cited in Stork 1975:125). 
The energy companies, newly developed over the 1960s (as detailed in the last 
chapter), were seeing their profits from oil production squeezed by the increasingly 
powerful OPEC cartel. In order to raise oil prices, while preventing a switch away from 
oil towards the other, cheaper, fuel sources that comprised the system of energy, they 
constructed a broader energy crisis. Suddenly reserve figures that had been steadily 
growing through the 1950s and 1960s peaked and started to decline.  
M. King Hubbert’s peak oil estimations for the US were suddenly accepted as the 
price of foreign oil was brought up to US prices by the OPEC embargo. Industry 
developed natural gas reserve estimations started to shrink from 1968 and coal prices 
skyrocketed due to the massive concentration and interlinkages within the new energy 
industry. As the energy crisis, manufactured to maintain high profit margins in the 
energy industry, started to impact on the growth of the US economy - already under 
pressure at the beginning of the 1970s - a second transformation was already being 
undertaken. The environment, which as I showed in chapter 5 had developed through 
the 1960s and early 1970s as the limited and closed ecosphere of Boulding and the 
antigrowth movement, was reconstructed through the effort of RFF economists. 
The sudden fragility of energy 
Beginning in 1970, a series of major US policy modifications enabled the importation 
of increasingly greater volumes of oil to the US from the Middle East. This resulted in 
the increasing price setting power of OPEC and by 1973 foreign oil prices had been 
raised to the price level of domestically produced crude and in 1973 Nixon scrapped 
the mandatory import quota system in favour of a series of tariffs (Bowden 1982:440, 
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1985:230). Just five months after the Managing the Environment Conference, On the 
16th October 1973, OPEC states decided to raise the posted price of crude oil by 70 
per cent. This action came about after a month of failed negotiations in Kuwait with the 
world’s oil companies, and was designed to restore tax rates that had been eroded 
over the previous two years by rising oil prices and high inflation rates. The next day, 
Arab gulf states announced a 5 per cent reduction in the production of their oil in 
response to the US’ obstructive role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, production 
was to be reduced by 5 per cent a month until Israel removed its forces from the 
territories occupied in the June 1967 war. As Mitchell notes (2011:184-185), these two 
separate events are frequently run together as the ‘OPEC embargo’ or oil crisis of 
1973-1974, and while the actual impact this had, if any, on the overall supply of 
petroleum and petroleum products to the US is difficult to gauge with any certainty 
(Mitchell 2011:175), the impact on the psyche of US and Western consumers is well 
known. As the supply from Arab states was reduced the oil price rose, and the US 
economy - already under pressure from the ongoing cost of the Vietnam war, the 
increasing US trade deficit since 1967, and the breakdown in the postwar Bretton 
Woods agreement in 1971 - saw its growth stall.  
Enormous queues for petrol at the pumps in the US, and daily price hikes against a 
background of inflation and economic slowdown delivered an object and indeed abject 
lesson on both the principles of neoclassical economics and oil politics to the 
American people (Mitchell 2011:173). But these lessons did not just arrive on the back 
of what would later be characterised as Arab intransigence. Instead they should be 
seen as part of a concerted effort by oil producers and the Nixon and Ford 
administrations to reconstruct energy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At this point, 
energy was converted from a stable system - removed from its particular mineral 
components through the work of the Paley commission, RFF economists in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and materially through the conversion of the oil companies themselves into 
energy companies - into one that was increasingly fragile, vulnerable, and from 1969, 
in crisis. 
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The energy crisis 
The head of the Federal Power Commission (FPC), John Nassikas predicted in 
testimony before the Senate Interior Committee on November 13th 1969, that the 
country was facing a deepening natural gas crisis, and that the policies of the FPC 
should be redesigned to enable greater levels of production (Stork 1975:129). But by 
the 10th August 1970, Nassikas would give a speech at the National Press Club that 
publicly announced the arrival of not just of a natural gas supply crisis, but of ‘The 
National Energy Crisis’. Nassikas informed his audience that the previous two years of 
electrical shortages suffered by large US cities, were due, not simply to delays in 
installing power generation and transmission facilities, but to an overall lack of fuel. 
Nassikas went on to warn that the nation could shortly be headed for energy rationing, 
including the potential necessity of manufacturing stoppages, and he maintained that 
the long-term solution to this crisis lay with the development of nuclear power. In the 
short term however, he recommended that government regulation, including that 
focused on anti-trust issues, would have to be relaxed (Mitchell 2011:177-178). 
In chapter four we saw how the oil industry developed into the energy industry in part 
through the international oil companies purchasing controlling interests in the 
competing energy sources of coal, nuclear, gas and even geothermal. This increased 
the concentration of energy resources in the hands of a relatively small number of the 
new energy companies. This allowed these companies greater leeway with respect to 
price setting and manipulation (Stork 1975:123), and precipitated the natural gas 
crisis, which began in 1968, when the oil industry decided to remove the control of 
natural gas prices by Nassikas’ organisation, the FPC (Stork 1975:125).  
Thirty years previously, in 1938, Congress passed the Natural Gas Act. Covering the 
inter-state transportation and sale of natural gas, it required that the rates charged be 
‘…just and reasonable, non-discriminatory, and publicly posted’ (Stork 1975:125). 
1954 saw the Supreme Court rule that the FPC had jurisdiction over sales by 
producers to instate pipelines under the Act. As Stork highlights (1975:125-126), the 
FPC’s attempt determined on a company-by-company basis a ‘cost-plus-fair-return’ 
massively overwhelmed the administrative capacity of the agency, and subsequently 
prices began to be approved without much regard to their reasonableness. In an 
attempt to rectify this state of affairs and cap the resultant spiralling gas prices, the 
!166
FPC initiated in the early 1960s an ‘area rate method’, whereby aggregate data on gas 
production costs for a regional area were generated, and then used to determine a 
cost-plus-12 percent price rate for all producers in that area. This pricing regime was 
challenged in court by industry, but was upheld by the Supreme court in 1968, 
although it would be increased to a rate of cost-plus-15 percent. This was not enough.  
Natural gas producers - largely owned by the oil industry argued that government 
price regulation at the producing end on the basis of cost-plus-15 percent did not 
provide a large enough incentive for companies to explore for and develop new 
reserves in order to meet growing demand (Stork 1975:127). At this point a sudden 
change occurred in the gas reserves estimations. Industry figures began to show that 
annual production was now exceeding annual additions to reserves and that the 
reserves/production ratio had declined from a range of 15 to 19 per cent in the mid 
1960s to 11.3 percent in 1971. In 1967 year end gas reserves were measured at a 
high of 289.3 trillion cubic feet (TCF), but these had dropped by 14.5 per cent to only 
247.4 TCF by 1971. These figures were produced by the American Gas Association 
(AGA) - the industry body. There were no independent government gas reserves 
figures, and neither were the reserve figures open to inspection by the FPC. The lack 
of transparency was maintained here on the grounds that the figures were confidential 
and proprietary - an obviously specious claim, given that rival gas production 
companies were not restricted from using the figures, and the AGA personnel who 
compiled these were in the employ of the various gas producers themselves.  
As Stork argued as early as 1975, there was no evidence to suggest that the natural 
gas crisis was anything other than an industry contrivance designed to increase prices. 
Gas reserve figures dropped inexplicably at the beginning of 1968, then continued 
their downward trajectory after this point, and this bore no relation to drilling efforts 
whatsoever. Stork notes that in southern Louisiana and other prime producing 
locations there was more successful well footage drilled in 1969 than in any year since 
1962 (1975:128), and as FTC antitrust chief James Halverson stated with respect to 
industry figures in testimony before the Senate Antitrust Monopoly Subcommittee in 
1973: 
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…the estimates of proved reserves for a given lease that are reflected in in-house 
reports… were primarily used for tax purposes, have been found to be lower 
than the estimates of proved reserves that are used for other in-house purposes 
such as decisions whether to build a drilling platform on a tract or to sell reserves 
to a pipeline company. (Halverson 1973, cited in Stork 1975:129) 
Moreover, companies argued that the FPC mechanisms resulted in natural gas being 
sold at too low a price, thereby encouraging wasteful use, and hastening the supply 
‘crisis’ that Nassikas had predicted four years earlier: 
I predicted on November 13, 1969, at the first policy hearing on natural gas 
before the Senate Interior Committee, that there was a deepening gas crisis, that 
we had to do something about it, and that policies of the FPC should be 
designed to elicit more supply of gas, better allocate resources, and to amend its 
policies of pre-existing Commissions to meet these objectives. (Nassikas 1973, 
cited in Stork 1975:129) 
The something that the Nixon White House, Interior Department and FPC chose to do 
about it, was a de facto deregulation of gas prices. Producers were allowed to 
increase prices without challenge, authorised by FPC staff and legal counsel with 
conflicts of interest so manifest as to border on parody . 52
Energy price rises 
The oil industry wanted to increase energy prices across the board however, and so 
the fuel crisis rapidly spread. With respect to coal prices, these were stable between 
1960 and 1965, but due to increasing demand by the electric utility sector prices had 
risen 22 per cent above the 1960 level by 1969. However, following the oil industry’s 
expansion into coal and the mergers and acquisitions that took place in the mid-to-late 
1960s, coal prices had risen by 60 per cent and over 100 percent in some US states 
just one year later (Stork 1975:123-124). This massive hike in prices bore the mark of 
the oil companies’ disdain for market forces and the economists’ laws of supply and 
demand. Between 1969 and 1970 production increased only 5 percent and total 
 e.g. FPC commissioner Rush Moody and general counsel Gordon Gooch were both former 52
lawyers at Houston law firms whose major clients were the very same oil companies they were 
now in charge of regulating (through their ownership of gas production). See Stork 
(1975:129-131).
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steam consumption had increased only 1.6 percent (Stork 1975:124). It was clear that 
an increase in demand relative to supply was not driving coal prices steadily upwards, 
and as an economic analysis by the antitrust division of the FTC concluded at the time: 
‘the sharp increases in coal prices in 1970 were made primarily to enhance the profits 
of the coal companies or their parents.’ (cited in Stork 1975: 124). At the same time as 
they were inflating prices through the fiction of a supply shortfall, the energy 
companies were restructuring the coal market from spot and short-term sales to long-
term contracts at prices reflecting this fictional coal shortage (Stork 1975:124). 
A further way in which the oil industry helped stoke an apparent crisis in energy 
production was through the increase in estimates of future demand (Mitchell 
2011:180). This was undertaken through the US National Petroleum Council’s (NPC) 
inflated estimation of future energy consumption in 1972 (de Marchi 1981:408; Mitchell 
2011:180). The Interior Department had requested this report from the NPC, and here 
the Council predicted that the US’ primary energy consumption would double to 125 
quadrillion BTUs by 1985. The actual energy consumption for 1985 was 76.4 
quadrillion BTUs . After the 1973-74 oil embargo, similarly inflated estimates would be 53
produced by the Federal Energy Administration’s (FEA) ‘Project Independence’ 
research group, and I will go into more detail about ‘Project Independence’ and its 
impact later in the chapter.  
It was against this backdrop that the large international oil companies could safely 
begin to raise prices in order to offset losses due to the increasing mobilisation of 
OPEC nations , without fear of a disruptive shift to alternate energy sources by 54
municipal governments, manufacturing and federal government policy. Subsequently, 
the 1973 oil embargo would result in a windfall that not even the oil industry had 
expected, quadrupling the price of oil by 1974 and far exceeding the highest price 
predicted by the NPC in 1972 (Bowden 1985:230). What the industry also didn’t 
expect was the popular and political backlash against this windfall. The energy née oil 
industry was suddenly forced to justify these prices rises, and it did this through a 
rehabilitation of Hubbert’s Peak Oil Thesis. In 1971, oil companies abruptly abandoned 
 Figures from United States Energy Information Administration. Available at: http://53
www.eia.gov/beta/MER/?tbl=T01.01#/?f=A.
 which at the end of the 1960s now also included Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya 54
(1962), the United Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969).
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their previous cornucopian estimates, and in line with Hubbert, and following the 
approach they had already taken with respect to natural gas reserve estimates they 
began forecasting the end of oil (Bowden 1985; Mitchell 2011:189). This abrupt shift 
was made possible as increasing OPEC price control and the impact of the embargo 
on global oil prices meant that the oil majors were no longer reliant upon the types of 
domestic US price support that I detailed in chapter 4. The shift was also made 
necessary as continued large reserve estimates undermined the ability of the oil 
industry to justify its high prices (Bowden 1985:230-231).  
A clear example of this shift took place in March 1974, when Vincent McKelvey, then 
chief geologist at the United States Geological Survey (USGS) released a new estimate 
of oil reserves to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. McKelvey was, 
as I showed in chapter 4, an advocate of price-based reserves calculations in 
opposition to Hubbert, and leaked an anonymous USGS report in 1963 which 
estimated US reserves figures at 590 billion barrels, three times greater than 
Hubbert’s contemporaneous estimate of 200 billion. Although McKelvey’s 1974 
estimate was lower than his previous figures, it was still immediately and publicly 
challenged in a letter by John Moody, the then Vice President of Mobil Oil. Moody, 
who sent copies of his letter to influential Senators, the National Academy of 
Science and the Journal Science, alleged that McKelvey’s figures were ten times 
higher than any that could be justified by Mobil.  
The public uproar that followed resulted in the development of a conference later 
that year by the National Academy of Science’s Panel on Estimation of Mineral 
Resources. Here, the Academy would follow the oil industry’s new, lower estimates 
and in September of 1974, the USGS produced new estimations, in line with other, 
lower estimates made that year (Bowden 1985:223). In 1977, the incoming Carter 
administration would unusually force the resignation of McKelvey. The following 
week Hubbert would be given the prestigious Rockefeller Public Service Award for his 
persistence in attempting to bring the ‘energy crisis to public attention’ (Bowden 
1985:211) 
Eight months before he would write to Senator Muskie proclaiming the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s new concern with the effect of the air quality provisions of the 
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1970 CAA, Russell Train addressed the New York Chamber of Commerce on the 3rd 
October 1974. In this address, Train clearly recognised the energy crisis, but even in 
front of an audience for which you might have expected the administrator of the EPA 
to soft-pedal an antigrowth environmental message, he did not do so. He took pains 
to highlight that the EPAs environmental programmes were not costly and not drivers 
of inflation, but that ‘[i]n no small measure, our energy, environmental and economic 
problems reflect the fact that we are living beyond our means’ (Train 1974). That is, the 
concurrent energy and environmental crises were still taken to represent the outcome 
of an unalloyed focus on growth, and: ‘[a]bove all, we must develop new values which 
match the new needs of our times, values which recognize that growth simply for the 
sake of growth is no longer enough - that we must find ways to nourish our physical 
needs while promoting the quality of our lives' (Train, 1974).  
What is clear here is that while the apparent fragility of the energy system is 
recognised, the goal of environmental protection is not fully reconciled with the goal of 
economic growth. This would be undertaken however, through the further spread of 
the tools of economic valuation of the environment, benefit-cost analysis, the 
development of the economic theory of Materials Balance and the construction of the 
discipline of environmental economics predominantly by RFF funded scholarship. 
The environment of economics 
In the early 1970s, the economic discipline’s response to the social and political 
upheavals of the time was in danger, as Joan Robinson’s 1971 Presidential address to 
the American Economics Association made clear, of rendering the profession an 
irrelevance (Robinson 1972). The new environmental regulation was perceived as 
having shut out economists and economic analyses from the burgeoning field of 
environmental policy implementation through the development of the EPA (Braadbaart 
1998:138–139). Alongside this, the increasing propensity for intricate theoretical 
models with little real world basis, or as David Pearce put it in 2002 with respect to 
growth theory, ‘elegant if demanding treatises’ (Pearce 2002:59), combined with the 
depredations of a popular environmental movement that attacked precisely the 
discipline’s sovereign ground - economic growth. The fear of irrelevance would not last 
for long however. In fact, developments in environmental valuation from the middle of 
the 1960s had, at the beginning of the 1970s, been brought together under the rubric 
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of the Materials Balance approach which would form the basis of the nascent 
discipline of environmental economics. 
Water quality and the expansion of economic valuation 
As I argued in the last chapter, there was a critical examination of large-scale water 
resource projects by conservationists throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and here the 
Bureau of the Budget’s mandated focus on national efficiency - in an attempt to curtail 
‘pork-barrel’ spending at the state and regional level - resulted in benefit-cost analysis 
being cast as a villainous and anti-environmental technique. However, rather than 
simply undermining this particular economic technology the conservationist backlash 
would itself spur the rapid development of the theoretical benefit-cost literature, where 
this development focused on the inclusion of environmental impacts as potential 
benefits or costs within the scope of benefit-costs analysis, and which maintained that; 
‘[i]n principle, the influence of a market might be simulated, to a first approximation, by 
introducing a set of shadow (or virtual) prices’ (Ayres & Kneese1969:291). These virtual 
prices were intended then to value environmental goods, and allow their 
commensurability with other goods under a common (monetary) unit of measurement. 
That is, there was a shift from considerations of pure economic efficiency to the 
broader economic valuation of the environment.  
In 1965, the Harvard Water Program came to a close, after publishing its major output 
two years earlier (Maass 1962). RFF however, would respond in a different way to the 
conservationist challenge. In 1960, John Krutilla, who was then co-director of RFFs 
Water Resources Program with RFF president Irving Fox, hired Alan V. Kneese, 
assistant Professor at the University of New Mexico, to help develop a new research 
stream at RFF focused on water quality. This programme, responding to the criticisms 
of large dam projects, and the growing awareness of pollution issues in general, would 
be central to the development of a large and growing literature and commentary on 
the application of benefit-cost techniques beyond simple national efficiency. The new 
techniques developed in this literature enabled the quantification and economic 
valuation of an ever growing set of environmental benefits and costs, and Hanley & 
Spash (1993) identified three particular means of valuing the environment that were 
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initiated during the mid-to-late 1960s: The Travel Cost Method, Hedonic Pricing and 
Contingent Valuation. 
The Travel Cost Method or ‘Clawson-Knetsch approach’ (Hanley & Spash 1993:83) is 
an attempt to value non-market environmental goods by measuring consumption 
behaviour in related markets and using these as a proxy. This was actually first 
developed by Harold Hotelling in a 1947 paper for the Prewitt report, commissioned by 
the U.S. National Parks Service. The purpose of the Prewitt report was to establish the 
worth of national parks which had no entrance fees, and Hotelling’s method overcame 
the problem (of economic valuation, in the absence of entrance fees), by drawing on 
the differential distances travelled by visitors to the park, and therefore the differential 
costs associated with this travel. By treating travel costs as prices, Hotelling 
constructed a demand curve for recreational visits to a park where the area under the 
curve represented an estimate of the total consumer surplus that accrued to park 
visitors.  
While Hotelling’s paper first established this approach, it was ignored by the Parks 
Service. Indeed, the other contributors to the report agreed that the problem of the 
economic valuation of National Parks could not in fact be solved (Pearce 2002:66-67; 
Porter 1995:181). However, Hotelling’s method was rehabilitated over a decade later 
when it was incorporated into a 1958 study of the recreational uses of the Feather 
River in California (Trice & Wood 1958) and subsequently by two RFF research papers 
by Marion Clawson (1959) and Clawson and Jack Knetsch (1966). In their 1966 book 55
Economics of Outdoor Recreation Clawson and Knetsch emphasised the 
development of methods and data required to measure the impact of environmental 
improvements with respect to outdoor recreation (Hanley & Spash 1993:6), and 
established the Travel Cost Method as a means to quantify the benefits of the new 
reservoirs created by the big dam projects of the mid 1930s through to the mid 1960s.  
 Clawson was an early member of RFF, joining the staff in 1955 after roles in the Department 55
of Agriculture’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the 1930s and 1940s, and then running the 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management from the late 1940s to the early ’50s.
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Hedonic Pricing, like the Travel Cost Method, is what is known as a ‘revealed 
preference’ technique. This refers to an individual’s preferences for a non-market good 
being revealed through the inspection of other markets (Pearce 2002:67), frequently 
using land and housing market prices. In contrast to the Travel Cost Method however, 
Hedonic Pricing ‘identifies environmental service flows as elements of a vector of 
characteristics describing a marketed good, typically housing.’ (Hanley & Spash 
1993:74). It derives from the ‘characteristics theory of value’ developed initially by 
Lancaster (1966) and assumes that the ‘vector of characteristics’ can be 
deconstructed in such a way as to isolate the environmental variable of interest. Early 
uses of Hedonic Pricing with respect to air pollution were undertaken by Ridker (1967) 
and Ridker & Henning (1967) and later Anderson & Crocker  (1971). Ridker (1967) 56
was the first to establish a link between property prices and air pollution levels in a 
study based in in St. Louis, Missouri. Undertaking a regression analysis on factors 
determining property prices, the figure Ridker obtained was the coefficient on air 
pollution (Pearce 2002:67). 
The Contingent Valuation Method was originally proposed by Robert K. Davis, also at 
RFF, in 1963, in the Natural Resources Journal (Davis 1963). This brief paper 
summarised work from Davis’ Harvard University PhD, submitted that same year. In 
short, Contingent Valuation involves directly questioning a sample of the consumers of 
a particular environmental service in order to determine how much they would either 
be willing to pay, or how much financial compensation they would be willing to accept 
for a specific change in the level of that service (Davis 1963; Hanley & Spash 1993:53). 
Contingent Valuation differs from the revealed preference methods of Travel Cost and 
Hedonic Pricing in that it purports to enable non-use values to be captured. That is, 
the utility derived from the existence of a recreational resource can be determined, 
even if the individual questioned does not actually avail themselves of that resource. 
This approach was further expounded and clarified by John V. Krutilla’s (1967) 
influential paper Conservation Reconsidered (Hanley & Spash 1993:5; Saxon 2003). 
As I outlined in the last chapter, Krutilla was central to the the late 1950s translation of 
the prosaic water-resource technology of benefit-cost analysis into welfare economics 
 Thomas Crocker would go on to make an important contribution to the economic theory of 56
pollution trading.
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- thereby enabling it to be made portable and moved to other areas of the federal 
government. In Conservation Reconsidered, Krutilla, as well as popularising the 
technique, was the first to include non-use values of an environmental amenity as part 
of an opportunity cost of the development (Pearce 2002:70; Hanley & Spash 
1993:66). 
The application and use of each of these valuation methods is anything but clearcut, 
and has indeed been widely contested , but what these methods highlight is that a 57
series of technical innovations to benefit-cost were undertaken during the 1960s in an 
attempt to put a price on previously unvalued aspects of the environment. These 
changes were, at least initially, largely undertaken by RFF economists and scholars 
associated with the organisation, and the expansion of valuation techniques were 
produced within the new Water Quality Program established by Alan Kneese, John 
Krutilla and Irving Fox. This shift from a focus on water quantity to water quality, and 
the attempt to include a wide raft of previously unquantifiable environmental ‘goods’ 
into benefit-cost analysis was largely undertaken in response to the initial 
conservationist backlash against benefit-cost techniques that had railed against the 
sole use of a national efficiency criterion as the means to justify or disqualify water 
projects. 
Alongside this, the burgeoning environmental movement and increasing concern with 
pollution issues also drove the expansion of benefit-cost techniques through the 
inclusion of polluting effects as costs. This expanding literature became increasingly 
widely used throughout the federal government as a means to identify previously 
unquantified benefits and costs of environmental development projects. This both 
reinforced an understanding of the pervasive impact of the growth of the economy on 
the environment that arose with Carson’s Silence, Boulding’s Spaceship and then the 
Club of Rome’s Limits, but at the same time began the rehabilitation of the economic 
concept of externalities. The new valuation techniques provided an ever growing 
corpus of quantified environmental externalities, while simultaneously helping to 
reinforce both the apparent validity and practical utility of both benefit-cost analyses 
and economics in general, to resource and environmental issues.  
 e.g. Adler & Posner 2001; Campen 1986; Sagoff 1990, 2004; Hanley & Spash 1993, 57
Lohmann 2009.
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Allen Kneese and Blair Bower published Managing Water Quality in 1968, which 
represented a comprehensive report of the RFF’s Water Quality Program and 
presented a broad spectrum economic analysis of water projects within the overall US 
multiple-purpose water development programme (Kneese, 2011). This included use of 
the expanded environmental valuation techniques in order to quantify externalities, and 
justify least cost and economic efficiency perspectives. A year after this 
comprehensive assessment of water programmes, Kneese would, with the physicist 
Robert U. Ayres, present a new economic approach to not just water, but the 
environment in general, that would further rehabilitate an economic approach to the 
environment. 
Materials balance and pollution as externality  
In a paper entitled Production, Consumption, and Externalities, that first appeared in 
the American Economic Review, Robert U. Ayres and Allen V. Kneese (1969) 
presented their materials balance approach to the economic analysis of pollution. This 
approach was the first outcome from a new research programme focusing on 
environmental quality generally, directed by Kneese at RFF; and would be presented 
more fully in an RFF report entitled Economics and the Environment: A Materials 
Balance Approach (with Ralph C. D’Arge from the University of California) in 1970. The 
development of a broad programme on environmental quality for both Kneese and 
RFF is both indicative of, and formed a core component of, the new discipline of 
environmental economics from its resource-focused base at this time. Indeed, 
Economics and the Environment was in the vanguard of a slew of new texts, many 
driven by RFF research, that focused on precisely this - the economics of the 
environment (Pearce 2002, p. 59-60; Lane 2012). The Materials Balance approach 
also presented the basis for what, in the 1990s, would be carried out as material flow 
analyses of national economies (Fischer-Kowalski 1998:71). 
More specifically, the Materials Balance approach itself should be seen as a response 
to the 1966 RFF forum on environmental quality organised by Allen Kneese and 
detailed in the last chapter. There he raised concerns about the lack of progress in the 
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application of welfare economics principles to environmental concerns, and 
importantly, the 1969 and 1970 Materials Balance texts take as their starting points 
the critiques of mainstream economic thought raised by E.J. Mishan and Kenneth 
Boulding respectively. In order to revivify the economic approach to the environment, 
which the publication of Boulding’s thesis had helped throw into malingering doubt, 
Ayres & Kneese argued that the mainstream welfare economic perspective on 
externalities was wrong, and that these were indeed not the ‘freakish 
anomalies’ (1969:287) they had previously been supposed in the academic literature.  
Following the work of Kapp (1950) the Materials balance approach showed that when 
the flow of materials through an entire economy, with inputs in the form of material 
resources and outputs in the form of final goods and ultimately residuals (pollutants), is 
considered, externalities are not exceptional but rather inherent to the economic 
process (Perez-Carmona 2013:89). Drawing from Ayres’ experience as a physicist, 
and in line with the development of thermodynamic metaphors within the developing 
ecology literature, they argued that the economics discipline had failed to view 
production and consumption processes in a way that was consistent with the laws of 
the conservation of mass (Ayres & Kneese 1969:283). Following this, they claimed that 
uncompensated externalities must arise unless (1) all inputs are converted into outputs 
with the production of residuals; (2) all final outputs were utterly destroyed in the 
process of consumption; or (3) property rights are applied to all relevant aspects of the 
environment and these are subject to exchange in competitive markets. None of these 
conditions could be expected to hold as nature does not allow the destruction of 
matter, yet standard economic theory expects material objects to disappear into the 
void upon final consumption (Ayres & Kneese 1969:283-284; Fischer Kowalski 
1998:71). 
This understanding of externalities is wedded to a version of the Walras-Cassel general 
equilibrium model in order to formally display ‘the “pervasiveness” of externalities 
associated with interrelationships between production, consumption, and 
environmental sectors when environmental (common property) resources are scarce 
and therefore have economic value but no price’ (Kneese, Ayres & D’Arge 
1970:82-83). They further incorporate the Materials Balance approach into a simplified 
model of the economy in order to show that such an approach can enable Pareto-
optimal and therefore economically efficient operation by every sector defined (Kneese, 
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Ayres & D’Arge 1970:102-103). The purpose of the Materials Balance approach was 
to develop a theoretical consideration of residuals production by and within the 
economy, and as Fischer Kowalski maintains: 
this contribution by Ayres and Kneese (1969) became a starter to a research 
tradition capable of portraying the material and energetic metabolism of 
advanced industrial economies. It was not “man” any more who was materially 
and energetically linked to nature, but a complex, well-defined social system 
(Fischer Kowalski 1998:72). 
What Fischer Kowalski refers to as a ‘well-defined social system’ is in fact the 
economy, established as an independent entity as I showed in chapter 3. Kneese, 
Ayres and D’Arge would later make this explicit: ‘The dollar flow governs and is 
governed by a combined flow of materials and services (value added)’ (Kneese, Ayres 
& D’arge 1974:54; cited in Fischer Kowalski 199872). What is interesting here is that at 
the same time as they recognise the material basis of the economy - an object that 
has been twice divorced from the environment: first through the application of relative 
price scarcity and the undermining of absolute resource limits, then through the 
development of energy as a system of interchangeable, and because of this, 
inexhaustible fuels - the notion of the environment is itself reconstructed. 
Environmental pollution, understood by Boulding as a pervasive problem of unlimited 
economic growth within a limited or finite global ecosystem, and therefore an issue 
fundamentally outside of the remit of mainstream economics, is reconstructed as an 
issue of economic externalities. Pollution is no longer the result of economic growth, 
but rather of a failure to adequately price an environment that does not allow the 
absolute destruction of matter upon economic consumption.  
The rehabilitation of the welfare economics concept of externalities within the Materials 
Balance approach, and the synthesis of this with a general equilibrium model of the 
economy had the effect of bringing pervasive pollution fully in line with the economic 
theory of externalities. In doing so, this undermined the opposition of the environment 
and the economy central to Boulding’s Spaceship Earth and The Limits to Growth 
approach and heralded the development of a fully fledged environmental economics, 
replete with a new understanding of the environment. This understanding crucially took 
the concerns highlighted by Boulding and the nascent anti-growth movement and yet 
translated them into a form that helped to secure the economy once more as a central 
matter of political concern. This defused the conflict between the environment and the 
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economy by undertaking a timely volte face on the environment and market failure. No 
longer is environmental pollution the clear indicator of the failure of markets and of a 
focus on economic growth. Rather, it is due to market failure - pollution results when 
markets are not implemented in order to adequately price the environment . 58
The Materials Balance approach spread rapidly through both the discipline of 
economics and the wider policy making consciousness - the latter through its easy 
association with Garrett Hardin’s highly influential Tragedy of the Commons argument 
in the journal Nature (Hardin 1968). Kneese himself, who was a well-known figure 
amongst Washington’s environmental policymakers also enabled this spread, due to 
his frequent appearances before Congress at environmental hearings, and from 1972 
via his relationship with Senator Peter Domenici and his staff, who was a member of 
the Senate’s environmental affairs subcommittee (Kelman 1981:21). Further work in 
this vein was sponsored by RFF (e.g. Bohm and Kneese 1971), and by December of 
1970, Materials Balance was referred to by Robert Solow as ‘the economist’s 
approach to pollution’ - which was the title of his vice-presidential address at the 
annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 
Chicago (Solow 1971).  
The economics of the new environment 
Alan Kneese testified before a congressional committee on ‘The Environmental 
decade’ in 1970. Here he clearly espoused the environmental economics position, and 
argued that environmental and natural resource policy should be based on the sole 
criterion of economic efficiency (Sagoff 1990:3). Kneese began his testimony by 
outlining the approach that he saw as opposing his, namely, that there is a need for a 
new morality or ethic of the natural, and the development of a new set of values in 
order to avoid environmental despoliation. For Kneese, these claims simply show a 
‘lack of understanding of what some of the central problems are.’ (Kneese 1970:191; 
cited in Sagoff 1990:4). Problems in fact arise, argued Kneese, because of the lack of 
property rights with respect to environmental resources: 
 Robert Ayres would actually come to recant this position later in his career, see e.g. Ayres 58
(1996; 2001).
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Our usual method for limiting the use of resources and leading them to their 
highest productivity employments is the process which are established in 
markets through exchanges between buyers and sellers. For common property 
resources this mechanism does not function…This idea has been well developed 
in the economics literature. (Kneese 1970:192; cited in Sagoff 1990:5)  
The answer? internalise these environmental externalities in order to correct for market 
failures. The theoretical development of the Materials Balance approach by RFF 
economists enabled the economics profession as a whole to reassert its providence 
over issues of environmental regulation in the US, and to undermine the concept of the 
environment as bounded by finite limits. These developments would help open the 
door to economic approaches to pollution control. The first through this door was a 
group of scientists, environmentalists and pressure groups that went by the name of 
‘The Coalition to Tax Pollution’. Formed in July 1971 and comprised of, amongst 
others, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth and the 
Federation of American Scientists, the coalition would press for an explicitly economic 
response to environmental issues.  
Drawing on the concept of externalities in their initial press release, they noted that: ‘It 
will be necessary to make the economic self-interest of polluters consistent with the 
goal of a clean environment if we are to achieve this objective.’(The Coalition to Tax 
Pollution, cited in Heller 1972:24). This was followed in 1972 by a document published 
by the coalition outlining evidence from economists on the economic efficiency, vis a 
vis current regulations, of a sulfur tax. Not just any economists were included here, but 
alongside Allen Kneese were the hugely influential Kenneth Arrow, Milton Friedman, 
Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, James Tobin, and the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisors (CEA).  
The call for the internalisation of externalities by the Coalition to Tax Pollution did not 
have an immediate impact in the US, despite both the broad range and prestige of its 
members. In 1973 however, the US Water Resource Council would issue a revised 
criteria document Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land 
Resources (1973) that combined the fundamental commensurability of the 
environment and the economy as developed through the notion of externalities in 
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Materials Balance, with the expansion of environmental valuation initiated largely by 
RFF scholars from the mid-1960s. This document established environmental quality as 
a coequal objective alongside economic efficiency for water development projects 
(Andrews 1984: 47; Campen 1986:18-19), and represented for the first time a multi-
objective framework for environmental project evaluation beyond just a focus on 
national efficiency.  
Although the reconstruction of the environment through the economic theory of 
Materials Balance conceptually undermined the conflict between economic growth 
and environmental sustainability here, in terms of formal economic evaluation through 
benefit-cost analysis, the OMB still insisted in 1973 on a separation of the objective of 
‘national economic development’ from issues of environmental quality, with the latter 
being included as ‘accounts’ rather than objectives (Andrews 1984:47; Campen 
1986:19). 
Alongside the formation of economic pressure groups and the reconstruction of 
benefit-cost analysis, an entire sub-discipline, environmental economics, developed at 
this point from its initial beginnings in the work of RFF economists (Pearce 2002). A 
series of foundational texts in the discipline were produced between 1970 and 1975, 
and illustrating its continued centrality, several of these were published under the 
auspices of, or involved staff members RFF. After Kneese, Ayres and d’Arge elucidated 
the Materials Balance approach in their Economics and the Environment (1970), an 
important reader would be produced (Dorfman & Dorfman 1972), shortly followed by a 
slew of influential texts (e.g. Seneca & Taussig, 1974; Baumol & Oates 1975; Kneese & 
Schultze, 1975) . 1974 saw the publication of the first issue of the new discipline’s 59
dedicated journal, the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
(JEEM) . This was also when initial empirical analyses were published. These 60
compared, via benefit-cost analysis, the putative economic impacts of environmental 
regulatory policies established through econometric models (e.g. Atkinson and Lewis, 
1974).  
 see Kelman (1981) and Gareau & DuPuis 2009).59
 And in fact the journal was run out of RFF’s Washington D.C. headquarters.60
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The texts would draw a clear distinction between the goals of environmental regulation 
and the means or instruments of reaching these goals. Baumol and Oates (1975) was 
particularly important here in enabling the reestablishment of the role of economics in 
environmental policy (Kula 1998:99). Their text devotes a chapter to the question of 
how incentive mechanisms can be used to achieve efficiency without optimality. This 
draws from the approach to cost-effectiveness analysis established by Roland N. 
McKean in his operations research text, Efficiency in Government Through Systems 
Analysis (1958), and then applied through government in the form of PPB. McKean’s 
distinction between means and ends, further espoused by Baumol and Oates, allowed 
economic tools, and crucially, economists, to engage with the development of 
environmental policy forms, where they were previously considered explicitly 
illegitimate with respect to environmental regulation, as the CAA primary air quality 
standards and their basis in health, not economic concerns, indicates.  
In the early 1970s then, the development and spread of a Materials Balance approach 
to the environment, and the subsequent development of environmental economics, 
enabled the economics discipline to rebut Joan Robinson’s concern regarding the 
irrelevance of the discipline. At the same time, the economic technology of benefit-
cost analysis became increasingly entrenched within federal government and with the 
expansion of environmental valuation methods would also help reconstruct the 
environment and environmental pollution as inadequately internalised externalities. This 
would have the effect of rather rapidly re-sacralizing economic growth, which arose 
resplendent like a phoenix from the antigrowth movement’s sackcloth and ashes, and 
became once again what Robert Fri termed in 1973 the ‘great American shibboleth’ 
the thing that for the Paley Commission, is ‘just better to the western mind’. 
The new limits to growth 
In April 1971, Sam Schurr, who was at this point the Director of RFF’s Energy and 
Minerals Program, would head up a two day public forum in Washington, organised by 
the think tank on Energy, Economic Growth, and the Environment. As Schurr noted in 
his introduction to the RFF book which followed in 1972: 
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The plans for the Resources for the Future public forum at which these papers 
were originally presented were guided by an acute awareness of the apparent 
conflict that has been emerging between two societal objectives that are both of 
prime importance: providing energy to meet the needs of future economic 
growth and protecting the quality of the natural environment.’ (Schurr 1972:vii) 
The merely ‘apparent’ nature of this conflict would become clear early on in the forum 
as the issue of economic growth was broached as a bedrock concern and central to 
the energy-environment debate (Schurr 1972:vii). Aside from establishing economic 
provenance over environmental issues, pollution and natural resources, Materials 
Balance would enable the Limits to Growth thesis of the Club of Rome to be broadly 
attacked and ridiculed by mainstream economists and economic commentators. 
Moreover, it would enable the environment and the newly fragile system of energy to 
be put together in such a way as to allow the blame for higher energy prices to be 
shifted onto not just OPEC countries, as Mitchell notes (2011), but onto federal 
regulation undertaken in order to safeguard the environment and reduce pollution - 
specifically the 1970 CAA with its imminent 1975 deadline for the attainment of its 
primary standards - and thus help to directly develop the growth ban. 
Energy, economy, and the new limits to growth 
Among the participants at RFF’s Energy, Economic Growth, and the Environment 
forum was Walter W. Heller. Heller, as outlined in chapter 3, had previously been 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), and was charged with fulfilling 
Kennedy’s 5 per cent annual growth promise under his New Frontier. He had also 
been a consultant, from 1965-1969, to the executive office of the President and tax 
advisor to King Hussein of Jordan. Heller introduced the forum by reiterating Robert 
Solow’s characterisation of Materials Balance as the economist’s approach to 
pollution. With this at the core of his presentation on economic growth, the concern 
over the conflict between this and the environment was thoroughly undermined, 
leaving Heller to conclude that: 
Much if not most of the environmental damage associated with growth is a 
function of the way we grow - of the nature of our technology and the forms of 
production. By prohibiting ecologically deadly or dangerous activities and forcing 
producers to absorb the cost of using air, water, and land areas for waste 
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disposal, growth technology and production can be redirected into 
environmentally more tolerable channels (Heller 1972:28). 
Following this he stated: 
Coupled with a conviction that economic growth can more than atone for its sins 
is a belief that its environmental vices can be diminished and its virtues magnified 
by greater use of the pricing system, by putting appropriate price tags on use of 
the public environment for private gain. (Heller 1972:29) 
Kneese, Ayres and D’Arge ended their Economics and the Environment with a 
postlude asking whether the approach raised once again the spectre of a new 
Malthusianism (Kneese, Ayres & D’Arge 1970:118). Contra to this, Heller’s clear 
exposition of the reconciliation of the growth of the economy and environmental 
sustainability would highlight how Materials Balance - with its notion of pollution as 
economic externality - underpinned the backlash against the Malthusianism of the 
Limits to Growth. In the popular press, the Yale economist Henry C. Wallich maintained 
in Newsweek that The Limits to Growth represented an attempt ‘to stop America dead 
in her tracks.’ (Wallich, quoted in Hamblin 2013:177).  
In the UK, The Times economics editor Peter Jay disparaged the ‘schoolboy 
howlers’ (1972) committed by the report, on precisely the basis that the pessimistic 
Malthusian claims made had long since been fatally undermined within the economics 
profession. Or more precisely, since the publication of Barnett & Morse’s Scarcity and 
Growth (1963). As the New York Times Review of the Limits to Growth put it, ‘Limits is 
not a “rediscovery of the laws of nature,” as the authors claim, but a “rediscovery of 
the oldest maxim of computer science: Garbage In, Garbage Out”’ (Passell, Roberts & 
Ross 1972; cited in Nafziger 2012:440). In the economics literature opposing critiques 
would shortly follow making use of the Materials Balance approach to the environment 
to indicate that any limits are purely economic and due to a failure to adequately price 
environmental resources and residuals . 61
 see e.g. Cole and Curnow (1973); Cole et al (1973); Solow (1973); Nordhaus (1974).61
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The Materials Balance approach, and its rehabilitation of the theory of externalities with 
respect to environmental pollution led here to an explicit reconciliation of the economy 
and the environment and the undermining of the Limits to Growth thesis. But if these 
two central objects of politics were no longer at odds, if the environment no longer 
supplied finite limits to growth, then how could the unprecedented increase in energy 
prices and concurrent economic slowdown at the beginning of the 1970s be 
accounted for? Fortunately a response to this was provided by the second topic of 
Sam Schurr’s Energy, Economic Growth, and the Environment forum. Not only was the 
forum interested in ‘the effects of energy use on the quality of the natural environment’ 
but also on ‘…the effects of environmental restrictions on energy costs and availability’ 
(Schurr 1972:viii).  
Papers by Phillip Sporn, the former president of the American Electric Power 
Company, and Richard Gonzalez, formerly of Humble Oil - who we have already 
encountered undermining M. King Hubbert’s Peak Oil Thesis in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s in chapter 4 - sought to provide evidence of the detrimental impact on 
economic growth of environmental regulations. Sporn argued that even assuming 
what he referred to as a low end estimate of cost increases due to environmental 
regulation of 25 percent, then the annual increase due to environmental regulations 
alone in the US’ electric energy bill by the year 2000 would amount to USD 32 billion, 
over one and a half times more than the total US electric energy bill of USD 20 billion in 
1969. As Sporn concluded: ‘When in 1776 Tom Paine said: “Tis dearness only, that 
gives everything its value,” he was speaking of freedom. But could he also have been 
prophetically alluding to the activities of his countrymen two centuries later in 
environmental control?’ (Sporn 1972:88). 
The US government would go about answering this rhetorical question in part through 
the initiation of ‘Project Independence’ in 1973. The linking of energy and 
environmental regulation had been a continual focus of the Nixon administration 
through the first few years of the 1970s (Mitchell 2011:191). On June 4th 1971, Nixon 
gave his landmark energy message to Congress, and this was reiterated in his later 
energy policy statement in April of 1973. Indeed, Nixon attempted on several 
occasions to institutionalise the relationship of energy and environmental regulation 
through the development of an energy and environment department, but this was 
continually rebuffed by a truculent Congress, resulting in the Nixon administration 
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implementing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with a sole environmental 
remit. And, as evidenced by its May 1973 conference on Managing the Environment, 
the EPA was rather more focused on the environmental impacts of the economy than 
the impacts of environmental regulation on economic growth. Finally then, this linkage 
was implemented with ‘Project Independence’ just two months before impeachment 
hearings began against the President, in part through the fusion of economic theory in 
the form of Materials Balance with the making fragile of the constructed system of 
energy by the oil industry at the beginning of the ‘environmental decade’. 
President Nixon would call for a new national endeavour in his Address to the Nation 
about Policies to Deal with the Energy Shortages on November 7th 1973: ‘Let us set as 
our national goal, in the spirit of Apollo, with the determination of the Manhattan 
Project, that by the end of this decade we will have developed the potential to meet 
our own energy needs without depending on any foreign energy sources’ (quoted in 
de Marchi 1981:448). ‘Project Independence’ as this endeavour was called was 
formally initiated by the Federal Energy Administration in March 1974 with the goal of 
evaluating the nation’s energy problems and developing a framework for a national 
energy policy.  
Outlining the alternative energy strategy of increased domestic energy supply in its 
executive summary, the FEA stated that ‘Potential water and environmental constraints 
would have to be overcome.’ (Project Independence: Executive Summary; reprinted in 
Grayson 1975: 33). Similarly, with respect to coal: ‘Production could be expanded 
greatly by 1985, but lower electric growth, increasing nuclear capacity and 
environmental restrictions limit this increase’ (Project Independence: Executive 
Summary; reprinted in Grayson 1975: 31). The Executive Summary was also clear 
about the perceived impact of the 1970 CAA requirements, and their prevention of the 
expansion of coal use, or even the maintenance of coal use at current levels: ‘Rather 
than stimulating coal use, current Clean Air Act requirements could, by mid-1975, 
preclude 225 million tons of coal now used in utilities’ (Project Independence: 
Executive Summary; reprinted in Grayson 1975: 32). 
President Ford’s own energy proposals in 1975 would follow Nixon’s lead and seek to 
re-establish the US’ prewar surplus capacity of total energy in order to end its 
vulnerability to economic disruption caused by restrictions to foreign (predominantly 
Middle Eastern) oil supply. The President’s interim measures included the development 
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of new sources of natural gas production, further expansion of ongoing programmes - 
including a massive increase in offshore oil production in Alaska - and the reinvigorated 
domestic production and use of coal. These would require significant scaling back of 
the federal oversight of energy production - Ford proposed deregulation of new natural 
gas production and an initiative to ‘decontrol’ the price of domestic oil (alongside the 
enactment of a windfall profit in a failed attempt to prevent the massive hike in prices 
that would result). It would also require the scaling back of environmental goals; and 
with specific respect to coal, the President stated that: 
Use of our most abundant domestic resource - coal - is severely limited. We 
must strike a reasonable compromise on environmental concerns with coal. I am 
submitting clean air amendments which will allow greater coal use without 
sacrificing clean air-goals. I vetoed the strip-mining legislation passed by the last 
Congress. With appropriate changes, I will sign a revised version when it comes 
to the White House. (Ford 1975; reprinted in Grayson 1975:24) 
He would go on to boldly outline his vision for a new energy programme: 
Within the next ten years, my program envisions: 200 major nuclear power 
plants, 250 major new coal mines, 150 major coal-fired power plants, 30 major 
new refineries, 20 major new synthetic fuel plants, the drilling of many thousands 
of new wells, the insulation of 18 million homes, and the manufacturing and sale 
of millions of new automobiles, trucks, and buses that use much less fuel. I 
happen to believe that we can do it… (Ford 1975; reprinted in Grayson 1975:24) 
The bringing together of energy and the environment and the subsequent 
demonisation of the latter for the apparent crisis in the former, was accompanied by 
the new environmental economics discipline undertaking more specific attacks on the 
new environmental regulations of the 1970s. As part of this response, the 1970 CAA 
came under attack almost immediately by economists ‘who urged that they be recast 
to work more flexibly through market incentives’ (Andrews 1984:58). As it became 
clear that there would be a widespread failure to meet CAA standards within the short 
deadlines given, this regulation was increasingly characterised as ineffective and 
politically unrealistic by economic commentators. Economic opinion articles in the early 
1970s began to urge that the technology-based standards of the CAA be replaced 
with incentive-based regulatory measures such as charges, taxes or marketable 
permits, whilst ignoring or heavily discounting any political or administrative difficulties 
that might be encountered in their implementation (Andrews 1984:58). By 1975, the 
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growth ban would become not only imminent, but immanent to environmental 
regulation. 
Environmental economics and the Clean Air Act’s growth ban 
The foundational environmental economics texts written in the early 1970s sought to 
establish a clear boundary between what would later be labelled ‘command-and-
control’  regulatory mechanisms and economic incentive based mechanisms to 62
environmental regulation, with the latter being ‘proved’, theoretically, to be the most 
efficient. This was undertaken by the reconstruction of the CAA as the archetypal 
command-and-control regulation. One of the most influential and widely cited texts 
was Kneese and Schultze’s (1975) Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy (Braadbaart 
1998:138; Kelman 1981:21) published by RFF. Alan Kneese’s prior accomplishments 
have been covered in some detail above and in the last chapter, and as indicated he 
wielded not inconsiderable influence. Similarly, Charles Schultze was the director of the 
Bureau of the Budget under Lyndon Johnson, and would later serve as the President 
of the Council of Economic Advisors from 1977 to 1980 (Kelman 1981:21).  
As Kelman notes with respect to Kneese & Schultze ‘… most of the book deals, not 
with any broader issues involved in the use of economic incentives in environmental 
policy, but with the unnecessary costs that a standard approach imposes’ (Kelman 
1981:22). Kneese and Schultze focused particularly on the potential impact of the New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) of the 1970 CAA on economic growth - taking 
this component of the regulatory apparatus as fundamentally indicative of the 
regulation as a whole, they criticised the entirety of the early 1970s environmental 
policies on two grounds (Braadbaart 1998:138). The first of these criticisms was with 
the focus on zero emissions targets, which Kneese and Schultze maintained were 
financially unattainable. The second was with the exclusive focus and reliance upon 
emissions and technology standards to the exclusion of either charges or incentive 
methods. 
 A term I believe was first used (at least in the academic and policy literature) actually later on, 62
by Charles schultze (1977).
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Both Seneca and Taussig (1974) and Baumol and Oates (1974) undertake a similar 
process with what they respectively refer to as ‘regulation and prohibition’ and ‘direct 
control’. In the case of the latter: ‘[A] direct control must involve a directive to individual 
decision makers requiring them to set one or more output or input quantities at some 
specified levels or prohibiting them from exceeding (or falling short of) some specified 
levels’ (Baumol & Oates 1975:153). Direct controls of this type are then argued to 
involve the costly and ultimately unwarranted expansion of federal expertise and 
capacity in terms of determining what is considered best technology and practice. 
That is, Seneca and Taussig and Baumol and Oates claim there is a duplication of 
private effort and expertise undertaken at the federal level and therefore an imposition 
of unnecessary cost.  
This reconstruction of the CAA, or perhaps more accurately, the NSPS of the CAA as 
archetypal command-and-control regulation enables these authors to make the case 
for the use of economic incentives drawing heavily from efficiency arguments 
(Braadbaart 1998:140) – where the economic incentives advocated at this point were 
predominantly limited to charges and taxes. As Kelman (1981:22) notes with respect 
to Kneese and Schultze, ‘most of the book deals, not with any broader issues involved 
in the use of economic incentives in environmental policy, but with the unnecessary 
costs that a standard approach imposes’. Summarising this process, Okke 
Braadbaart argues: 
…from the early 1970s onwards environmental economists developed an 
abstract version of the American Water and Air Act Amendments into a straw 
man. The opposition of incentives and regulations offered a perfect pedagogical 
vehicle for exposing the potential benefits of the policy approach championed by 
economists (Braadbaart 1998:140). 
The arguments developed within environmental economics were echoed within the 
CEQ’s yearly Environmental Quality reports. In the last chapter I noted that the first two 
Environmental Quality Reports stressed the importance of misplaced economic 
incentives in causing pollution, and the importance of not extending property rights in 
such a way as to give firms the apparent right to pollute. However, from 1973-1975, 
the reports began to display a much greater concern with the apparent costs of 
pollution abatement under the Federal environmental regulation in comparison to the 
reports from 1970-1972.  
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The Ford administration’s first report in 1973 discussed pollution damage avoidance 
and abatement costs, and transaction costs  (CEQ 1973). In 1975, the CEQ report 63
had shifted to a focus on the trade off between potential costs. The report noted that 
Federal laws had the principal effect of reducing damage and avoidance costs, but at 
the same time, increased abatement and transaction costs. Here, the report argued 
that the overall goal was to minimise all four (damage, avoidance, abatement and 
transaction) costs (CEQ 1975). The commensurability of these costs was enabled 
through the expansion of the economic valuation of environmental impacts, the 
reconstruction of the environment and environmental pollution under Materials Balance 
and the development of the growth ban as the CAA became the economic growth 
killing ‘command-and-control’ regulation. Or as Playboy magazine parodied it in 1975: 
And the Lord spake unto Moses, “There is both good news and bad news. The 
good news is that plagues shall smite your Egyptian oppressors. The Nile shall 
be turned to blood. Frogs and locusts shall cover the fields, and gnats and flies 
shall infest the Pharoah’s people. Their cattle shall die and rot in the pastures, 
and hail and darkness shall visit punishment upon the land of Egypt. Then will I 
lead the children of Israel forth, parting the waters of the Red Sea so that they 
may cross, and thereafter strewing the desert with manna so that they may eat.” 
And Moses said, “O Lord, that’s wonderful; but tell me, what’s the bad news?” 
And the Lord God replied, “it will be up to you, Moses, to write the environmental 
impact statement.” (Playboy 1975; cited in Liroff 1976:3) 
The economic impact of environmental regulation 
To follow Playboy’s biblical lead, the importance of the growth ban is not due to its 
apparent retelling of the parable of Paul on the Damascene road. The scales do not 
fall, suddenly, from the eyes of the environmental spaceman, revealing the underlying 
economic logic of pollution as externality, the necessity of economic growth, and the 
moribund nature of environmental regulations. But neither is this merely a fiction. 
Instead, an historically (and indeed geographically/spatially) specific technical-material 
world had to be constructed, comprised of lowered reserves calculations, energy 
 These being the costs of federal research and enforcement to achieve abatement, and 63
asserted that the goal of policy was to minimise all four types of cost (Andrews 1984:59).
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policies, environmental valuations through benefit-cost analysis, economic theories of 
externalities and Materials Balance, energy flows, and the constant innovation and 
proselytisation of Resources For the Future.  
Only following the Project Independence proposals, and the shifting emphasis within 
the CEQ and the development of the new discipline of environmental economics, did 
EPA administrator Russell Train pronounce in 1975 to Senator Muskie that the CAA 
could represent ‘a complete prohibition on new growth or expansion in non-attainment 
regions would pose very serious problems. The economic impact on certain urban 
areas of such a growth ban could be quite harmful’ (Train 1975; emphasis added). It is 
only at this point then, that we can see the impact of RFF’s transformation of the 
environment from a finite object antithetical to the economy in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, into one consonant with economic theory.  
The Materials Balance approach and the propagation of this through environmental 
and bureaucratic economics enabled environment and energy to be brought together 
in such a way that the historically observed pattern of increasing environmental 
degradation with increasing economic growth is made merely contingent. Pollution 
and overuse of resources could then be rendered as a correctable market failure as 
opposed to the rather more troubling (for contemporary economists and politicians) 
failure of markets. In short, economy and environment were put together in such a way 
as to allow, theoretically, the continued infinite growth of the former, and the pillorying 
of federal environmental regulation for its apparent negative economic impact. In this 
way, the regulatory response to pollution issues - most importantly the 1970 Clean Air 
Act (CAA) - was then reconstructed as one of the causes of the ongoing energy crisis. 
High energy prices, and the concomitant economic impact this was having were due 
not just to the ‘political’ intervention of OPEC (Mitchell 2011), but due to the impact of 
meeting costly environmental standards at home. In this way, Russell Train’s urgent 
concern with the economic impact of environmental regulation was born, and the 
1975 deadline for the attainment of air quality standards under the CAA was 
reconstructed into the looming and leering, imminent and immanent, ban on growth. 
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8. Conclusion: The Economy, energy, 	
	 environment and the nature of 	 	
	 growth

After 1975, the economy could grow all along. This bastardisation of Latour’s 
metaphysical whimsy  is intended to capture three crucial aspects of the 64
promiscuous history of postwar growth: First, the economy, energy and the 
environment had to be constituted, translated and retranslated over a quarter century 
period from the early 1950s in order that growth could come to be seen as 
paradigmatic (Dale 2011; Purdey 2010). Second, the objects are not simply defined by 
prematurely naturalised social laws. The inherent growth of the economy, the 
interchangeable set of power sources that comprise the system of energy, and the 
environment understood in metabolic terms with environmental pollution resulting from 
market failure, all have to be brought to the objects they apparently define. Third, these 
objects and the laws that both define them and determine their relations with each 
other are then retrojected back through historical time, and thereby presented as 
ahistorical, unchanging, mute causes. That is, the contemporary conceptions of the 
economy, or energy, or the environment are understood as having always existed, they 
just weren’t recognised as such.  
A striking example of this kind of peculiarly modern conception (Latour 1993b) can be 
seen in the work of economist Angus Maddison, who constructed Gross Domestic 
Product statistics for the world back to AD1000, in what Diane Coyle referred to 
unironically as an ‘extraordinary achievement’ (Coyle 2014:11). But this problematic 
 In Pandora’s Hope, Latour states that ‘After 1864 airborne germs were there all 64
along’ (Latour refers to the work of Louis Pasteur as not simply discovering pre-existing 
airborne germs in 1864, but co-constituting them as a new composite actor in the world 
retrojected back through time from 1864 on. I have neither the space nor indeed the 
competence to adequately explain what could easily appear as a merely vexatious metaphysics 
of time here, but Graham Harman explains this statement as follows: ‘[Latour] holds that the 
true reality of any moment in time is not something that slumbers beneath its surface 
articulations; rather, the moment is incarnated in those very articulations. To rethink the past for 
Latour means to produce an alternative version of the past retroactively, a time that never really 
existed at the moment in question’ (Harman 2009:84; emphasis in original).
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retrojection of contemporary conceptual categories is also present in the work of 
critical scholars, and both Elmar Altvater (2006) and E.A. Wrigley (2010) make claims 
regarding the absence of economic growth prior to the exploitation of fossil fuels and 
the industrial revolution. As I argued earlier in this thesis, specifically contemporary 
conceptions of growth do not map straightforwardly or unproblematically onto material 
progress prior to the development of the concept of the economy - constructed 
according to Mitchell from the 1930s through to the 1950s (e.g. Mitchell 1998). This 
separates historical description from ahistorical conceptual explanation, rendering the 
former as ‘mere’ description, and limiting historical analysis to the social, political and 
technical imaginary of the present (Knafo 2010). 
The composition of the economy, energy and the environment, their definition 
according to inherent laws, and their subsequent projection back though historical 
time are involved in the development of the postwar ‘growth paradigm’. This is then a 
‘law of the social world’ (Latour 2005) that does not explain the great acceleration, but 
instead has to be explained as a fundamental part of that process of changing human-
environmental relations. Again, and to reiterate from the introduction of this thesis, 
these apparently cold, dumb objects of politics - the economy, energy, and the 
environment, defined and driven by natural ‘laws of the social world’, are nothing of the 
sort: 
They are not behind the scene, above our heads and before the action, but 
after the action, below the participants and smack in the foreground. They 
don’t cover, nor encompass, nor gather, nor explain; they circulate, they 
format, they standardize, they coordinate, they have to be explained. (Latour 
2005:246; emphasis in original) 
This thesis has focused on tracing precisely the circulation, formatting, standardisation 
and ultimate coordination of the economy, energy and the environment through a 
roughly twenty-five-year period. This approach brings to light the work that was 
required to enable the great acceleration, the ways in which this work resulted in 
unintended consequences and new forms of contestation, and the historical specificity 
of the innovations and technical developments that lay at the heart of contemporary 
environmental governance.  
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This contemporary form of governance, prefaced upon the market-based 
management of the environment, spread from its US beginnings to became the 
prevailing framework for global and national environmental governance programmes 
(McAfee 2012); and since 2007 the concepts of ‘green growth’ and the ‘green 
economy’ have come to occupy prominent positions in the policy discourse of 
international economic and development institutions (e.g. World Bank 2012, OECD 
2012, UNEP 2011). Alongside this, the creation of new institutions such as the Global 
Green Growth Institute in 2012, the establishment of a Green Growth Knowledge 
Platform, various fora and explicit commitments to green growth as a policy objective 
at G20 summits and the UN’s 2012 Rio+20 meeting are helping to ensure that green 
growth is firmly established, at least rhetorically, within the global political economy.  
While interpretations and differences between the various organisations’ use of the 
terms green growth and green economy vary, the core meaning is simply stated: ‘It is 
economic growth (growth of gross domestic product or GDP) which also achieves 
significant environmental protection.’ (Jacobs 2012:4). Environmental pollution in 
general and climate change in particular are understood here as market failures. Lord 
Stern made this point clearly with respect to the latter in his famed 2006 report when 
he claimed that ‘Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the 
greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen’ (Stern 2006:i). That is, 
greenhouse gases are simply inadequately internalised externalities of production. 
Given this understanding, it is imperative, as EU Commissioner for Climate Action 
Connie Hedegaard maintained in 2011, to undertake action on climate change through 
the implementation of policies that do not impede economic growth and therefore 
enable greenhouse gas emissions to be cut at least cost (Hedegaard 2011). 
This approach to environmental degradation and the growth of the economy form the 
clearly espoused and firmly entrenched mainstream perspective on the political 
economy of the environment, and as such has been subject to a broad excoriation 
from a catholic church of critique. In spite of the claimed potential for decoupling, the 
possibility of green growth, and the development of a green economy, history very 
clearly indicates that there is little evidence for this possibility as anything other than an 
economic philosopher’s stone (Koch 2012:123-128). In 2006, the ecomarxist critic 
Elmar Altvater wrote that the idea that we are living in increasingly virtual, information 
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based and financialised economies, decoupled from energy and material throughput is 
a myth. Or as he also more rudely put it, following Harry Frankfurt, the concept of 
decoupling is nothing but ‘bullshit’ (Altvater 2006:37).  
For Altvater, the contemporary capitalist political economy is based upon the use of 
energy dense fossil fuels. Altvater argued that apparent productivity and efficiency 
gains are a kind of accounting sleight of hand that hide the massive increases in the 
use of energy from these fuels, and that if you take into account Energy Return On 
Energy Input (EROEI), then since the industrial revolution in the late 18th century, what 
we have actually witnessed has been a steady reduction in overall energy efficiency 
(Altvater 2006:39-40). As I have already shown in chapter 5, nearly forty years before 
Altvater, Kenneth Boulding stated that with respect to the growth of the economy: 
‘Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a 
madman or an economist.’ (U.S. Congress 1973). 
Bullshit espoused by madmen or economists. While I don’t disagree with this overall 
assessment, this critique of decoupling and the fallacy of exponential economic growth 
overlooks - as I argued in chapter 2 - precisely what is historically unique about the 
postwar milieu and the great acceleration. By orienting my analysis around the Paley 
Commission and then the think tank Resources For the Future - instituted in order to 
continue work on the economics of natural resources under the ‘Paley approach’ - I 
have been able to focus on the series of translations required in order to stabilise 
growth as a postwar paradigm.  
This series of translations began, as I argued in chapter 3, with the impact of the newly 
born economy in the immediate aftermath of the second world war. The end of the 
war brought with it a resurgent fear of depression, stoked in the US by the economics 
profession under the influence of Alvin Hansen. Depression and then national security 
fears at the beginning of the cold war resulted in the question of growth becoming 
prevalent. Could the US economy grow? Will the US economy grow? Here the work of 
Frederick Dewhurst played a central role in helping both to further write the economy 
into history for the first time, and then bringing about a neo-Malthusian concern with its 
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growth. This concern was addressed by the Paley Commission at the beginning of the 
1950s.  
The Commission developed a novel approach to the issue of material scarcity and 
reserves calculations, giving practical import to the concept of scarcity developed as 
an ‘open-ended myth’ (Xenos 1989:14) by the neoclassical economists and 
popularised, at least with respect to economics textbooks, by Lionel Robbins in 1932. 
Further developing this approach, Resources For the Future helped secure the 
economy as a discrete ontological object, capable of, and indeed defined by, the 
capacity for infinite growth. Eventually, as Walker notes, material scarcity was ‘quietly 
abolished as a fundamental constraint upon economies’ (Walker 2007:179) and with 
the release of Scarcity and Growth (Barnett & Morse 1963), the stage was set for the 
elaboration of growth theory, development economics and resource economics and 
their continued use within US domestic and foreign policy throughout the years of the 
cold war. 
The ability, and indeed the need, for growth during the cold war went hand in hand 
with the development of the system of energy to power this growth. In chapter 4 I 
investigated how the initial development of energy as an interrelated system 
threatened the continued profits of the oil industry, and how this threat was later 
translated into an opportunity for further expansion by oil companies, particularly the 
large international conglomerates.  
By the end of the second world war, oil was the world’s most important traded 
commodity, and its flows - predominantly from the Middle East - would come to fuel 
parallel but opposite flows of money within the financial architecture developed at 
Bretton Woods. The ‘Peak Oil’ Thesis of oil geologist M. King Hubbert in 1956 was 
seen as a threat by both domestic US oil producers and American owned international 
oil majors. An imminent peak and then rapid reduction in US oil reserves would have 
meant that historic government price and production supports in the form of a variety 
of tax allowances, quota limitations and transportation restrictions under the 1935 
Connally Hot Oil Act, would no longer be supportable. Increasing oil scarcity would 
have resulted in increasing attention, and crucially Federal support, to alternative 
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power sources in order to maintain the overall levels of energy required for the 
necessary growth of the economy.  
This threat was overcome by the further application of the ‘Paley approach’ to oil 
reserves calculations. The application of economic accounts of scarcity enabled 
previously unimagined amounts of oil to be ‘discovered’, hidden not in the porous 
rocks of the earth, but in the apparently faulty calculations of oil geologists. The 
application of economic scarcity and the concomitant alchemists’ belief in ‘technology’ 
enabled new mandatory US government quotas that supported oil prices worldwide 
and enabled the vast expansion of oil through the 1950s and 1960s. The resultant 
oversupply of oil in the 1960s and the fall in price on the European markets resulted in 
the oil industry diversifying into alternative forms of fuel production and developing the 
energy industry proper, as well as unifying oil producing countries in an attempt to 
protect their own tax revenues by forming the Oil Producing and Exporting Cartel 
(OPEC). At the same time, Resources For the Future helped constitute both the history 
and the future of this never before existing industry through its inscription into 
economic theory.  
While chapters 3 and 4 traced how the economy was first stabilised as an object 
capable of infinite growth, and then how this growth was apparently assured through 
the parallel construction of a system of energy, in chapter 5, I looked at how these 
developments provoked an oppositional response - in the form of the environment as 
finite, bounded and defined by limits - and the development of benefit-cost analysis 
was a key innovation here. Initially a technique developed by the Army Corps of 
Engineers to evaluate waterway construction projects, this limited tool, developed by 
engineers, would be translated ultimately into a portable economic decision 
technology. This was undertaken first through the inclusion of ‘intangible factors’ to 
enable analyses to be brought to bear on the growth and development of the national 
economy as a whole, and later through the translation of benefit-cost analysis into 
postwar welfare economics theory - largely through the work of RFF, at the end of the 
1950s.  
The overriding focus on the economic efficiency of benefit-cost analysis resulted in it 
becoming a target for the newly reconstituted conservationist movement from the mid 
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1950s until the end of the ‘big dam’ era in 1965 (Billington Jr. et al 2005: 383). 
Alongside this conservationist backlash, pollution became a pervasive issue during the 
1960s, and a 1966 RFF forum provided the arena within which economist Kenneth 
Boulding would launch his concept of the Spaceship Earth. The response to these 
developments from the late 1960s involved both the growth of limits - in the form of 
new federal environmental regulations at the beginning of the 1970s, but also the 
famed Limits to Growth (1972) report and the development of a popular antigrowth 
sensibility.  
In this last chapter, I focused on how the economy, energy and the environment were 
brought together in new ways from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Here, the growth 
of the economy was once again secured and installed as a primary political concern in 
response to the challenge of the antigrowth movement of the early 1970s and as a 
means for both the economics discipline and later administrations to counter the 
expansion of federal environmental regulation initiated by the Nixon Presidency. During 
the late 1960s the previously secure system of energy was made to look increasingly 
fragile and crisis ridden.  
This reconstruction was undertaken by the oil industry in order to raise energy prices in 
general, and involved the rehabilitation of Hubbert’s Peak Oil Thesis - previously 
challenged by the oil industry and the United States Geological Survey under Vincent 
McKelvey. New, lower estimates of natural gas, then oil, were produced as they were 
no longer needed to underwrite US domestic price supports. Indeed, higher estimates 
would have undermined the justification of price hikes which occurred after the events 
that would come to be run together as the 1973-1974 OPEC oil embargo. Alongside 
this, economists, particularly those associated with RFF, reconstituted the environment 
in the image of economic theory.  
The spread of benefit-cost technology through the federal government, the expansion 
of economic valuation and the rehabilitation of the concept of externalities through the 
development of the Materials Balance approach enabled the economics discipline to 
reassert itself with respect to environmental concerns. Under this approach the 
environment was reconstructed as no longer at odds with the economy, and this 
enableed the construction of new limits to growth in the form of Federally mandated 
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environmental regulation. In this way the infinite growth of the economy was 
constituted as no longer a threat to a finite global ecology, and was presented instead 
as the surest means to safeguard it. 
As summarised in a recent Resources For the Future book on the development of 
pollution emissions trading mechanisms by Blas Pérez Henríquez - the Director of the 
Center for Environmental Public Policy at Berkeley - the ‘regulatory 
unreasonableness’ (Bardach & Kagan, 1982) of the uniform air quality standards 
developed under the 1970 CAA imposed an unacceptable cost burden to the US’ 
energy and manufacturing industries and resulted in numerous areas of the country 
failing to attain the National Air Ambient Quality Standards (NAAQSs) required by the 
regulations by the 1975 deadline. Pérez Henríquez goes on to state: ‘With the growth 
ban coming into effect for these areas, and with high compliance costs for those trying 
to reduce emissions, economic development was clearly being hampered by 
environmental regulation’ (2013:51). For Pérez  Henríquez, these developments 
provided both the political demand, and the opportunity, for air pollution regulatory 
reform in the US. For example, a 1975 US Senate report on air pollution control 
identified several deficiencies with the then current regulations, where ‘[t]he underlying 
argument was that only regulatory relief from the stringent CAA framework through a 
market-based regulatory approach would permit the US to avoid growth 
stagnation.’ (Pérez Henríquez, 2013:51-52).  
Aside from being factually incorrect with respect to this last point on the 1975 Senate 
report , the promiscuous history undertaken through this thesis indicates that contra 65
Pérez Henríquez, there was, in fact, nothing clear about this process, nor the twenty-
five-year history that led up to it. Constant processes of translation were required 
throughout the postwar years in order to constitute the growth of the economy as a 
settled law. Multiple economic innovations, implementations and readjustments, as 
well as the institutionalisation of entirely new sub-disciplines were undertaken, and 
Resources For the Future was at the heart of this history. Overall, the great 
acceleration as a unique, and indeed ongoing period in history is best understood not 
through the unveiling, but through the making, of the nature of growth. 
 Cook (1988:35), who Pérez Henríquez cites here, makes clear that this report was on 65
deficiencies that the Congress had attempted to rectify in 1970.
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